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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-2968 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | proxy_project, proxy | A remote attacker can trigger a denial of service in the socket.remoteAddress variable, by sending a crafted HTTP request. Usage of the undefined variable raises a TypeError exception. | 8 Oct |
| CVE-2024-8676 | 7.4 high | 1.0% | no CPE yet | A vulnerability was found in CRI-O, where it can be requested to take a checkpoint archive of a container and later be asked to restore it. When it does that restoration, it attempts to restore the mounts from the restore archive instead of the pod request. As a result, the validations run on the pod spec, verifying that the pod has access to the mounts it specifies are not applicable to a restored container. This flaw allows a malicious user to trick CRI-O into restoring a pod that doesn't have access to host mounts. The user needs access to the kubelet or cri-o socket to call the restore endpoint and trigger the restore. | 13 Oct |
| CVE-2024-50033 | 7.1 high | 1.0% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: make slhc_remember() more robust against malicious packets syzbot found that slhc_remember() was missing checks against malicious packets [1]. slhc_remember() only checked the size of the packet was at least 20, which is not good enough. We need to make sure the packet includes the IPv4 and TCP header that are supposed to be carried. Add iph and th pointers to make the code more readable. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in slhc_remember+0x2e8/0x7b0 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:666 slhc_remember+0x2e8/0x7b0 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:666 ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0xe45/0x35e0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2455 ppp_receive_frame drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2372 [inline] ppp_do_recv+0x65f/0x40d0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2212 ppp_input+0x7dc/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2327 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1d3/0x720 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1113 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3072 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3626 pppoe_sendmsg+0x2b8/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744 ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656 __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768 x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587 __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline] sock_wmalloc+0xfe/0x1a0 net/core/sock.c:2732 pppoe_sendmsg+0x3a7/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:867 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744 ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656 __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768 x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5460 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00006-g87d6aab2389e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2026-67440 | 6.9 medium | 1.0% | no CPE yet | FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In 1.3.2 and earlier, the DEVICE_BROWSE, DEVICE_NODE_ATTRIBUTE, HOST_INTERFACES, and DEVICE_TAGS_REQUEST handlers in server/runtime/index.js return device-discovery, node-attribute, host-network-interface, and device-tag metadata without isSocketAdminAuthorized when secureEnabled is true. A remote unauthenticated or guest user can invoke these metadata-oriented Socket.IO events and collect system-discovery information that is not required for normal public HMI viewing, while ordinary device status, value, alarm, and dashboard events remain intentionally public. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3. | 22 Oct |
| CVE-2026-34477 | 6.3 medium | 1.0% | apache, log4j | The fix for CVE-2025-68161 https://logging.apache.org/security.html#CVE-2025-68161 was incomplete: it addressed hostname verification only when enabled via the log4j2.sslVerifyHostName https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/systemproperties.html#log4j2.sslVerifyHostName system property, but not when configured through the verifyHostName https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/appenders/network.html#SslConfiguration-attr-verifyHostName attribute of the <Ssl> element. Although the verifyHostName configuration attribute was introduced in Log4j Core 2.12.0, it was silently ignored in all versions through 2.25.3, leaving TLS connections vulnerable to interception regardless of the configured value. A network-based attacker may be able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack when all of the following conditions are met: * An SMTP, Socket, or Syslog appender is in use. * TLS is configured via a nested <Ssl> element. * The attacker can present a certificate issued by a CA trusted by the appender's configured trust store, or by the default Java trust store if none is configured. This issue does not affect users of the HTTP appender, which uses a separate verifyHostname https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/appenders/network.html#HttpAppender-attr-verifyHostName attribute that was not subject to this bug and verifies host names by default. Users are advised to upgrade to Apache Log4j Core 2.25.4, which corrects this issue. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-114216 | 6.3 medium | 1.0% | no CPE yet | Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in the HTTP/1.1 chunked body reader of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle a second request past a front-end proxy via a chunk extension that contains a bare LF. The chunked reader in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex takes the chunk-size line to be everything up to the first CRLF and discards everything after ; without checking it against the RFC 9112 chunk-ext grammar, so bare LF, bare CR and other control bytes pass. A proxy that ends the size line at a bare LF reads 2;\nxx\r\n40\r\n... as one request whose second chunk holds a GET /admin, while Bandit ends the body early and dispatches GET /admin as a separate pipelined request. Deployments without such a proxy in front of Bandit are not affected. This issue affects bandit: from 1.12.4 before 1.14.0. