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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-39980 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group The kernel forbids the creation of non-FDB nexthop groups with FDB nexthops: # ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.1 fdb # ip nexthop add id 2 group 1 Error: Non FDB nexthop group cannot have fdb nexthops. And vice versa: # ip nexthop add id 3 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 4 group 3 fdb Error: FDB nexthop group can only have fdb nexthops. However, as long as no routes are pointing to a non-FDB nexthop group, the kernel allows changing the type of a nexthop from FDB to non-FDB and vice versa: # ip nexthop add id 5 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 6 group 5 # ip nexthop replace id 5 via 192.0.2.2 fdb # echo $? 0 This configuration is invalid and can result in a NPD [1] since FDB nexthops are not associated with a nexthop device: # ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 6 # ping 198.51.100.1 Fix by preventing nexthop FDB status change while the nexthop is in a group: # ip nexthop add id 7 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 8 group 7 # ip nexthop replace id 7 via 192.0.2.2 fdb Error: Cannot change nexthop FDB status while in a group. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0 [...] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 367 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6-virtme-gb65678cacc03 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_lookup_good_nhc+0x1e/0x80 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> fib_table_lookup+0x541/0x650 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2ea/0x970 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x55/0x80 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x250/0x330 udp_connect+0x2b/0x60 __sys_connect+0x9c/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40080 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nbd: restrict sockets to TCP and UDP Recently, syzbot started to abuse NBD with all kinds of sockets. Commit cf1b2326b734 ("nbd: verify socket is supported during setup") made sure the socket supported a shutdown() method. Explicitely accept TCP and UNIX stream sockets. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98849 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pfcp: fix socket lifetime on netdevice registration failure pfcp_newlink() creates the UDP socket before register_netdevice(). If registration fails after pfcp_dev_init() succeeds, the core calls pfcp_dev_uninit(), which releases the socket and clears pfcp->sk. The newlink error path then releases it again, causing a NULL pointer dereference. This was observed with failslab fault injection: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for pfcp0 (error: -12 parent: net) BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x1c/0x50 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000120 by task ip/1037 Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 print_report+0x468/0x5cc kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0 __asan_load8+0x7c/0xd0 udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x1c/0x50 pfcp_newlink+0x128/0x184 rtnl_newlink+0x848/0xe44 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x468/0x514 netlink_rcv_skb+0xc0/0x1f0 rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x24 netlink_unicast+0x4b8/0x558 netlink_sendmsg+0x2b8/0x584 ... Return from pfcp_del_sock() if pfcp->sk is NULL. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98801 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: restrict SO_RESERVE_MEM to TCP sockets and cap max value Commit 2bb2f5fb21b0 ("net: add new socket option SO_RESERVE_MEM") and commit d00c8ee31729 ("net: fix possible NULL deref in sock_reserve_memory") only checked sk_has_account(sk), which is true for both TCP and UDP sockets. However, SO_RESERVE_MEM and sk_unused_reserved_mem() are currently only supported by TCP: - On UDP sockets, sk->sk_forward_alloc is protected by sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, whereas sock_reserve_memory() and sock_release_reserved_memory() only acquire lock_sock(sk). Concurrent UDP packet reception/release and setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM) corrupt sk_forward_alloc and memcg accounting. - udp_rmem_release() reclaims excess sk_forward_alloc without accounting for sk_unused_reserved_mem(sk). Restrict sock_reserve_memory() to TCP sockets (sk_is_tcp(sk)) for now. Supporting SO_RESERVE_MEM for UDP (acquiring sk_receive_queue.lock and honoring sk_unused_reserved_mem() in udp_rmem_release()) can be done in a future net-next series if needed. In addition, reject val > SZ_1G with -EINVAL in sk_setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM). Without an upper bound, values near INT_MAX cause sk_mem_pages(delta) and (pages << PAGE_SHIFT) to overflow 32-bit signed int, corrupting sk->sk_forward_alloc and sk->sk_reserved_mem. Using a page-aligned cap (SZ_1G) ensures that the page-rounded sk->sk_reserved_mem reported by getsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM) can always be passed back to setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98646 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Skip cond_resched() in inet_csk_listen_stop() under BPF context bpf_sock_destroy() runs from the tcp iterator, under rcu_read_lock(). If the