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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-120307 | 9.9 critical | — | beam-cloud, beta9 worker | The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source. | 18 h ago |
| CVE-2026-74245 | 5.9 medium | 0.00% | red hat, red hat openshift update service, red hat quay 3 | A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata. | Sun 1 Nov |
| CVE-2026-116296 | unscored | 0.00% | gitea | The API routes for releases, release assets, milestones and repository labels did not reject changes to archived repositories. A user with write access to an archived repository, or a holder of such a user's write-scoped token, could replace or delete release assets while keeping their download URLs, delete releases and tags, and create, edit or delete milestones and labels of a repository that is meant to be read-only. Changing requests on these routes now return 423 Locked for archived repositories. | 18 h ago |
| CVE-2026-113429 | unscored | 0.00% | gitea | Legacy (v1 to v3) Actions artifact uploads stored the request's `Content-Encoding` header unchecked in the column that is served as the artifact's `Content-Type` on download, and a value starting with `video/` or `audio/` also removed the sandboxing Content-Security-Policy. A user who can run an Actions job could upload an artifact that a browser renders as HTML on the Gitea origin when the direct artifact download URL is opened, and the URL is reachable anonymously on public repositories. A victim who opens the link runs the attacker's script with their own session, which for an administrator means control of the instance. Legacy uploads now store only the `gzip` marker, and the special serve headers are chosen only for valid media types. | 21 h ago |
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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.