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-63643 | 6.3 medium | 1.0% | no CPE yet | MagicMirror² is an open source modular smart mirror platform. Prior to 2.37.0, the ADD_CALENDAR handler in defaultmodules/calendar/node_helper.js accepts an attacker-controlled URL, authentication data, and selfSignedCert setting through the unauthenticated Socket.IO namespace /calendar. The handler passes these fields to CalendarFetcher, causing a server-side request without SSRF validation and optionally disabling TLS verification. When the response is valid iCal, CALENDAR_EVENTS returns parsed event data to the attacker, allowing internal-service response data to be exfiltrated; other responses still provide a blind request and timing primitive. This issue is fixed in version 2.37.0. | 22 Oct |
| CVE-2024-53090 | 5.5 medium | 1.0% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix lock recursion afs_wake_up_async_call() can incur lock recursion. The problem is that it is called from AF_RXRPC whilst holding the ->notify_lock, but it tries to take a ref on the afs_call struct in order to pass it to a work queue - but if the afs_call is already queued, we then have an extraneous ref that must be put... calling afs_put_call() may call back down into AF_RXRPC through rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(), however, which might try taking the ->notify_lock again. This case isn't very common, however, so defer it to a workqueue. The oops looks something like: BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, krxrpcio/7001/1646 lock: 0xffff888141399b30, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: krxrpcio/7001/1646, .owner_cpu: 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1646 Comm: krxrpcio/7001 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-build3+ #4351 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70 do_raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x90 rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call+0x83/0xb0 afs_put_call+0xd7/0x180 rxrpc_notify_socket+0xa0/0x190 rxrpc_input_split_jumbo+0x198/0x1d0 rxrpc_input_data+0x14b/0x1e0 ? rxrpc_input_call_packet+0xc2/0x1f0 rxrpc_input_call_event+0xad/0x6b0 rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn+0x1e1/0x210 rxrpc_input_packet+0x3f2/0x4d0 rxrpc_io_thread+0x243/0x410 ? __pfx_rxrpc_io_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcf/0xe0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2024-56644 | 5.5 medium | 1.0% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/ipv6: release expired exception dst cached in socket Dst objects get leaked in ip6_negative_advice() when this function is executed for an expired IPv6 route located in the exception table. There are several conditions that must be fulfilled for the leak to occur: * an ICMPv6 packet indicating a change of the MTU for the path is received, resulting in an exception dst being created * a TCP connection that uses the exception dst for routing packets must start timing out so that TCP begins retransmissions * after the exception dst expires, the FIB6 garbage collector must not run before TCP executes ip6_negative_advice() for the expired exception dst When TCP executes ip6_negative_advice() for an exception dst that has expired and if no other socket holds a reference to the exception dst, the refcount of the exception dst is 2, which corresponds to the increment made by dst_init() and the increment made by the TCP socket for which the connection is timing out. The refcount made by the socket is never released. The refcount of the dst is decremented in sk_dst_reset() but that decrement is counteracted by a dst_hold() intentionally placed just before the sk_dst_reset() in ip6_negative_advice(). After ip6_negative_advice() has finished, there is no other object tied to the dst. The socket lost its reference stored in sk_dst_cache and the dst is no longer in the exception table. The exception dst becomes a leaked object. As a result of this dst leak, an unbalanced refcount is reported for the loopback device of a net namespace being destroyed under kernels that do not contain e5f80fcf869a ("ipv6: give an IPv6 dev to blackhole_netdev"): unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 2 Fix the dst leak by removing the dst_hold() in ip6_negative_advice(). The patch that introduced the dst_hold() in ip6_negative_advice() was 92f1655aa2b22 ("net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race"). But 92f1655aa2b22 merely refactored the code with regards to the dst refcount so the issue was present even before 92f1655aa2b22. The bug was introduced in 54c1a859efd9f ("ipv6: Don't drop cache route entry unless timer actually expired.") where the expired cached route is deleted and the sk_dst_cache member of the socket is set to NULL by calling dst_negative_advice() but the refcount belonging to the socket is left unbalanced. The IPv4 version - ipv4_negative_advice() - is not affected by this bug. When the TCP connection times out ipv4_negative_advice() merely resets the sk_dst_cache of the socket while decrementing the refcount of the exception dst. | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2024-35884 | 5.5 medium | 1.0% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by looking for a matching socket. This is performed in udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list. We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path, the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to kernel crashes. One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled) skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list, although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues. Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances) but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early. This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must be segmented. [1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408! RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70 __udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560 | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2024-53095 | 9.8 critical | — | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace. Recently, we got a customer report that CIFS triggers oops while reconnecting to a server. [0] The workload runs on Kubernetes, and some pods mount CIFS servers in non-root network namespaces. The problem rarely happened, but it was always while the pod was dying. The root cause is wrong reference counting for network namespace. CIFS uses kernel sockets, which do not hold refcnt of the netns that the socket belongs to. That means CIFS must ensure the socket is always freed before its netns; otherwise, use-after-free happens. The repro steps are roughly: 1. mount CIFS in a non-root netns 2. drop packets from the netns 3. destroy the netns 4. unmount CIFS We can reproduce the issue quickly with the script [1] below and see the splat [2] if CONFIG_NET_NS_REFCNT_TRACKER is enabled. When the socket is TCP, it is hard to guarantee the netns lifetime without holding refcnt due to async timers. Let's hold netns refcnt for each socket as done for SMC in commit 9744d2bf1976 ("smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler()."). Note that we need to move put_net() from cifs_put_tcp_session() to clean_demultiplex_info(); otherwise, __sock_create() still could touch a freed netns while cifsd tries to reconnect from cifs_demultiplex_thread(). Also, maybe_get_net() cannot be put just before __sock_create() because the code is not under RCU and there is a small chance that the same address happened to be reallocated to another netns. [0]: CIFS: VFS: \\XXXXXXXXXXX has not responded in 15 seconds. Reconnecting... CIFS: Serverclose failed 4 times, giving up Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 14de99e461f84a07 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 [14de99e461f84a07] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cls_bpf sch_ingress nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 dns_resolver tcp_diag inet_diag veth xt_state xt_connmark nf_conntrack_netlink xt_nat xt_statistic xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_addrtype ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink overlay nls_ascii nls_cp437 sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sm4_ce_cipher sm4 sm3_ce sm3 sha3_ce sha512_ce sha512_arm64 sha1_ce ena button sch_fq_codel loop fuse configfs dmi_sysfs sha2_ce sha256_arm64 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax efivarfs CPU: 5 PID: 2690970 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.1.103-109.184.amzn2023.aarch64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 r7g.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018 pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 lr : __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc sp : ffff8000265db790 x29: ffff8000265db790 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 000000000000bd01 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff000b4baf8000 x24: ffff00047b5e4580 x23: ffff8000265db7e0 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff00047b5e4500 x20: ffff0010e3f694f8 x19: 14de99e461f849f7 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 3f92800abd010002 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0010e3f69420 x9 : ffff800008a6f294 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffff001924354280 x3 : ffff8000265db7e0 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0010e3f694f8 x0 : ffff00047b5e4500 Call trace: fib_rules_lookup+0x44/0x238 __fib_lookup+0x64/0xbc ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2c4/0x398 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x60/0x8c tcp_v4_connect+0x290/0x488 __inet_stream_connect+0x108/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x78 kernel_connect+0x6c/0xac generic_ip_conne ---truncated--- | 4 h ago |
| CVE-2026-99079 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Prevent stale XSK buffer release on refill retry When an XDP redirect to an AF_XDP socket fails because its RX ring is full, the XSK core frees the buffer. During the subsequent batched refill of a legacy cyclic RQ, mlx5e also releases the WQE's XSK buffer before allocating a replacement. If that refill succeeds only partially, a WQE left without a replacement retains its old buffer pointer. The buffer can meanwhile be allocated to another WQE. A later refill retry can then free the live buffer through the stale pointer and publish the same UMEM frame twice. Mark the WQE as released immediately after the driver-side free. The flag is already cleared when a replacement buffer is assigned, so refill retries no longer release stale pointers. The failure is silent and produces no kernel warning or splat. A standalone legacy cyclic-RQ zero-copy libxsk reproducer, using 64-byte UDP traffic offered at 12 Mpps, detected it: stock stopped after 2,854,914 packets in 4.094 seconds, with 4,542 xdp_rx_ring_full events and 64 ownership/double-publication errors. With this change it processed 356,904,225 packets in 30 seconds despite 571,405 xdp_rx_ring_full events, with no ownership or data errors. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46651 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 24.03 to before version 26.05, the DownloadTaskEndpoint WebSocket endpoint (/tasks/download/monitor.socket) in goobi-viewer-core accepts download requests from unauthenticated users. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | 23 Oct |
