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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-34198 | 9.3 critical | 1.0% | vasion, virtual_appliance_application, virtual_appliance_host | Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host versions prior to 22.0.951 and Application prior to 20.0.2368 (VA and SaaS deployments) contain shared, hardcoded SSH host private keys in the appliance image. The same private host keys (RSA, ECDSA, and ED25519) are present across installations, rather than being uniquely generated per appliance. An attacker who obtains these private keys (for example from one compromised appliance image or another installation) can impersonate the appliance, decrypt or intercept SSH connections to appliances that use the same keys, and perform man-in-the-middle or impersonation attacks against administrative SSH sessions. This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2024-011 — Hardcoded SSH Host Key. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2025-66016 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | CGGMP24 is a state-of-art ECDSA TSS protocol that supports 1-round signing (requires 3 preprocessing rounds), identifiable abort, and a key refresh protocol. Prior to version 0.6.3, there is a missing check in the ZK proof that enables an attack in which single malicious signer can reconstruct full private key. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.3, for full mitigation it is recommended to upgrade to cggmp24 version 0.7.0-alpha.2 as it contains more security checks. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-16516 | 9.0 critical | 0.00% | wolfssh | wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDH_REPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key). | 13 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.