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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63377 | 9.8 critical | — | fctr-id, okta-ai-agent | TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, `POST /api/auth/setup` in `src/api/routers/auth.py` allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The `initial_setup` function checks only the `is_setup` completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the `Dockerfile` starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and `src/api/main.py` mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes `create_auth_user` with `UserRole.ADMIN` and `set_auth_cookie`, issuing a valid `fctr_session` JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta. | 2 h ago |
| CVE-2026-62331 | 8.2 high | — | mtzanidakis, praktor | praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1. | 5 h ago |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.