| CVE-2026-89702 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: size fh_verify server sockaddr slot by xpt_locallen The nfsd_fh_verify and nfsd_fh_verify_err tracepoints declare the server sockaddr slot sized by xpt_remotelen but fill it from xpt_local using xpt_locallen: TP_STRUCT__entry( ... __sockaddr(server, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_remotelen) ... ) TP_fast_assign( ... __assign_sockaddr(server, &rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_local, rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_locallen); ... ) When xpt_locallen exceeds xpt_remotelen, __assign_sockaddr's memcpy writes past the reserved ring-buffer slot. In the reverse direction (xpt_locallen < xpt_remotelen) the slot is oversized and the unwritten tail leaks prior ring-buffer contents to trace consumers. The write-past-end case is reachable on NFS/UDP. svc_xprt_set_remote() is only called from svc_tcp_accept() (net/sunrpc/svcsock.c) and from the RDMA connect path; svc_create_socket() for UDP calls only svc_xprt_set_local(), so xpt_remotelen stays 0 for the xprt's lifetime. Every fh_verify trace for an NFSv2/v3-over-UDP request then copies 16 or 28 bytes from xpt_local into a zero-byte slot. The other NFSD tracepoints that record the server address (NFSD_TRACE_PROC_CALL_FIELDS, NFSD_TRACE_PROC_RES_FIELDS, SVC_RQST_ENDPOINT_FIELDS) already size the server slot by xpt_locallen; nfsd_fh_verify and nfsd_fh_verify_err were the only exceptions. Fix by sizing the server slot with xpt_locallen so the declared slot matches the copy length. The client slot and its assignment already agree on xpt_remotelen and are left untouched. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74345 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Fix endpoint/socket association handling Disassociating a socket from an endpoint via siw_socket_disassoc() may release the last reference on that endpoint and free it. Therefore, don't clear the endpoints socket pointer after calling that function, but within. This fixes a: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in siw_cm_work_handler (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:1053 drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:1075) which occurred after processing a malformed MPA request during connection establishment, causing the new endpoint to be closed. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64523 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-63978 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-101306 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | freebsd | SCM_RIGHTS file descriptor passing did not preserve FD_RESOLVE_BENEATH when a descriptor was transferred. A process could clear the restriction by sending the descriptor to itself over a Unix domain socket. A process in a jail that has received a directory file descriptor from another jail can use these techniques to escape the jail's filesystem root restriction. | 20 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64025 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and defers to psock->saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present, avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser's ownership of the receive queue (commit e91de6afa81c, "bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types with ktls"). sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard. When a socket is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready as rx_ctx->saved_data_ready. On data arrival: tls_data_ready -> tls_strp_data_ready -> tls_rx_msg_ready -> saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() -> tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink() without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced. tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() >= full_len (stale), calls tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and returns with rx_ctx->strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned (potentially freed) skb. tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that frag_list: use-after-free. Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context is present, call psock->saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue untouched. TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the record normally through tls_sw_recvmsg(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-43198 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix potential race in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() Code in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() after the call to tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() is done too late. After tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(), the child socket is already visible from TCP ehash table and other cpus might use it. Since newinet->pinet6 is still pointing to the listener ipv6_pinfo bad things can happen as syzbot found. Move the problematic code in tcp_v6_mapped_child_init() and call this new helper from tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() before the ehash insertion. This allows the removal of one tcp_sync_mss(), since tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() will call it with the correct context. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46137 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: fix potential data-race This mptcp_pm_add_timer() helper is executed as a timer callback in softirq context. To avoid any data races, the socket lock needs to be held with bh_lock_sock(). If the socket is in use, retry again soon after, similar to what is done with the keepalive timer. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46135 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without serializing against target-side queue teardown. If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request (ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue reference under state_lock. If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a second kref_put() on an already released queue. The ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has already moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still overwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the window for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference. Fix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with state_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started. Use -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather than propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep nvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before honoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the existing release path completes. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-31669 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag via proto_register(). However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5), before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point, tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab remains NULL permanently. This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established. Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-23450 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1]. smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path (softirq) via icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock->sk_user_data to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release(). This leads to two issues: 1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when accessed. 2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs, ori_af_ops) are accessed. The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1] triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -> smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path has the same race): CPU A (softirq) CPU B (process ctx) tcp_v4_rcv() TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV: sk = req->rsk_listener sock_hold(sk) /* No lock on listener */ smc_close_active(): write_lock_bh(cb_lock) sk_user_data = NULL write_unlock_bh(cb_lock) ... smc_clcsock_release() sock_put(smc->sk) x2 -> smc_sock freed! tcp_check_req() smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(): smc = user_data(sk) -> NULL or dangling smc->queued_smc_hs -> crash! Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the smc_sock from being freed. Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight. - Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when accessed inside rcu_read_lock(). - Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data. - Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely. Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing any smc_sock field, so it is not affected. Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run, the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9 | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74436 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: serialize kernel accept preallocation with socket teardown rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept() reads rx->backlog without any socket/backlog synchronization and passes that raw pointer into rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(). A concurrent rxrpc_discard_prealloc() sets rx->backlog = NULL and frees the backlog rings, so a kernel preallocation worker can keep using a freed struct rxrpc_backlog while updating *_backlog_head/tail and array slots. Serialize the state check and backlog lookup with the socket lock, and reject kernel preallocation once teardown has disabled listening or discarded the service backlog. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2026-109575 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0 through 3.4.3 (and corresponding Enterprise Edition releases), Server.ConfigureAPI() has process-global authentication logic that improperly drops security controls across multiple transport types. When a TLS Certificate Authority (tls_ca) is configured and a numeric TLS port (tls_port) is specified, the application globally disables Basic authentication on its shared internal request handler. Because this handler is shared concurrently among HTTP, HTTPS, and UNIX domain socket listeners, and mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificate verification (tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert) is enforced exclusively on the HTTPS server path, all other simultaneously active non-mTLS listeners fail open. Consequently, an unauthenticated attacker capable of reaching an affected HTTP or UNIX management endpoint can completely bypass credentials to gain full API administrative access. This allows unauthorized remote or local actors to read sensitive, cleartext HAProxy configuration data or replace the managed configuration entirely via the raw configuration endpoint. This has been fixed in versions 3.4.4, 3.3.9, 3.2.17, 3.0.25, 2.9.29, and their respective EE backports by migrating to a per-request TLS connection-state validation model. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2026-7301 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | lmsys, sglang | SGLangs multimodal generation runtime scheduler's ROUTER socket binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and contains a sink that calls pickle.loads() on incoming messages, enabling RCE when exposed to the internet. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80585 | 9.4 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fastopen: only mark MPTFO subflows with SYN data Passive TCP Fast Open accepts a valid-cookie SYN even when it carries no data. In that case the child socket's receive queue is intentionally left empty. mptcp_fastopen_subflow_synack_set_params() set is_mptfo before checking for queued SYN data. That made data-less TFO SYNs hit a WARN and, if the warning was non-fatal, left stale MPTFO state behind. The stale flag could later trigger a state-confusion bug in check_fully_established(). Only mark the subflow as MPTFO after confirming that an SKB was queued. Return quietly when the receive queue is empty. Note that mptcp_subflow_context's is_mptfo field is now not just about subflows where the TFO was present, but about MPTFO subflow that consumed SYN data. Only having a valid cookie but not carrying data is not really "doing TFO". | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2023-7325 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Anheng Mingyu Operation and Maintenance Audit and Risk Control System up to 2023-08-10 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the xmlrpc.sock handler. The product accepts specially crafted XML-RPC requests that can be used to instruct the server to connect to internal unix socket RPC endpoints and perform privileged XML-RPC methods. An attacker able to send such requests can invoke administrative RPC methods via the unix socket interface to create arbitrary user accounts on the system, resulting in account creation and potential takeover of the bastion host. VulnCheck has observed this vulnerability being exploited in the wild as of 2025-10-30 at 00:30:17.837319 UTC. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74310 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/net: complete zerocopy ubufs only once vhost-net initializes one ubuf_info per outstanding zerocopy TX descriptor and hands it to the backend socket. The networking stack may then clone a zerocopy skb before all skb references are released. For example, batman-adv fragmentation reaches skb_split(), which calls skb_zerocopy_clone() and increments the same ubuf_info refcount. vhost_zerocopy_complete() currently treats every ubuf callback as a completed vhost descriptor. It dereferences ubuf->ctx, writes the descriptor completion state, and drops the vhost_net_ubuf_ref even when the callback only releases a cloned skb reference. A backend reset can therefore wait for and free the vhost_net_ubuf_ref while another cloned skb still carries the same ubuf_info. A later completion then dereferences the freed ubufs pointer. KASAN reports the stale completion as: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x1d7/0x1f0 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x101/0x1f0 vhost_zerocopy_complete skb_copy_ubufs __dev_forward_skb2 veth_xmit The freed object was allocated from vhost_net_ioctl() while setting the backend and freed through kfree_rcu()/kvfree_rcu_bulk after backend removal, while delayed skb completion still reached vhost_zerocopy_complete(). Honor the generic ubuf_info refcount before touching vhost state, and run the vhost descriptor completion only for the final ubuf reference. This matches the msg_zerocopy_complete() ownership rule for cloned zerocopy skbs. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2026-107935 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | A path traversal vulnerability was found in gvproxy, the network forwarder provided by the gvisor-tap-vsock package. The unauthenticated /services/forwarder/expose endpoint does not validate the caller-supplied socket path, allowing an attacker to delete arbitrary files on the host system. | 12 Oct |
| CVE-2026-73665 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | sangoma, freepbx | FreePBX is an open source IP PBX. Prior to 17.0.9, the UCP Node server on ports 8001 and 8003 uses io.use(checkAuth) in node/lib/server.js, but Socket.IO version 4 applies that middleware only to the default namespace. An unauthenticated client can connect to custom namespaces that do not consistently invoke checkAuth in node/lib/auth.js and send crafted event values containing carriage-return or newline characters through the Asterisk Manager Interface action path patched by node/lib/asterisk-manager-patch.js, allowing arbitrary commands to execute as the asterisk service user. This issue is fixed in version 17.0.9. | 9 Oct |
| CVE-2026-34177 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | canonical, lxd | Canonical LXD versions 4.12 through 6.7 contain an incomplete denylist in isVMLowLevelOptionForbidden (lxd/project/limits/permissions.go), which omits raw.apparmor and raw.qemu.conf from the set of keys blocked under the restricted.virtual-machines.lowlevel=block project restriction. A remote attacker with can_edit permission on a VM instance in a restricted project can inject an AppArmor rule and a QEMU chardev configuration that bridges the LXD Unix socket into the guest VM, enabling privilege escalation to LXD cluster administrator and subsequently to host root. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-44726 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | deno | Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. From 2.0.0 until 2.7.8, a flaw in Deno's Node.js tls compatibility layer could cause a TLS client to transmit application data in plaintext after a connection retry. When `autoSelectFamily was enabled and the first address-family attempt failed, the socket reinitialization path reused a stale TLS upgrade hook that was bound to the original, failed handle. As a result, the replacement TCP connection was never upgraded to TLS, and any data the application wrote before the secureConnect event travelled over the network unencrypted. A network attacker positioned to cause the initial connection attempt to fail (for example, by dropping IPv6 traffic on a dual-stack host) could deterministically trigger the fallback path and observe or tamper with traffic that the application believed was TLS-protected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.8. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-55953 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | erlang, erlang\/otp, erlang\/ssl | The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-107685 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in the WebSocket streaming client in agentjido req_llm allows an on-path attacker to read and modify OpenAI WebSocket sessions, including the authorization bearer token, via a TLS certificate the client does not trust. ReqLLM.Streaming.WebSocketSession.Client.start/3 in lib/req_llm/streaming/web_socket_session/client.ex starts WebSockex without TLS options, and WebSockex defaults to insecure: true, which connects with verify: :verify_none. The option allowlist also drops any caller-supplied cacerts or ssl_options, so an application cannot turn verification on. The OpenAI Responses, Realtime, and Codex WebSocket paths reach this client and send the API key or OAuth access token in the