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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-108947 | 1.9 low | 0.00% | no CPE yet | A flaw has been found in yoshitomo-matsubara torchdistill up to 1.1.5. This affects the function load_ckpt of the file torchdistill/common/main_util.py. Executing a manipulation of the argument src_ckpt can lead to deserialization. The attack needs to be launched locally. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project maintainer explains: "This is very similar to an internal report that GH auto-generated for the owner before, which I found tolerable for this project at that time. So I will close this as duplicate." | 13 Oct |
| CVE-2026-114443 | unscored | — | unknown, security plugin, firewall & malware scanner with auto removal | The Security Plugin, Firewall & Malware Scanner with Auto Removal WordPress plugin before 2.191 does not verify the account password before accepting an authenticator-app two-factor code at login, allowing anyone who holds a user's current authenticator code to log in as that user, including an administrator, without the password. | 4 h ago |
| CVE-2026-114444 | unscored | — | unknown, security plugin, firewall & malware scanner with auto removal | The Security Plugin, Firewall & Malware Scanner with Auto Removal WordPress plugin before 2.191 does not restrict its File System Watcher file viewer to Super Admins or to the files it legitimately tracks, allowing a non-super-admin administrator, including a subsite administrator on WordPress multisite, to read the contents of sensitive tracked files such as the main configuration file and disclose the site's authentication keys, salts and, on a standard install, database credentials. | 4 h ago |
| CVE-2026-99165 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the extension of every removed stream. The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL extension. Fatal-oops policies then panic the host. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f] RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0 Call Trace: sctp_primitive_SEND sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc sctp_sendmsg A range check alone is insufficient. Stream reconfiguration can grow the output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions freed by the earlier shrink. The stream can then be in range while its extension remains NULL. The send-buffer wait has the same issue. Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after each send-path wait that drops the socket lock. Once the lock is reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and queueing. If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is already established. Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent. | 4 h ago |
| CVE-2026-97477 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/counter: Fix num_counters leak on bind_qp failure in alloc_and_bind() When __rdma_counter_bind_qp() fails in alloc_and_bind(), the error path jumps to err_mode which frees the counter without decrementing port_counter->num_counters. The only place that decrements is rdma_counter_free(), which is unreachable since the counter was never successfully bound. This leak accumulates across repeated failures, permanently preventing the port from switching to AUTO mode (-EBUSY in __counter_set_mode()) and blocking the MANUAL→NONE auto-revert in rdma_counter_free(). When the mode was NONE before the call, the MANUAL mode set by __counter_set_mode() also leaks since the revert logic is never reached. Add an err_bind label between the num_counters increment and the existing err_mode label. It decrements num_counters and mirrors the MANUAL→NONE revert from rdma_counter_free(), ensuring the port state is fully restored on bind failure. | 5 h ago |
| CVE-2026-90139 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: check for NULL root inode in fuse_fill_super_submount fuse_iget() can return NULL when its inode allocation fails, but fuse_fill_super_submount() passed the result straight to get_fuse_inode() and decremented fi->nlookup without checking it: root = fuse_iget(sb, parent_fi->nodeid, ...); fi = get_fuse_inode(root); fi->nlookup--; Inside fuse_iget() the inode allocation can fail and return NULL. The submount root takes the iget5_locked() path, whose alloc_inode() can fail under memory pressure (the auto-submount branch can fail the same way in new_inode() or fuse_alloc_submount_lookup()): inode = iget5_locked(sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, fuse_inode_set, &nodeid); if (!inode) return NULL; A NULL root makes get_fuse_inode() a container_of() on NULL and the nlookup decrement a write to a bogus address, oopsing the mount. With CONFIG_KASAN the following null pointer dereference is reported when the root inode allocation of an auto-submount fails (e.g. under memory pressure): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0 Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000002b0 by task ls/942 CPU: 0 PID: 942 Comm: ls Tainted: G W 6.6 #15 Call Trace: <TASK> fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0 vfs_get_tree+0x48/0x140 fc_mount+0x13/0x50 fuse_dentry_automount+0x7a/0xb0 __traverse_mounts+0xca/0x330 step_into+0x339/0xac0 path_lookupat+0xc5/0x2f0 filename_lookup+0x163/0x2a0 vfs_statx+0xd5/0x200 do_statx+0x83/0xd0 __x64_sys_statx+0xa0/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 </TASK> ================================================================== Return -ENOMEM instead; the caller tears down the partially built superblock on error, matching the other error returns in this function. | 5 h ago |