sock is a listener that still has children in its accept queue, tcp_abort() ends up in inet_csk_listen_stop() and the cond_resched() there trips the debug check: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1523 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 628, name: test_progs preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 locks held by test_progs/628: 3, last CPU#3: #0: ffff8881158cee18 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x56/0x1210 #1: ffff8881106bb858 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x32b/0x4b0 #2: ffffffffb435af20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_iter_run_prog+0x46b/0xde0 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 628 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G W 7.2.0+ #65 PREEMPT Tainted: [W]=WARN Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc1/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __might_resched+0x3d2/0x610 inet_csk_listen_stop+0x7b/0xbf0 tcp_abort+0x23b/0x3b0 bpf_sock_destroy+0xfc/0x140 bpf_prog_448133d24601754f_iter_tcp6_server+0x81/0x8a bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0 bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210 vfs_read+0x197/0xe40 ksys_read+0x119/0x240 __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0 do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fad39b28aca RSP: 002b:00007ffc381c61c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc381c6a88 RCX: 00007fad39b28aca RDX: 0000000000000032 RSI: 00007ffc381c6250 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: 00007ffc381c61e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055f077c1bbb0 R15: 00007fad3a0f3000 </TASK> The commit that added the kfunc already guards lock_sock() in tcp_abort() and udp_abort() with has_current_bpf_ctx(), but missed the listener path. Do the same for the cond_resched(). The loop runs inside the iterator's rcu_read_lock(), it must not reschedule or report a quiescent state there. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98622 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ct: don't WARN on benign flow_offload_alloc() failure flow_offload_alloc() returns NULL when the conntrack entry is dying (e.g. raced with a conntrack flush) or when the GFP_ATOMIC allocation fails; both are expected under load and neither is a kernel bug. This path runs from softirq on every committed packet, so with panic_on_warn=1 an unprivileged user can panic the box just by racing a conntrack flush against a `tc ... action ct commit` classifier. Reproduced with a custom repro under QEMU: a small, fixed set of UDP flows through `tc filter ... action ct commit` on lo, raced against threads flooding bare ctnetlink CT_DELETE (flush) requests. Hits WARNING: net/sched/act_ct.c:437 (tcf_ct_flow_table_add(), inlined into tcf_ct_act() in this build) within ~15s on the unpatched kernel; same setup is clean on the patched kernel. The fix itself is behavior-preserving: both branches already did `goto err_alloc` before and after, only the WARN is removed. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98604 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: replace bind when learning local endpoint struct ovpn_bind is published through peer->bind with RCU, but local endpoint learning updates bind->local in place under peer->lock. UDP TX reads the field without that lock. In particular, a concurrent IPv6 update can therefore result in a torn address read. Use ovpn_peer_reset_sockaddr to publish a replacement bind when learning a new local endpoint, just as a remote endpoint change does. Preserve the current remote address and reset the dst cache only after the new bind has been published successfully. Track remote endpoint changes separately so that float notification and transport-address rehashing remain limited to actual peer floats. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98603 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn address. Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish a replacement bind with a wildcard local address. Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98595 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table A UDP socket bound to a specific address and port keeps its entry in the 4-tuple hash table after it is disconnected: sk binds to 127.0.0.1:21001 sk connects to 127.0.0.2:20001 // filed in the 4-tuple table sk disconnects, connect(AF_UNSPEC) // still filed, peer now 0.0.0.0:0 __udp_disconnect() takes a socket out of that table only as a side effect of ->rehash() or ->unhash(), and it skips ->rehash() when SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK is set and ->unhash() when SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK is set. commit 6996a2d2d0a6 ("udp: Unhash auto-bound connected sk from 4-tuple hash table when disconnected.") fixed the same end state for a wildcard-bound socket, by a path this one does not take. The entry is counted whether or not anything hits it. hash4_cnt on the hash2 slot stays raised for as long as the socket lives, so udp_has_hash4() keeps sending every packet for that address and port through the 4-tuple lookup first. On IPv6 it can also be hit. __udp_disconnect() does not clear sk_v6_daddr, so udp_v6_rehash() files the entry under the peer the socket was connected to with a zero dport, and inet6_match() compares that same field: a datagram from the former peer with a zero source port matches, and