authorization header. HTTP streaming through Finch and the HTTP/2 duplex session through Mint verify certificates and are not affected. This issue affects req_llm: from 1.9.0 before 1.29.0. | Fri 23 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46266 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: RAW sockets using IPPROTO_RAW MUST drop incoming ICMP Yizhou Zhao reported that simply having one RAW socket on protocol IPPROTO_RAW (255) was dangerous. socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, 255); A malicious incoming ICMP packet can set the protocol field to 255 and match this socket, leading to FNHE cache changes. inner = IP(src="192.168.2.1", dst="8.8.8.8", proto=255)/Raw("TEST") pkt = IP(src="192.168.1.1", dst="192.168.2.1")/ICMP(type=3, code=4, nexthopmtu=576)/inner "man 7 raw" states: A protocol of IPPROTO_RAW implies enabled IP_HDRINCL and is able to send any IP protocol that is specified in the passed header. Receiving of all IP protocols via IPPROTO_RAW is not possible using raw sockets. Make sure we drop these malicious packets. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-44713 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | pam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. Prior to 0.8.7, src/tmux.c reads the user's $TMUX environment variable, splits it on commas, and interpolates the socket-path component directly into a shell command passed to popen(). Because the value is placed inside double-quotes without sanitisation, any value containing " terminates the quoted string and injects arbitrary shell syntax. popen() runs as root inside the PAM stack. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.7. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-10054 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In affected versions of Eclipse Theia (1.8.1 and later), the browser backend exposes privileged terminal RPC over WebSocket (/services/shell-terminal, /services/terminals/:id) without service-level authentication. WebSocket origin validation in @theia/core is fail-open: connections are accepted when the Origin header is missing or when no THEIA_HOSTS allowlist is configured (the default). The Socket.IO integration additionally replaces the real Origin header with a client-supplied fix-origin header that an attacker can control or omit. As a result, a foreign-origin web page visited by a user with a running Theia instance can open the /services WebSocket namespace, invoke terminal creation, attach to the resulting terminal data channel, execute arbitrary OS commands, and read their output. This affects both local developer setups (drive-by attack) and hosted or tunneled deployments without strong external authentication. A fix is in development that enforces same-origin validation by default, removes trust in the fix-origin header, gates HTTP and WebSocket access on a SameSite=Strict; HttpOnly connection-token cookie, and sanitizes shell terminal creation options. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-13622 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise. | Fri 23 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74538 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: lock sk in iso_connect_ind Accessing iso_pi(sk)->conn requires lock_sock, which is not taken in the "ev3" part of iso_connect_ind. It may also be NULL if socket has transitioned away from the LISTEN/CONNECT states before locking. Fix by adding lock/release. Recheck hcon is valid after lock acquire where needed. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74537 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: hold sk properly in iso_conn_ready sk deref in iso_conn_ready must be done either under conn->lock, or holding a refcount, to avoid concurrent close. conn->sk is currently accessed without either: [Task 1] [Task 2] iso_sock_release iso_conn_ready sk = conn->sk lock_sock(sk) conn->sk = NULL lock_sock(sk) release_sock(sk) iso_sock_kill(sk) UAF on sk deref Fix possible UAF by holding sk refcount in iso_conn_ready(). Also recheck after lock_sock that the socket is still valid. Adjust locking so conn->sk is cleared only under lock_sock. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-104795 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise | 20 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64115 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returned err = 0 for a peer RST in its default switch arm: err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL; That made vmci_transport_recv_listen() skip vsock_remove_pending(), leaving the pending socket on the listener's pending_links with sk_state = TCP_CLOSE while destroy: still dropped the explicit reference taken before schedule_delayed_work(). One second later vsock_pending_work() observed is_pending=true and performed full cleanup: vsock_remove_pending() then the two trailing sock_put(sk) calls -- the first reached refcount 0 and __sk_freed the socket, and the second wrote into the freed object: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work Treat peer RST like any other unexpected packet type (err = -EINVAL). All destroy: arms now return err < 0, so vmci_transport_recv_listen() removes pending from pending_links synchronously and vsock_pending_work() takes the is_pending=false / !rejected branch, dropping only its own work reference. This also closes the multi-packet race Sashiko reported on v2: pending is removed from the list before any subsequent packet can find it. The pre-existing sk_acceptq_removed() gap on the err < 0 path of vmci_transport_recv_listen() that Sashiko also noted is not introduced or changed by this patch. Tested on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64109 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait() unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and freed. This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue"). The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison `tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address; which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a