Vulnerabilities
All
My stack
Known exploited
Public exploit
Critical (9+)
Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%)
Changed, 24 h
New, 24 h
Sort:
risk
modified
published
CVSS
EPSS
| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-120345 | 10.0 critical | — | wavlink, wn551x3-a | A vulnerability was found in WAVLINK WN551X3-A M51X3_V251020-WO-182e965. This impacts the function sub_41a430 of the file /bin/ioos of the component DNS Resolution Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument data results in os command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure. | 6 h ago |
| CVE-2026-120312 | 8.7 high | — | jovancoding, network-ai | Network-AI from 5.13.4 before 5.15.5 contains a path traversal vulnerability in AgentVCR that allows attackers controlling the cassette name to read or write arbitrary .json files. Attackers can pass traversal sequences to load() or save() to disclose sensitive JSON data or overwrite policy files such as AuthGuardian trust-level configuration. | 9 h ago |
| CVE-2026-95863 | 7.6 high | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in Apache Wicket. Apache Wicket generates JavaScript that refers to the elements it renders, and writes into that JavaScript two values it derives itself: a component's markup id, and the input name of a form component, which is built from component ids. Both are placed inside single-quoted JavaScript string literals without being escaped for that context, so a value containing a single quote or a backslash ends the literal, and what follows is parsed as script and runs in the application's origin when the page loads. A markup id is the value passed to org.apache.wicket.Component#setMarkupId(String), or the id attribute written in the component's markup, or an id Wicket generates, in that order. The first two are supplied by the application in an HTML context, where both characters are legal and where Wicket escapes them correctly when it writes the same value into the id attribute of the element; a generated id cannot contain either. An input name is derived from the ids of the components between the form and the form component, and a component id was rejected only for ':' and '~'. In org.apache.wicket:wicket-core on 9.x and 10.x, org.apache.wicket.markup.head.OnEventHeaderItem#forMarkupId(String, String, CharSequence) quotes the id it is given into a Wicket.Event.add call, and components in both wicket-core and wicket-extensions reach it through #forComponent(Component, String, CharSequence). On every affected version, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form writes its markup id and the id of its hidden-fields container into such literals, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.FormComponentUpdatingBehavior writes an input name, and org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.MultiFileUploadField writes two markup ids and an input name. On 8.x, Form also writes an input name into the action of a submitting link, and on 8.x and 9.x Form#appendDefaultButtonField writes an input name into a name attribute with no escaping at all, so a value containing a double quote escapes the attribute into markup. org.apache.wicket:wicket-extensions is affected in its own right and not only through wicket-core: AjaxEditableLabel, AjaxIndicatorAppender, AjaxDisableComponentListener, UploadProgressBar, KittenCaptchaPanel, Palette, FilterForm and, on 9.x and 10.x, TrapFocusBehavior and AjaxListPanel each build their own JavaScript containing a markup id. An application is affected where a markup id or a component id carries one of those characters. Wicket does not put one there itself, so the value comes from the application: an id set on a component, an id attribute in a template, or a component id derived from data. None of those is a JavaScript context from the application's point of view. The Content-Security-Policy that Apache Wicket 9.x and 10.x send by default does not prevent this. The generated script is written into a script element carrying the per-response nonce, so the injected code is part of a script the policy admits. The fixed versions check an id where it enters instead of escaping each place it is written. A component id and a markup id may no longer contain a quote, a backquote, a backslash, braces, angle brackets, a semicolon, an ampersand or a control character, and a markup id may not contain parentheses or square brackets either; a component constructed with such an id, or given such a markup id, fails with an exception. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 12 h ago |
| CVE-2026-84231 | 7.4 high | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.ExternalLink builds a JavaScript click handler and writes it into the tag's onclick attribute whenever the markup tag the component is bound to is not an a, link or area element. The URL held in the component's model is concatenated into a single-quoted JavaScript string literal in that handler without being escaped for that context. The same happens on the neighbouring branch, taken when popup settings are attached, where the value is concatenated into the window.open() call built by org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.PopupSettings#getPopupJavaScript(). The only escaping applied is the markup escaping that every attribute value receives as the tag is written, which replaces an apostrophe with a character reference. A browser decodes character references in an attribute value before it compiles the event handler, so the apostrophe is restored, closes the string literal, and the rest of the model value is executed as script in the application's origin. An application is affected where it binds an ExternalLink to a markup tag that is not an anchor, such as a button or a span, and the URL in the model holds data an attacker can influence, which is the ordinary use of the component rather than a misuse of it. Nothing runs until a user activates the element. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, which fixes the issue. | 12 h ago |
