Vulnerabilities
All
My stack
Known exploited
Public exploit
Critical (9+)
Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%)
Changed, 24 h
New, 24 h
Sort:
risk
modified
published
CVSS
EPSS
| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-38429 | 10.0 critical | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bus: mhi: ep: Update read pointer only after buffer is written Inside mhi_ep_ring_add_element, the read pointer (rd_offset) is updated before the buffer is written, potentially causing race conditions where the host sees an updated read pointer before the buffer is actually written. Updating rd_offset prematurely can lead to the host accessing an uninitialized or incomplete element, resulting in data corruption. Invoke the buffer write before updating rd_offset to ensure the element is fully written before signaling its availability. | 23 h ago |
| CVE-2026-40573 | 8.6 high | — | minecanton209, novumos | NovumOS is a custom 32-bit operating system written in Zig and x86 Assembly. Prior to version 0.25-beta.1, the `Nova` interpreter runs in Ring 0 with unrestricted kernel-memory access. Loading a malicious `.nv` script through the shell permits a local user to execute code with kernel privileges without security checks. The advisory identifies VM initialization in `zig/nova/vm.zig` as the affected component; script execution is not isolated in a restricted Ring 3 privilege domain. This issue is fixed in version 0.25-beta.1. | 15 h ago |
| CVE-2024-46765 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: protect XDP configuration with a mutex The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_x ---truncated--- | 23 h ago |
| CVE-2026-62864 | 7.5 high | — | ring-clojure, ring | Ring is a Clojure web applications library inspired by Python's WSGI and Ruby's Rack. Prior to 1.15.5, `wrap-nested-params` in the `ring.middleware.nested-params` namespace uses a backtracking regular expression to match parameter names from URL query strings and HTTP request bodies. An attacker can craft a parameter name that drives quadratic O(n^2) matching work, causing regular-expression denial of service in applications using the middleware. `Ring-Defaults` users are also exposed because nested-params is enabled by default. Applications omitting the middleware do not expose this parsing path. This issue is fixed in version 1.15.5. | 15 h ago |
| CVE-2026-78048 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | A reachable-assertion flaw in the HPACK header-compression decoder of the HTTP/2 (h2/gRPC) stack in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a remote attacker to crash the server process by sending a crafted sequence of HPACK headers, resulting in a denial of service. Root Cause: In src/brpc/details/hpack.cpp, IndexTable::Init sizes the dynamic-table ring buffer as num_headers = max_size / (32 + 2), i.e. it assumes a minimum table entry of 34 bytes (name >= 1 byte + value >= 1 byte + 32 bytes of overhead). However, RFC 7541 section 4.1 specifies that the minimum entry size is 33 bytes, because the value may be empty (name >= 1 byte + value == 0 + 32 bytes). For the default 4096-byte table this allocates only 120 slots (4096/34). Eviction in AddHeader is driven by byte usage (_max_size), not by slot count, so a peer can add 121 minimal 33-byte entries (121*33 = 3993 <= 4096) without triggering eviction. The 121st AddHeader then hits CHECK(!_header_queue.full()), which aborts the process. Affected Scenarios: Use a bRPC server that serves HTTP/2 or gRPC requests (e.g. via the h2 protocol) from an untrusted network. The malicious header block is processed during HPACK decoding of incoming requests without authentication. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3462 Note: The fix sizes the dynamic table for the 33-byte minimum entry (max_size / (32 + 1)) and ensures at least one ring-buffer slot is kept when max_size is smaller than the minimum entry, so that initialization cannot fail on malloc(0). | 19 h ago |
| CVE-2026-53345 | unscored | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero. This will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what is effectively a false positive on the WARN. For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next KVM_RUN. But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers the WARN about not having a running vCPU. Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN, as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons; suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance). But loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn't already loaded), and is ultimately pointless. The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU's dirty ring, e.g. to ensure userspace doesn't miss a dirty page. But for the VM's refcount to reach zero, there can't be _any_ userspace mappings to the dirty ring, as mapping the dirty ring requires doing mmap() on the vCPU FD. I.e. if userspace had a valid mapping for the dirty ring, then the vCPU file and thus the owning VM would still be alive. And so since userspace can't possibly reach the dirty ring, whether or not KVM technically "misses" a push to the dirty ring is irrelevant. | 23 h ago |
| CVE-2024-57888 | unscored | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: workqueue: Do not warn when cancelling WQ_MEM_RECLAIM work from !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM worker After commit 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") amdgpu started seeing the following warning: [ ] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM sdma0:drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:amdgpu_device_delay_enable_gfx_off [amdgpu] ... [ ] Workqueue: sdma0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] ... [ ] Call Trace: [ ] <TASK> ... [ ] ? check_flush_dependency+0xf5/0x110 ... [ ] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x6e/0x80 [ ] amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl+0xab/0x140 [amdgpu] [ ] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu] [ ] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0xf4/0x810 [amdgpu] [ ] ? drm_sched_run_job_work+0x22c/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ ] amdgpu_job_run+0xaa/0x1f0 [amdgpu] [ ] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x257/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ ] process_one_work+0x217/0x720 ... [ ] </TASK> The intent of the verifcation done in check_flush_depedency is to ensure forward progress during memory reclaim, by flagging cases when either a memory reclaim process, or a memory reclaim work item is flushed from a context not marked as memory reclaim safe. This is correct when flushing, but when called from the cancel(_delayed)_work_sync() paths it is a false positive because work is either already running, or will not be running at all. Therefore cancelling it is safe and we can relax the warning criteria by letting the helper know of the calling context. References: 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") | 23 h ago |
7 of 7
Download these 7 as CSV · subscribe to this list.
EPSS scores: 2026-10-30. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.