real problem. But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded, and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in two threads: ``` static int socks[2]; void test_setup(void) { socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks); send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0); int peekoff = 1; setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff)); } void test_thread1(void) { char dummy; recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK); } void test_thread2(void) { char dummy; recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0); shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR); } ``` when racing like this: ``` thread1 thread2 unix_stream_read_generic mutex_lock(&u->iolock) skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue) mutex_unlock(&u->iolock) unix_stream_read_generic unix_state_lock(sk) skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) unix_state_unlock(sk) unix_stream_data_wait unix_state_lock(sk) tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock) __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue) spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock) consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB] `tail != last`: false `tail`: true `tail->len != last_len` ***UAF*** ``` Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow, which can no longer happen. Kuniyuki explained: > When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage > support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last > skb in the receiver's queue. > > That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed > while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait(). > > However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and > commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use > MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added > to a new skb. That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39982 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix UAF in hci_acl_create_conn_sync This fixes the following UFA in hci_acl_create_conn_sync where a connection still pending is command submission (conn->state == BT_OPEN) maybe freed, also since this also can happen with the likes of hci_le_create_conn_sync fix it as well: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805ffcc038 by task kworker/u11:2/9541 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9541 Comm: kworker/u11:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci3 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 123736: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939 hci_conn_add_unset net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1051 [inline] hci_connect_acl+0x16c/0x4e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1634 pair_device+0x418/0xa70 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3556 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1131 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x54b/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 103680: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline] hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/sour ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68432 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns vxlan->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan->net can rewrite a vxlan device whose underlay lives in vxlan->net. vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against vxlan->net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan->net, ...)) and can reopen the underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here. Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68397 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: take a reference on the socket found in afiucv_hs_rcv() afiucv_hs_rcv() looks up the destination socket under iucv_sk_list.lock, drops the lock, and then passes the socket to the afiucv_hs_callback_*() handlers without holding a reference. AF_IUCV sockets are not RCU-protected and are freed synchronously by iucv_sock_kill() -> sock_put(), so a concurrent close can free the socket in the window between read_unlock() and the handler, which then dereferences freed memory (for example sk->sk_data_ready() in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()). Take a reference with sock_hold() while the socket is still on the list and release it with sock_put() once the handler has run. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68294 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace QRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables that are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a single global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global xarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that global state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places no restriction on the namespace a socket is created in. As a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket in a separate network namespace, e.g. via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams - including control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR sockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving socket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable from a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network namespaces are expected to provide. QRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other remote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel name service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the socket family to the initial network namespace, as other non-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the ieee802154 socket code). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68140 | 8.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use-after-free of a severed iucv_path af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path. Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued. | 19 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.