| CVE-2026-83559 | 7.4 high | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Improper encoding or escaping of output in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.core.util.string.JavaScriptUtils#escapeQuotes() replaces each single quote in its input with a backslash and a single quote, and each double quote with a backslash and a double quote, so that the value can be placed inside a JavaScript string literal. It does not escape the backslash, which is the character that has to be escaped, and escaped first, for the rest of that escaping to hold. A value that already holds a backslash immediately before a quote therefore ends up with two backslashes in front of that quote: the first escapes the second, the quote itself is left unescaped, and it closes the literal. Whatever the value carries after that point is no longer text but JavaScript, and it runs in the application's origin and in the session of the user looking at the page. The method is public, is not deprecated, and its documentation states that its result can be part of a JavaScript call such as an alert; the only limitation it notes concerns JSON values, which need different escaping. An application is affected wherever it calls the method itself and places the result inside a JavaScript string literal, from its own code or from a component of its own or of a third party, and the value it escapes holds data an attacker can influence. There is no further condition, and no component of Wicket has to be involved: the application is using the method for what its documentation offers, and the method does not deliver it. Two components shipped with Wicket Extensions pass a value through the method. org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.markup.html.AjaxEditableLabel writes the editor's first error feedback message into a single-quoted JavaScript string literal in the Ajax response, so an application is affected through that component where the message shown for a failed edit holds data an attacker can influence, whether that is the submitted value itself or another variable the application sets on the validation error. A validation message can carry the submitted value, because input is a message variable that every form component supplies for its own validation errors, and the documentation shows overriding a validator's message to include it; none of the message bundles shipped with Wicket interpolates it, so an application that has not written such a message is not affected through this component. org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.markup.html.repeater.AjaxListPanel passes the serialized markup tag of an appended component through the method and is not affected: the tag comes from the panel's own markup file, and a quote in any of its attribute values, the component's markup id included, is written as a character reference by the tag serialization and cannot close the literal. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 13 h ago |
| CVE-2026-83539 | 7.4 high | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Improper neutralization of input during web page generation in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.basic.SmartLinkLabel and org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.basic.SmartLinkMultiLineLabel display a text value and turn any URL they find in it into a hyperlink. Both escape the model value and then hand the escaped text to org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.basic.DefaultLinkParser, which searches it for anything of the form scheme://rest and wraps each match in an anchor whose href is the matched text, copied in as it is. The pattern accepts any scheme, and there is no list of permitted schemes anywhere on the path. A text value naming a scheme that executes script therefore becomes an anchor that executes it, in the application's origin and in the reader's own session, when the reader clicks the link. Rendering the page is not enough on its own; the link has to be activated. Escaping does not prevent this and is not the issue: the characters the payload needs are all valid in a URL and are ones that org.apache.wicket.util.string.Strings#escapeMarkup() leaves alone, and the value ends up in a URL rather than in element text, which is a context that escaping model data does not make safe. An application is affected where it renders text it received through either of these two components. That is what they are for: they exist to linkify email addresses and web URLs found in the data an application is displaying, so untrusted input is the purpose of the feature rather than a misuse of it, and no unusual configuration is involved. No other component uses this parser, and an application that uses neither SmartLinkLabel nor SmartLinkMultiLineLabel is not affected. On 9.x and 10.x the Content-Security-Policy Wicket sends by default admits script only from a source carrying a per-response nonce, and a URL whose scheme executes script cannot carry one, so that default policy stops the script from running. This is a property of the default policy and not of these components. An application that has weakened or disabled its Content-Security-Policy, for this or for any unrelated reason, is affected in full. Wicket 8.x has no Content-Security-Policy support at all and is affected as it stands. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 13 h ago |
