Vulnerabilities
All
My stack
Known exploited
Public exploit
Critical (9+)
Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%)
Changed, 24 h
New, 24 h
Sort:
risk
modified
published
CVSS
EPSS
| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-73519exploit | 9.3 critical | 1.0% | no CPE yet | WolfStack before 25.9.2 contains a hard-coded cluster-authentication secret compiled into every build and published as a constant in src/auth/mod.rs, allowing remote unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication by supplying this value in the X-WolfStack-Secret header to the require_auth() gate without any session, API key, or user account. Attackers can reach an affected node's management port to enumerate all Docker and LXC containers on the host and execute arbitrary commands as root inside any container via the POST /api/containers/{runtime}/{id}/exec endpoint. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-66906exploit | 9.1 critical | 1.0% | apache, camel | Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure Storage Blob component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-azure-storage-blob component can download an Azure Storage blob to the local filesystem through its downloadBlobToFile operation, writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option, which is documented as usable from both the producer and the consumer. BlobOperations.downloadBlobToFile built the local target by joining fileDir with the remote blob name exactly as the Azure SDK reported it (new File(fileDir, client.getBlobName())) and passed the result straight to the SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The blob name is not route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the container in BlobConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromContainer, which lists blobs and creates one exchange per entry from BlobItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name filtering by default. A blob name containing parent-directory segments therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone able to influence the names present in the consumed container cause Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the privileges of the Camel process. Depending on what the process can write to, overwriting a file outside the download directory can escalate beyond the loss of integrity of that file. Azure Storage blob containers use a flat namespace in which the blob name is an opaque key, so a name carrying such segments is stored and listed as given. The fileDir option is an ordinary common-group configuration parameter and carries no security marker, so nothing signalled to users that its value was not being enforced as a containment boundary. Camel's other file-download consumers - camel-file, camel-ftp, camel-smb, camel-mina-sftp and camel-azure-files - already constrained their local downloads to the configured directory using a path-segment boundary check; the camel-azure-storage-blob download path was not covered by that work. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, constrain the names the consumer will act on using the regex endpoint option, which is applied to each listed blob name as a full-string match, so that only simple single-segment names are accepted and any name carrying a path separator or a parent-directory segment is filtered out before an exchange is created; the prefix option can additionally narrow the listing server-side, noting that when both are set regex takes priority and prefix is ignored. Alternatively, avoid the downloadBlobToFile operation on untrusted containers and write the payload from the route under a file name the route itself controls, rather than one taken from the remote listing. As defence in depth, treat the blob names in any externally writable container as untrusted input and do not derive local filesystem paths from them. | 12 Oct |
| CVE-2026-59734exploit | 8.8 high | 1.0% | no CPE yet | Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. Prior to 4.0.0-beta.469, Coolify's app/Jobs/ApplicationDeploymentJob.php generate_healthcheck_commands() function directly interpolated the health_check_host, health_check_method, and health_check_path parameters into shell commands without proper sanitization, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands inside deployment containers. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.469. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-100833exploit | 8.6 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Contrast (edgelesssys/contrast) versions 1.14.0 before 1.23.1 generate runtime policies that fail to detect all container image substitutions. A bad rebase during a Kata Containers update accidentally introduced an `allow_storage` rule that accepts storage entries using the `image_guest_pull` driver without verifying the image digest. An attacker with access to the Kata agent API — for example, a Kubernetes cluster administrator in Contrast's threat model — can therefore substitute a container image with an exploit payload, provided the substituted image satisfies the remaining policy rules, undermining the confidential container's integrity guarantees. | 9 Oct |
| CVE-2026-78122exploit | 8.3 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | docker-socket-proxy fails to properly gate read endpoints in the /containers Docker API namespace when the CONTAINERS environment variable is set. Attackers can use GET requests to /containers/{id}/archive, /containers/{id}/export, /containers/{id}/logs, and /containers/{id}/top to read arbitrary files and download entire container filesystems as tar archives. | 12 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64531exploit ×5 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs Open vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len field is u16. Commit a1e64addf3ff ("net: openvswitch: remove misbehaving actions length check") allowed the total sw_flow_actions stream to grow beyond 64 KiB, which is valid, but also removed the last guard preventing a generated nested action attribute from exceeding U16_MAX. An oversized generated container can thus be closed with a truncated nla_len. A later dump or teardown then walks a structurally different stream than the one that was validated. In particular, an oversized nested CLONE/CT action may cause subsequent bytes in the generated stream to be interpreted as independent actions. Keep the larger total-action-stream behavior, but make nested action close reject generated containers that do not fit in nla_len, and return the error through all callers. For recursive SAMPLE, CLONE, DEC_TTL, and CHECK_PKT_LEN builders, trim resource-owning action-list tails in reverse construction order before discarding failed wrappers, so resources copied into the rejected tails are released before the wrappers are removed. Most failed outer wrappers are discarded by truncating actions_len after child resources have been released. CHECK_PKT_LEN also trims its parent after branch resources are gone. SET/TUNNEL close failures unwind their known tun_dst ownership directly, and SET_TO_MASKED has no external ownership and truncates on close failure. | 19 Oct |
6 of 6
Download these 6 as CSV · subscribe to this list.
EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.