| CVE-2026-86415 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | libcurl's connection cache match function never considers the automatic client certificate option, so a cached, already authenticated Schannel connection can be handed to a transfer that got redirected to a different origin, even though the code explicitly switched off the auto client cert option for that transfer to prevent exactly this. | 5 h ago |
| CVE-2026-98924 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: avoid repeated scans in evict_inodes() We observed hung tasks when users attempted to unmount a filesystem after its disk had been removed while still in use. During device removal, fs_bdev_mark_dead() calls evict_inodes() while holding s_umount. Each time evict_inodes() drops s_inode_list_lock to reschedule, it restarts the walk from the head of s_inodes. With many referenced inodes at the head of the list, these restarts repeatedly scan the same inodes without reclaiming them. This can keep s_umount held for a long time, blocking concurrent umount attempts and triggering hung-task reports. Keep the current inode, already marked I_FREEING, out of the disposal batch until s_inode_list_lock is reacquired. Resume the walk from this inode and dispose of it in a later batch or at the end of the walk. The zero-refcount and state checks under i_lock allow this walker to claim the inode by setting I_FREEING and removing it from the LRU. Other reclaimers skip the inode, leaving this walker responsible for eviction. Only evict() removes it from s_inodes, so keeping it out of the disposal batch ensures that it remains on the list while the lock is dropped. After reacquiring the lock, reading its current next pointer accounts for concurrent removal of following inodes. The existing inode lifetime rules prohibit acquiring a reference to an inode marked I_FREEING or I_WILL_FREE. __iget() requires its caller to hold i_lock and establish that taking a reference is valid. Inode lookup and igrab() check these flags under i_lock when acquiring a reference from zero. ihold() requires an existing reference, which would keep i_count nonzero and prevent this walker from claiming the inode. These rules already allow iput_final() and the inode shrinker to release i_lock after setting I_FREEING and before eviction completes. A temporary __iget() reference would also keep the inode on the list, but its release must preserve last-reference handling. Another user can acquire a reference, update lazy timestamps and drop its reference while the pin is held. If the pin becomes the last reference, dropping it with atomic_dec_and_test() and evicting directly bypasses iput()'s lazytime handling and can lose those timestamp updates. Releasing the pin with iput() preserves that handling, but does not guarantee eviction. fs_bdev_mark_dead() runs with SB_ACTIVE set, so iput() may retain the inode in cache, whereas evict_inodes() must evict eligible zero-reference inodes. The inode may also have been freed when iput() returns, so the walker cannot then use it to force eviction. Using I_FREEING preserves the existing eviction behavior without introducing an additional last-reference transition. The xfstests auto group passed on ext4 and XFS with known unrelated failures excluded. No new issues were observed, and the previously reproducible hung task no longer occurs with this patch. | 23 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40023 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/vf: Don't expose sysfs attributes not applicable for VFs VFs can't read BMG_PCIE_CAP(0x138340) register nor access PCODE (already guarded by the info.skip_pcode flag) so we shouldn't expose attributes that require any of them to avoid errors like: [] xe 0000:03:00.1: [drm] Tile0: GT0: VF is trying to read an \ inaccessible register 0x138340+0x0 [] RIP: 0010:xe_gt_sriov_vf_read32+0x6c2/0x9a0 [xe] [] Call Trace: [] xe_mmio_read32+0x110/0x280 [xe] [] auto_link_downgrade_capable_show+0x2e/0x70 [xe] [] dev_attr_show+0x1a/0x70 [] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xaa/0x120 [] kernfs_seq_show+0x41/0x60 (cherry picked from commit a2d6223d224f333f705ed8495bf8bebfbc585c35) | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40122 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel: Fix IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B MSRs access error When running perf_fuzzer on PTL, sometimes the below "unchecked MSR access error" is seen when accessing IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B MSRs. [ 55.611268] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x1986 (tried to write 0x0000000200000001) at rIP: 0xffffffffac564b28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30) [ 55.611280] Call Trace: [ 55.611282] <TASK> [ 55.611284] ? intel_pmu_config_acr+0x87/0x160 [ 55.611289] intel_pmu_enable_acr+0x6d/0x80 [ 55.611291] intel_pmu_enable_event+0xce/0x460 [ 55.611293] x86_pmu_start+0x78/0xb0 [ 55.611297] x86_pmu_enable+0x218/0x3a0 [ 55.611300] ? x86_pmu_enable+0x121/0x3a0 [ 55.611302] perf_pmu_enable+0x40/0x50 [ 55.611307] ctx_resched+0x19d/0x220 [ 55.611309] __perf_install_in_context+0x284/0x2f0 [ 55.611311] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10 [ 55.611314] remote_function+0x52/0x70 [ 55.611317] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10 [ 55.611319] generic_exec_single+0x84/0x150 [ 55.611323] smp_call_function_single+0xc5/0x1a0 [ 55.611326] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10 [ 55.611329] perf_install_in_context+0xd1/0x1e0 [ 55.611331] ? __pfx___perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10 [ 55.611333] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xa76/0x1040 [ 55.611336] __x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x26/0x30 [ 55.611337] x64_sys_call+0x1d8e/0x20c0 [ 55.611339] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120 [ 55.611343] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e On PTL, GP counter 0 and 1 doesn't support auto counter reload feature, thus it would trigger a #GP when trying to write 1 on bit 0 of CFG_B MSR which requires to enable auto counter reload on GP counter 0. The root cause of causing this issue is the check for auto counter reload (ACR) counter mask from user space is incorrect in intel_pmu_acr_late_setup() helper. It leads to an invalid ACR counter mask from user space could be set into hw.config1 and then written into CFG_B MSRs and trigger the MSR access warning. e.g., User may create a perf event with ACR counter mask (config2=0xcb), and there is only 1 event created, so "cpuc->n_events" is 1. The correct check condition should be "i + idx >= cpuc->n_events" instead of "i + idx > cpuc->n_events" (it looks a typo). Otherwise, the counter mask would traverse twice and an invalid "cpuc->assign[1]" bit (bit 0) is set into hw.config1 and cause MSR accessing error. Besides, also check if the ACR counter mask corresponding events are ACR events. If not, filter out these counter mask. If a event is not a ACR event, it could be scheduled to an HW counter which doesn't support ACR. It's invalid to add their counter index in ACR counter mask. Furthermore, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() since it's easily triggered as user could set any invalid ACR counter mask and the warning message could mislead users. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40181 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kvm: Force legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding MTRRs for TDX/SNP When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_i ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98629 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix manual hash table handle IDR aliasing A u32 hash table created with an explicit handle ('tc filter add ... handle 801: u32 divisor N') keys its IDR entry on the raw handle, while the destroy paths free it under handle2id(handle). The two key domains disagree for handles in the 0x800..0xFFF htid range: handle2id() folds them back into the auto-allocated id space (1..0x7FF). A manual table therefore leaves its raw-keyed IDR entry unreachable on delete (a permanent leak), and its delete can drop the idr entry of an unrelated live auto table. A later auto allocation can then hand out a handle that aliases the live manual table; u32_lookup_ht() first-match routes lookups and TCA_U32_LINK for that htid to the wrong table. Key the divisor-path alloc on handle2id(handle) so allocation and removal share one key domain. A manual handle that maps onto an id already in use is rejected with -ENOSPC, and auto allocation skips ids held by live manual tables. Conditions to recreate: ip link add test0 type dummy tc qdisc add dev test0 clsact tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 \ handle 801: u32 divisor 16 tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 2 u32 divisor 16 tc -d filter show dev test0 ingress | grep 'fh 801:' # unpatched: two live tables with handle 0x80100000 (the pref 2 root # hnode is auto-allocated id 1); patched: the auto hnode takes id 2. Also tested with a poc with a live u32 table on the block, add/delete a manual table 'handle 901: u32 divisor 1' twice; unpatched, the re-add fails with -ENOSPC because the raw key leaked on the first delete. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98595 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table A UDP socket bound to a specific address and port keeps its entry in the 4-tuple hash table after it is disconnected: sk binds to 127.0.0.1:21001 sk connects to 127.0.0.2:20001 // filed in the 4-tuple table sk disconnects, connect(AF_UNSPEC) // still filed, peer now 0.0.0.0:0 __udp_disconnect() takes a socket out of that table only as a side effect of ->rehash() or ->unhash(), and it skips ->rehash() when SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK is set and ->unhash() when SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK is set. commit 6996a2d2d0a6 ("udp: Unhash auto-bound connected sk from 4-tuple hash table when disconnected.") fixed the same end state for a wildcard-bound socket, by a path this one does not take. The entry is counted whether or not anything hits it. hash4_cnt on the hash2 slot stays raised for as long as the socket lives, so udp_has_hash4() keeps sending every packet for that address and port through the 4-tuple lookup first. On IPv6 it can also be hit. __udp_disconnect() does not clear sk_v6_daddr, so udp_v6_rehash() files the entry under the peer the socket was connected to with a zero dport, and inet6_match() compares that same field: a datagram from the former peer with a zero source port matches, and source port zero is accepted on receive. On IPv4 the peer is cleared, so a match would need a zero source address as well, which the routing layer rejects as martian. The stale sk_v6_daddr is a separate defect, not addressed here; removing the entry closes this path either way. The entry can also be relocated. __udp_disconnect() clears sk_bound_dev_if, so a subsequent SO_BINDTODEVICE calls ->rehash(), and because the receive address is