| CVE-2026-84177 | 6.3 medium | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Incorrect behavior order in Apache Wicket: a file path is validated before the framework appends the attributes that complete it. org.apache.wicket.request.resource.PackageResource asks the configured package resource guard about a path built from the scope class' package and the file name in the request URL, and then hands that same path to the resource stream locator together with a style, a variation and a locale. Those three attributes are decoded from the name of the first query parameter and never appear in the string the guard was given. org.apache.wicket.core.util.resource.locator.ResourceNameIterator appends them to that path, each preceded by an underscore, in the order variation, style, locale, before the file extension, so the file that is opened is not the file the guard approved. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.PackageResourceGuard decides whether an HTML file is a component's markup template by looking for a class file of the same name beside it, stripping one underscore-delimited suffix at a time as it goes. HTML is on the default allow list, so that check is the only thing separating a static HTML file, which may be served, from a markup template, which may not. Asked about the name of a template, the guard refuses it correctly. Asked about a shorter name for which no class exists, it accepts, and a style supplied in the URL then completes that name into the markup template of a component class, which is written to the response. An application is affected if the simple name of any of its component classes contains an underscore and no shorter part of that name is itself a class, such as Report_v2 or Wizard_Step1; an application with no such class name is not affected. No unusual deployment, packaging or configuration is required, and running in deployment rather than development mode does not prevent it. Java naming conventions discourage underscores in class names and no module Wicket ships has one, so no framework markup is exposed; what an application exposes this way is its own. A component whose class name has no underscore is not reachable, and neither is its localized or styled markup, because the guard finds the class file under the base name and refuses the request. The attributes cannot change the file extension and cannot leave the component's package, so nothing beyond HTML files in that package is reachable. Access is read-only, and what is disclosed is developer-authored template content: component structure, developer comments, markup that is rendered only under some conditions, inline script, and the endpoints a template names. No user data, credential or session material is reachable this way. An attacker has to name a class in the target package and the component itself, and Wicket writes fully qualified class names into the URL of every package resource it renders. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 13 h ago |
| CVE-2026-84172 | 6.3 medium | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Files accessible to external parties in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.PackageResourceGuard decides whether a file on the classpath may be streamed to a client as a package resource. HTML is on the default allow list, so the only thing that separates a static HTML file, which may be served, from a component's markup template, which may not, is a check for a class file of the same name beside it. That check calls getResource() on the class loader that loaded wicket-core. The resource itself is reached through different class loaders: the scope class is resolved through the application's IClassResolver, which uses the thread context class loader, and org.apache.wicket.core.util.resource.ClassPathResourceFinder#find() then tries the scope class' own loader, the context class loader, and the wicket-core loader last. Where wicket-core is loaded by a class loader that cannot see the application's classes, the check finds no class file, concludes the file is not a component markup template, and serves it. A request for the package resource URL of a component class then returns that component's markup template with status 200. What is disclosed is developer-authored template content: component structure, developer comments, markup that is rendered only under some conditions, inline script, and the endpoints a template names. Access is read-only, and no user data, credential or session material is reachable this way. Such a deployment is rare. The ordinary packaging, a web archive with wicket-core in WEB-INF/lib, puts the framework and the application in one class loader, so the check finds the class file and the template is refused; those deployments are not affected. The exposure is confined to deployments that give wicket-core a class loader which cannot see the application's component classes: wicket-core placed in a servlet container's shared library directory, in an enterprise archive library directory with the application in the web archive, as an application server global module, or as an OSGi bundle, where wicket-core's bundle cannot resolve a class held by an application bundle. Markup shipped by Wicket's own modules, and by any other code sharing a class loader with wicket-core, remains protected. An attacker has to name a component class, and Wicket writes fully qualified class names into the URL of every package resource it renders. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 13 h ago |
