Apache Karaf's instance-management service (InstanceServiceImpl) builds the command line used to launch a child Karaf JVM by string concatenation, then executes it through /bin/sh (Unix) or cscript (Windows). The caller-supplied javaOpts value is spliced into that string unquoted. A javaOpts value containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $(...)) is interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to the JVM as an option, giving arbitrary OS command execution as the Karaf process user. Reachable via the shell commands instance:create, instance:start, instance:restart, instance:change-opts, and the equivalent InstanceMBean JMX operations (createInstance, startInstance, changeJavaOpts, cloneInstance). Mitigation * Set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties to close the fail-open gap for all unconfigured command scopes. * Restrict which principals can reach instance:* commands and InstancesMBean via etc/users.properties role assignments. * Treat javaOpts passed to instance:create/instance:start/instance:change-opts/InstancesMBean as untrusted input only from fully-trusted operators.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 1
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/olzy0yjw82b20w59vonfjr1x7v5yzocr Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 8.8 · apacheNVD modified 2026-10-08 19:19
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 2
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/olzy0yjw82b20w59vonfjr1x7v5yzocr Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/3 Mailing List, Third Party Advisory