source port zero is accepted on receive. On IPv4 the peer is cleared, so a match would need a zero source address as well, which the routing layer rejects as martian. The stale sk_v6_daddr is a separate defect, not addressed here; removing the entry closes this path either way. The entry can also be relocated. __udp_disconnect() clears sk_bound_dev_if, so a subsequent SO_BINDTODEVICE calls ->rehash(), and because the receive address is still specific udp_lib_rehash() moves the entry instead of removing it, into the bucket that (rcv_saddr, num, 0, 0) hashes to -- a pure function of the address and port, so every socket reaching this state on one address and port collects in one bucket. The bucket cannot be chosen from outside, as udp_ehashfn() is seeded with a per-boot secret. This last one became reachable only with commit 644f9108f3a5 ("udp: Make rehash4 independent in udp_lib_rehash()"), which moved the hash4 handling out of a branch a disconnected socket does not take; the stale entry itself dates from the commit in Fixes. Take the socket out of the table before __udp_disconnect() runs, while it still matches how it was filed. This also reaches the wildcard case ahead of udp_lib_rehash()'s udp_unhash4() branch, leaving that branch unreachable from udp_disconnect(); removing it belongs in net-next. udp_disconnect() and udp_abort() are the only UDP entries into __udp_disconnect(), which is shared with raw, ping and l2tp sockets that are not struct udp_sock: ping_prot.obj_size is sizeof(struct inet_sock), so udp_hashed4() on one would read past the allocation. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98557 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gve: DQO: fix header length used by gve_can_send_tso() for UDP GSO gve_can_send_tso() computes how many buffers each segment of a GSO packet would span, and for this it needs the length of the headers that the device replicates in front of every segment. It unconditionally uses skb_tcp_all_headers(), which reads the doff field of the TCP header. SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets have no TCP header: tcp_hdrlen() then reads one byte of the UDP payload, and header_len can be anything in [0, 60] instead of the transport offset plus the eight bytes of the UDP header that gve_prep_tso() programs into the TSO context descriptor. A wrong header length shifts all the segment boundaries computed in the loop, so the number of buffers per segment can be over or under estimated. In the first case, GSO is needlessly disabled for this packet by gve_features_check_dqo() and the stack has to segment it. In the second case, the driver hands the device a packet whose segments span more than GVE_TX_MAX_DATA_DESCS buffers. Use the UDP header length for SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 packets, matching what gve_prep_tso() does. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98541 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fou: reject omitted FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO on FOU_ENCAP_DIRECT Commit 7a9bc9e3f423 ("fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.") added NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_U8, 1) to fou_nl_policy[FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO], which rejects an explicitly supplied FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO == 0 attribute with -ERANGE. However, FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is an optional netlink attribute. When a user sends FOU_CMD_ADD with FOU_ATTR_TYPE set to FOU_ENCAP_DIRECT and omits FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO entirely, nla_policy validation succeeds and parse_nl_config() leaves cfg->protocol as 0 (from memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg))). fou_create() then creates a FOU_ENCAP_DIRECT socket with fou->protocol == 0. In fou_udp_recv(), returning -fou->protocol to udp_queue_rcv_one_skb() triggers IP protocol resubmission when fou->protocol > 0, whereas returning 0 tells the UDP tunnel layer that the skb was consumed without freeing it. When fou->protocol == 0, every packet received on the socket returns 0 from fou_udp_recv() and leaks the sk_buff. Reject FOU_ENCAP_DIRECT when !cfg->protocol in fou_create() so that creating a direct encapsulation port without FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO fails with -EINVAL while leaving FOU_CMD_DEL and FOU_CMD_GET (which share parse_nl_config()) unaffected. Tested in QEMU against Linux 7.3.0-rc3 by sending a FOU_CMD_ADD Generic Netlink request with FOU_ATTR_PORT = 5555 and FOU_ATTR_TYPE = FOU_ENCAP_DIRECT while omitting FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. On the unfixed kernel, FOU_CMD_ADD succeeds (err = 0), FOU_CMD_GET reports fou->type = 1 and fou->protocol = 0, and sending 4000 UDP packets to 127.0.0.1:5555 leaks all 4000 sk_buffs (SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grows from 41456 kB to 59008 kB, +17552 kB); with this patch applied, FOU_CMD_ADD is rejected with -EINVAL (-22). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98427 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: codel: bound the dropping loop per dequeue call The CoDel control law schedules the next drop one interval/sqrt(count) after the previous drop, using the configured interval (codel_params.interval). For very small intervals the scheduled step rounds down to zero, so the dropping loop in codel_dequeue() never advances and drains the entire backlog under the qdisc lock in one call - an unprivileged user can trigger a soft lockup this way. Fix in the shared codel code used by both codel and fq_codel: 1. Make the control-law step at least 1 tick so the dropping loop always moves forward. 