| CVE-2026-82705 | 6.3 medium | — | apache software foundation, apache wicket | Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy declares isResourceAuthorized(), and that method has a single enforcement point in the framework: org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, the handler that serves a resource reached through a mounted or shared ResourceReference. Components that are handed an org.apache.wicket.request.resource.IResource instance instead call IResource#respond() themselves from their own request listener and never construct that handler. In wicket-core these are org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.ResourceLink, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.image.Image and org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.ImageButton; in wicket-extensions it is org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.AjaxDownloadBehavior. A resource restricted by a custom isResourceAuthorized() implementation, or by an @AuthorizeResource annotation from wicket-auth-roles, is therefore enforced when it is requested through its own resource URL and is not enforced when the same instance is served through the component that holds it. Which of the two happens is decided by the constructor the application used, and not by anything the application can see in the rendered page. ResourceLink(String, ResourceReference) renders a resource URL and the request is authorized; ResourceLink(String, IResource) renders a component listener URL and it is not. Image, ImageButton and AjaxDownloadBehavior each offer the same pair of constructors and behave the same way. Image and ImageButton write that listener URL into the src attribute of the tag they render, so a browser requests it without any action by the user, and the resource an Image serves may also come from the component's model. An application is affected where it restricts a resource through IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized() or an @AuthorizeResource annotation and then hands that same resource to one of those components as an IResource. An application that does not restrict resources at all is not affected, and neither is a resource that is only mounted or registered as a shared resource. The pattern does not have to be written by the application itself: org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.repeater.data.table.export.ExportToolbar builds each of its export links from an IResource instance, so the exported contents of a data table are served without the resource check in any application that adds that toolbar. As a workaround, register the resource in the application's shared resources and pass the resulting ResourceReference to the component instead of the IResource, so that the request is routed through the handler that consults the authorization strategy. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | 13 h ago |
| CVE-2026-18800 | 4.4 medium | — | wso2, wso2 api manager, wso2 traffic manager, wso2 api control plane | When an Event Publisher output adapter is configured with properties that are irrelevant to its function, the affected products log these irrelevant properties. This can inadvertently include sensitive user credentials or other confidential information depending on the nature of the misconfigured property. A malicious actor with access to the 'wso2carbon' log files could retrieve sensitive information logged by the system. This may potentially lead to unauthorized access if the logged data contains credentials or other critical secrets. | 56 min ago |
| CVE-2026-120310 | 2.3 low | — | parse-community, parse-server | Parse Server before 8.6.109 and 9.0.0 before 9.10.6-alpha.1 returns stored field values in object update responses without checking read access, so clients whose class-level permissions or object ACLs allow update but not read can see object data. Attackers can update such objects to read atomic operation results (Increment, Add, AddUnique, Remove), Cloud Code trigger-set values, and, for dot notation keys under certain conditions, the whole stored parent field. | 9 h ago |
| CVE-2026-117680 | 2.1 low | — | lud, jsv | Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in the pattern and patternProperties keywords in lud jsv allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass schema validation via a string that matches a schema regex only after heavy backtracking. JSV.Helpers.RegexExt.bounded_match?/2 runs schema regexes with a backtracking budget but calls :re.run/3 without :report_errors, so a match that exhausts the budget returns the same :nomatch as a real non-match. A key that matches a patternProperties regex is then checked against additionalProperties or not at all, and a string that matches a not subschema with a pattern is accepted. Before the budget existed, Regex.match?/2 failed the same way at Erlang's default match limit. Only schemas whose regex explores a catastrophic branch before the branch that matches are affected. The attacker controls the data, not the schema, and linear patterns never exhaust the budget. This issue affects jsv: from 0.1.0 before 0.26.2. | 21 h ago |
| CVE-2026-118504 | unscored | 0.00% | gitea | The web interface blocks issue and pull request changes on archived repositories, but several issue routes of the REST API did not check whether the repository is archived. A user allowed to change issues of an archived repository could use the API to edit, close or delete issues, change labels and deadlines, add or delete tracked time and stopwatches, add reactions, change issue blocks, and pin issues, altering data that archiving is meant to freeze. Gitea 28.2.0 added the check to the issue edit, delete and label routes; Gitea 28.3.0 applies it to all modifying repository API requests. | Sun 1 Nov |
| CVE-2026-117677 | unscored | 0.00% | gitea | When parsing an uploaded Helm chart, Gitea decompressed the archive and read every tar entry while looking for `Chart.yaml` without limiting the decompressed size, and did so before the package size quota was checked; the quota only considers the compressed upload size. A user with package write access to an owner, for example their own account on an instance with open registration, could repeatedly upload small, highly compressed archives that make the server spend CPU time proportional to the decompressed size, degrading the availability of the Gitea instance. The issue does not allow code execution or data access. | Sun 1 Nov |
14 of 14
Download these 14 as CSV · subscribe to this list.
EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.