2. Cap the dropping loop at CODEL_MAX_DROPS_PER_DEQUEUE (256) drops per codel_dequeue() call, resyncing drop_next to now when the cap is hit: the catch-up owed to the loop grows with the idle gap and the backlog, which no interval threshold can bound. This is a deliberate behaviour change after long idle gaps. The cap applies to fq_codel (4b549a2ef4be) and the mac80211 TXQ path (fixed interval, cap only). The target sojourn delay (codel_params.target) is not validated: it does not feed the control law, so a sub-tick value is aggressive rather than deadlock-prone. Conditions to recreate the bug: - tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 1kbit burst 2kb limit 1000000 - tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 10: codel interval 2us target 1ms noecn limit 1000000 (same for fq_codel) - unpatched kernel: tc accepts it; a UDP flood under the 1kbit tbf soft-lockups (watchdog: BUG: soft lockup) while one codel_dequeue() call drops the backlog under the qdisc lock - patched kernel: same setup, at most 256 drops per dequeue call, no soft lockup Testing: claim reproducer and interval 2us/3us variants run clean; tdc qdisc category passes (see the selftests patch). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98402 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: icmp: avoid invalid transport header access in icmp_send tracepoint syzbot reported a WARNING triggered by DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(): WARNING: at skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3087 [inline] WARNING: at udp_hdr include/linux/udp.h:23 [inline] WARNING: at do_trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:30 [inline] WARNING: at trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send+0x48c/0x6ec include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 Call trace: skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3087 [inline] udp_hdr include/linux/udp.h:23 [inline] do_trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:30 [inline] trace_event_raw_event_icmp_send+0x48c/0x6ec include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 __traceiter_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 [inline] __do_trace_icmp_send include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 [inline] trace_icmp_send+0x320/0x49c include/trace/events/icmp.h:11 __icmp_send+0xcfc/0x11d8 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1013 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1280 [inline] ipv4_link_failure+0x57c/0x8dc net/ipv4/route.c:1287 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:438 [inline] vti_tunnel_xmit+0xe40/0x17a4 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:307 TP_fast_assign() unconditionally calls udp_hdr(skb) before checking whether the packet is UDP. Furthermore, __icmp_send() can be invoked from paths (e.g., link failures, ARP errors, forwarding, AF_PACKET) where skb->transport_header was never initialized (~0U). Under CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y, calling skb_transport_header(skb) triggers DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)). Fix this by: 1. Only parsing transport info when iph->protocol == IPPROTO_UDP. 2. Using skb_header_pointer() at skb_network_offset(skb) + (iph->ihl << 2) to safely fetch the UDP header without assuming transport_header is set. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98393 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP_MAX_MTU to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IP_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU. Steps to reproduce: 1. Set device MTU bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + 20. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip_setup_cork. 2. Set IP_MTU_DISCOVER to IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip_append_data, rather than to IP_MAX_MTU. 3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +20 bytes of IPv4 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP_MAX_MTU + IPv4 header, and the device MTU is bigger than that). 4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short. Note: IP_PMTUDISC_DO with IPv4 is safe, because ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward always clamps at IP_MAX_MTU, unlike ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward. The Fixes tag points at the first commit where I could reproduce the overflow with IPv4 and IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98306 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: set IPSKB_L3SLAVE from IP6SKB_L3SLAVE on IPIP decapsulation When an SRv6 packet arrives on an interface enslaved to a VRF, vrf_ip6_rcv() sets IP6SKB_L3SLAVE in IP6CB, but decap_and_validate() has never set IPSKB_L3SLAVE in IPCB. The bit stayed clear in the common case, and with CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6 the leftover frag_max_size of a reassembled outer packet could even set it, with no VRF involved. Commit 44930446dde4 ("ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation") then made the unreliable bit reliably clear. The effect of the missing flag is visible with End.DX4 when a delivery to a local address of the node reaches the socket lookup. For example, a UDP socket bound to the enslaved ingress interface does not receive any of the decapsulated packets, while an unbound socket outside the VRF does. This contradicts Documentation/networking/vrf.rst: by default the scope of an unbound UDP or TCP socket is limited to the default VRF. Set IPSKB_L3SLAVE for IPv4 in decap_and_validate(), which already does the same for IPv6. The socket lookup then matches the decapsulated packet like any other packet received on that enslaved interface. Such a packet matches an unbound UDP or TCP socket only when udp_l3mdev_accept or tcp_l3mdev_accept is set. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98233 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: clear RX owner on VNET header error Commit 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition") added rx_owner_map and made tpacket_rcv() claim a V1 or V2 ring slot before converting the virtio-net header. If the conversion fails, the drop path leaves the slot claimed. With a one-frame TPACKET_V2 ring, an unsupported UDP GSO packet leaves the only slot unavailable, so the ring also drops the next valid packet. Clear the ownership bit on this error path. TPACKET_V3 already clears its block state here. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98101 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: mcast: use copy-on-write RCU updates in ip6_mc_source() pmc->sflist is read locklessly under rcu_read_lock() by inet6_mc_check() during packet reception in the UDP and RAW multicast receive paths. ip6_mc_source() mutated psl->sl_addr and psl->sl_count in-place when adding or removing a source filter. Additionally, when expanding the filter buffer, newpsl was published via rcu_assign_pointer() before writing the new source into the array. Because 16-byte struct in6_addr writes are not atomic and array shifting is not synchronized with RCU readers, concurrent readers in inet6_mc_check() could read torn IPv6 addresses or observe duplicated/missed source entries. Fix this by switching ip6_mc_source() to copy-on-write RCU updates: allocate and fully populate newpsl before publishing it via rcu_assign_pointer(), and reclaim the old filter via kfree_rcu(), matching ip6_mc_msfilter(). Also remove the now unused IP6_SFBLOCK macro. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-97984 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU. Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest): 1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork. 2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU. 3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that). 4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short. To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit the change to UDP sockets only. The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later, and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE"). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90078 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered by tcf_skbmod_act(): !skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act(): 1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set, which is not guaranteed when tcf_skbmod_act() runs at TC ingress. 2. Unconditionally calling skb_mac_header_len() at the beginning of tcf_skbmod_act() triggers a warning on L3 devices (e.g. TUN) where the MAC header is unset, evaluating to an underflowed garbage length. 3. On TC ingress, skb->data points to the network header. Adding the MAC header length to the IP header length causes skb_ensure_writable() to request more bytes than the actual IP packet length, dropping valid short packets (e.g. 28-byte UDP/IPv4 packets). Fix these by: - Using skb_network_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr/ipv6hdr) for SKBMOD_F_ECN so that the required length is correctly calculated on both ingress (offset == 0) and egress (offset == mac_len). - Setting max_edit_len to ETH_HLEN for Ethernet header modifications after validating ARPHRD_ETHER. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90063 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by gso_size. Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68169 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: Fix deadlock in memory allocation under spinlock Fix a AA deadlock in refill_skbs() where memory allocation while holding skb_pool->lock can trigger a recursive lock acquisition attempt. The deadlock scenario occurs when the system is under severe memory pressure: 1. refill_skbs() acquires skb_pool->lock (spinlock) 2. alloc_skb() is called while holding the lock 3. Memory allocator fails and calls slab_out_of_memory() 4. This triggers printk() for the OOM warning 5. The console output path calls netpoll_send_udp() 6. netpoll_send_udp() attempts to acquire the same skb_pool->lock 7. Deadlock: the lock is already held by the same CPU Call stack: refill_skbs() spin_lock_irqsave(&skb_pool->lock) <- lock acquired __alloc_skb() kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof() slab_out_of_memory() printk() console_flush_all() netpoll_send_udp() skb_dequeue() spin_lock_irqsave(&skb_pool->lock) <- deadlock attempt This bug was exposed by commit 248f6571fd4c51 ("netpoll: Optimize skb refilling on critical path") which removed refill_skbs() from the critical path (where nested printk was being deferred), letting nested printk being called from inside refill_skbs() Refactor refill_skbs() to never allocate memory while holding the spinlock. Another possible solution to fix this problem is protecting the refill_skbs() from nested printks, basically calling printk_deferred_{enter,exit}() in refill_skbs(), then, any nested pr_warn() would be deferred. I prefer this approach, given I _think_ it might be a good idea to move the alloc_skb() from GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL in the future, so, having the alloc_skb() outside of the lock will be necessary step. There is a possible TOCTOU issue when checking for the pool length, and queueing the new allocated skb, but, this is not an issue, given that an extra SKB in the pool is harmless and it will be eventually used. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68191 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp_tunnel: use netdev_warn() instead of netdev_WARN() netdev_WARN() uses WARN/WARN_ON to print a backtrace along with file and line information. In this case, udp_tunnel_nic_register() returning an error is just a failed operation, not a kernel bug. udp_tunnel_nic_register() can fail due to a memory allocation failure (kzalloc() or udp_tunnel_nic_alloc()). This is a normal runtime error and not a kernel bug. Replace netdev_WARN() with netdev_warn() accordingly. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68199 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: codetag: debug: handle existing CODETAG_EMPTY in mark_objexts_empty for slabobj_ext When alloc_slab_obj_exts() fails and then later succeeds in allocating a slab extension vector, it calls handle_failed_objexts_alloc() to mark all objects in the vector as empty. As a result all objects in this slab (slabA) will have their extensions set to CODETAG_EMPTY. Later on if this slabA is used to allocate a slabobj_ext vector for another slab (slabB), we end up with the slabB->obj_exts pointing to a slabobj_ext vector that itself has a non-NULL slabobj_ext equal to CODETAG_EMPTY. When slabB gets freed, free_slab_obj_exts() is called to free slabB->obj_exts vector. free_slab_obj_exts() calls mark_objexts_empty(slabB->obj_exts) which will generate a warning because it expects slabobj_ext vectors to have a NULL obj_ext, not CODETAG_EMPTY. Modify mark_objexts_empty() to skip the warning and setting the obj_ext value if it's already set to CODETAG_EMPTY. To quickly detect this WARN, I modified the code from WARN_ON(slab_exts[offs].ref.ct) to BUG_ON(slab_exts[offs].ref.ct == 1); We then obtained this message: [21630.898561] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [21630.898596] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:2050! [21630.898611] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP [21630.900372] Modules linked in: squashfs isofs vfio_iommu_type1 vhost_vsock vfio vhost_net vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vhost tap vhost_iotlb iommufd vsock binfmt_misc nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace netfs tls rds dns_resolver tun brd overlay ntfs3 exfat btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon raid6_pq loop sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables rfkill ip_set sunrpc vfat fat joydev sg sch_fq_codel nfnetlink virtio_gpu sr_mod cdrom drm_client_lib virtio_dma_buf drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper drm ghash_ce backlight virtio_net virtio_blk virtio_scsi net_failover virtio_console failover virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev virtio_pci virtio_pci_legacy_dev virtio_pci_modern_dev virtio virtio_ring autofs4 aes_neon_bs aes_ce_blk [last unloaded: hwpoison_inject] [21630.909177] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3787 Comm: kylin-process-m Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc1+ #74 PREEMPT(voluntary) [21630.910495] Tainted: [W]=WARN [21630.910867] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [21630.911625] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [21630.912392] pc : __free_slab+0x228/0x250 [21630.912868] lr : __free_slab+0x18c/0x250[21630.913334] sp : ffff8000a02f73e0 [21630.913830] x29: ffff8000a02f73e0 x28: fffffdffc43fc800 x27: ffff0000c0011c40 [21630.914677] x26: ffff0000c000cac0 x25: ffff00010fe5e5f0 x24: ffff000102199b40 [21630.915469] x23: 0000000000000003 x22: 0000000000000003 x21: ffff0000c0011c40 [21630.916259] x20: fffffdffc4086600 x19: fffffdffc43fc800 x18: 0000000000000000 [21630.917048] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [21630.917837] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff70001405ee66 [21630.918640] x11: 1ffff0001405ee65 x10: ffff70001405ee65 x9 : ffff800080a295dc [21630.919442] x8 : ffff8000a02f7330 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000003000 [21630.920232] x5 : 0000000024924925 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000007 [21630.921021] x2 : 0000000000001b40 x1 : 000000000000001f x0 : 0000000000000001 [21630.921810] Call trace: [21630.922130] __free_slab+0x228/0x250 (P) [21630.922669] free_slab+0x38/0x118 [21630.923079] free_to_partial_list+0x1d4/0x340 [21630.923591] __slab_free+0x24c/0x348 [21630.924024] ___cache_free+0xf0/0x110 [21630.924468] qlist_free_all+0x78/0x130 [21630.924922] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x11 ---truncated--- | 14 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-31. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.