still specific udp_lib_rehash() moves the entry instead of removing it, into the bucket that (rcv_saddr, num, 0, 0) hashes to -- a pure function of the address and port, so every socket reaching this state on one address and port collects in one bucket. The bucket cannot be chosen from outside, as udp_ehashfn() is seeded with a per-boot secret. This last one became reachable only with commit 644f9108f3a5 ("udp: Make rehash4 independent in udp_lib_rehash()"), which moved the hash4 handling out of a branch a disconnected socket does not take; the stale entry itself dates from the commit in Fixes. Take the socket out of the table before __udp_disconnect() runs, while it still matches how it was filed. This also reaches the wildcard case ahead of udp_lib_rehash()'s udp_unhash4() branch, leaving that branch unreachable from udp_disconnect(); removing it belongs in net-next. udp_disconnect() and udp_abort() are the only UDP entries into __udp_disconnect(), which is shared with raw, ping and l2tp sockets that are not struct udp_sock: ping_prot.obj_size is sizeof(struct inet_sock), so udp_hashed4() on one would read past the allocation. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98592 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: spacemit: clear TX descriptor on fragment mapping failure emac_tx_mem_map() writes TX_DESC_0_OWN into the ring descriptor for every slot beyond old_head as soon as that slot's memset()'d local copy is committed with "*tx_desc_addr = tx_desc", i.e. before the buffers for that slot have necessarily all been mapped successfully. If emac_tx_map_frag() then fails on a later fragment, the err_free_skb path calls emac_free_tx_buf() to unmap and drop the skb, but leaves the already-written descriptor memory untouched, and tx_ring->head is never advanced past old_head (the "tx_ring->head = head" store is skipped by the goto). So a slot between old_head and the rolled-back head can be left with TX_DESC_0_OWN set and buffer_addr_{1,2} pointing at DMA mappings that emac_free_tx_buf() just tore down, while software considers that slot free again. The next successful emac_tx_mem_map() call only rebuilds old_head itself; if the DMA engine auto-advances into the following descriptor once it finishes old_head's packet, it will fetch that stale, already-unmapped address. emac_tx_clean_desc() already treats emac_free_tx_buf() and clearing the descriptor as a pair when reclaiming completed descriptors; do the same in the mapping failure path. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98587 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firewire: cdev: fix back-transition for iso_resource_auto client resource The todo member of iso_resource_auto structure represents the state of the client resource and normally transitions in the following order: ISO_RES_AUTO_ALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC However, concurrent access from the work item and the file descriptor release function can cause the state to transition backwards from ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC to ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC. Prevent the back-transition by checking the current state before updating it in the work item. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98104 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness within the table's node ID space. The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one failed add compounds into further duplicates. The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht->handle_idr is per hash table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes. The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure: it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(), allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same exhaustion check that the divisor path already has. Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM when the hash table ID space is exhausted. The extack message distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from a transient allocation failure (-ENOMEM). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_CLS_U32=y (or =m with module loaded) - Create a clsact qdisc on a device, then add 4095 u32 filters with auto-generated handles to fill the node ID space for the root hash table (single bucket). The 4096th auto-handle filter add triggers the duplicate handle (fh 800::fff reused). Reachable at Level 2 (unshare -Urn, namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN). - For gen_new_htid: create 2047 u32 proto entries on the same block to fill the tp_c handle pool, then create one more. The root table gets handle 0 and aliases with other handle-0 root tables. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-93257 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: handle nogenerate/noverify properly in fs-integrity Check the BIP_CHECK flags before generating or verifying PI information, otherwise this can be incorrectly called for non-PI metadata and cause generation of incorrect metadata and crashed in the verification handler. The new behavior matches that of the block layer auto-generated metadata. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-93193 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(), the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a symmetrical way [1]. Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90323 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: validate auto buf reg before taking uring_cmd With UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG, invalid sqe->addr can fail after ublk_fill_io_cmd() has set UBLK_IO_FLAG_ACTIVE. The uring_cmd is completed while the tag stays active, which can hang teardown. Split validation from buffer apply so the check has no side effects, then take the uring_cmd and store the already-validated buffer. Apply the same order in FETCH so io->buf is not written before __ublk_fetch() state checks. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90119 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ice1712: Fix the card leak at probe error with the auto-cleanup snd_ice1712_probe() performs multiple initialization steps after snd_card_new(), but directly returns on failures from later steps without releasing the ALSA card, causing resource leaks when probing fails. Use snd_devm_card_new() together with scope-based cleanup via __free(snd_card_unref), and clear the card pointer after successful registration to keep it alive. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-89590 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: Fix error path handling in rocket_job_run() In rocket_job_run(), after taking an extra fence reference for job->done_fence via dma_fence_get(), the error paths have three bugs: - The dma_fence reference held by job->done_fence is never released, causing a reference leak. - pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the usage counter even on failure, but the error path does not decrement it, leaking the runtime PM reference and preventing the NPU from suspending. - A valid but unsignaled fence is returned to the DRM scheduler, which triggers WARN("Fence ... released with pending signals!") when the scheduler drops its reference. Fix by replacing pm_runtime_get_sync() with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() which auto-balances the usage counter on failure, releasing both fence references on error, and returning ERR_PTR(ret) instead of the unsignaled fence. [tomeu: Refactored error paths to use consolidated goto labels] | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80818 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Fix CMD_SYNC use-after-free on teardown arm_smmu_impl_remove() is registered as a devres action in arm_smmu_impl_probe(), before arm_smmu_init_queues() allocates smmu->cmdq.q.base. On a devres unwind, whether a failed probe or an unbind, the queue is freed first and arm_smmu_impl_remove() then runs tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf(), whose VINTF deinit issues a CMD_SYNC on the freed memory. Observed during testing with a QEMU hack that makes the VCMDQ fail to enable, so the impl reset fails and probe aborts into the devres unwind: platform NVDA200C:00: tegra241_cmdqv: VINTF0: VCMDQ0/LVCMDQ0: failed to enable, STATUS=0x00000000 platform NVDA200C:00: tegra241_cmdqv: VINTF0: VCMDQ0/LVCMDQ0: GERRORN=0x0, GERROR=0x4, CONS=0x0 platform NVDA200C:00: tegra241_cmdqv: VINTF0: VCMDQ0/LVCMDQ0: uncleared error detected, resetting arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.0.auto: failed to reset impl arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.0.auto: probe with driver arm-smmu-v3 failed with error -110 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000891e0098 ... Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000047 [#1] SMP ... Call trace: arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x320/0x6fc (P) tegra241_vcmdq_hw_deinit+0x98/0x168 tegra241_vintf_hw_deinit+0x5c/0x1b0 tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf+0x34/0xec tegra241_cmdqv_remove+0x40/0x9c arm_smmu_impl_remove+0x20/0x30 devm_action_release+0x14/0x20 devres_release_all+0xa8/0x110 device_unbind_cleanup+0x18/0x84 really_probe+0x1f0/0x29c Drop the VINTF deinit from tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf() so the unwind no longer touches the freed queue. Quiesce the VINTFs earlier instead. Add a device_disable() impl op and run it from arm_smmu_disable_action() while the CMDQ is still up. That handles a live unbind. A failed reset is already handled because tegra241_vintf_hw_init() deinits the VINTF on its own error path. tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf() is also used by the iommufd viommu destroy path, so quiesce there too. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80795 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated() nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS. ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an auto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the limit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the array (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to walk the array with the inflated count: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci] Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12 Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci] Call trace: nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci] nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci] nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci] process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500 worker_thread+0x240/0x460 kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618) Guard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by nci_add_new_target(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80794 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf / nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF technology-specific parameters are only extracted when rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it: - discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol(); - activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol(). nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0 nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0 nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30 nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0 process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0 worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0 kthread+0x376/0x500 Local variable ntf.i created at: nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30 Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as zero when no technology-specific parameters are present. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68216 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Disable trampoline for kernel module function trace The current LoongArch BPF trampoline implementation is incompatible with tracing functions in kernel modules. This causes several severe and user-visible problems: * The `bpf_selftests/module_attach` test fails consistently. * Kernel lockup when a BPF program is attached to a module function [1]. * Critical kernel modules like WireGuard experience traffic disruption when their functions are traced with fentry [2]. Given the severity and the potential for other unknown side-effects, it is safest to disable the feature entirely for now. This patch prevents the BPF subsystem from allowing trampoline attachments to kernel module functions on LoongArch. This is a temporary mitigation until the core issues in the trampoline code for kernel module handling can be identified and fixed. [root@fedora bpf]# ./test_progs -a module_attach -v bpf_testmod.ko is already unloaded. Loading bpf_testmod.ko... Successfully loaded bpf_testmod.ko. test_module_attach:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target 0 nsec test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target_explicit 0 nsec test_module_attach:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to attach: -ENOTSUPP libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to auto-attach: -ENOTSUPP test_module_attach:FAIL:skel_attach skeleton attach failed: -524 Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED Successfully unloaded bpf_testmod.ko. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wDmpC-hP4u4pJY8T-yfKyk4yRzpu2LMO+C13FMT58oqQ@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wYcpc+OwdLDUBvg2rF9rvvyc5amfHT-KcFaK93uoELPg@mail.gmail.com/ | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68220 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: ti: netcp: Standardize knav_dma_open_channel to return NULL on error Make knav_dma_open_channel consistently return NULL on error instead of ERR_PTR. Currently the header include/linux/soc/ti/knav_dma.h returns NULL when the driver is disabled, but the driver implementation does not even return NULL or ERR_PTR on failure, causing inconsistency in the users. This results in a crash in netcp_free_navigator_resources as followed (trimmed): Unhandled fault: alignment exception (0x221) at 0xfffffff2 [fffffff2] *pgd=80000800207003, *pmd=82ffda003, *pte=00000000 Internal error: : 221 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7 #1 NONE Hardware name: Keystone PC is at knav_dma_close_channel+0x30/0x19c LR is at netcp_free_navigator_resources+0x2c/0x28c [... TRIM...] Call trace: knav_dma_close_channel from netcp_free_navigator_resources+0x2c/0x28c netcp_free_navigator_resources from netcp_ndo_open+0x430/0x46c netcp_ndo_open from __dev_open+0x114/0x29c __dev_open from __dev_change_flags+0x190/0x208 __dev_change_flags from netif_change_flags+0x1c/0x58 netif_change_flags from dev_change_flags+0x38/0xa0 dev_change_flags from ip_auto_config+0x2c4/0x11f0 ip_auto_config from do_one_initcall+0x58/0x200 do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1cc/0x238 kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x1c/0x12c kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x38 [... TRIM...] Standardize the error handling by making the function return NULL on all error conditions. The API is used in just the netcp_core.c so the impact is limited. Note, this change, in effect reverts commit 5b6cb43b4d62 ("net: ethernet: ti: netcp_core: return error while dma channel open issue"), but provides a less error prone implementation. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74659 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mrp: fix uninitialised bytes on the wire br_mrp_alloc_test_skb() builds MRP test frames on an skb from dev_alloc_skb(), which does not clear the linear data area. On the MRA ring-role branch the sub-option TLV header is appended with sub_tlv = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*sub_tlv)); sub_tlv->type = BR_MRP_SUB_TLV_HEADER_TEST_AUTO_MGR; so sub_tlv->length is never written, and the two trailing alignment bytes are appended with a bare skb_put() that does not clear them either. The neighbouring oui and sub_opt regions are explicitly zeroed, so three uninitialised bytes are left in every MRA MRP_Test frame that goes out. Put the sub-option TLV header and the alignment padding in a single skb_put_zero(), which clears both. The AUTO_MGR sub-TLV carries no payload, so the zeroed length field is already the value it should have. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68289 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_eem: Fix memory leak in eem_unwrap The existing code did not handle the failure case of usb_ep_queue in the command path, potentially leading to memory leaks. Improve error handling to free all allocated resources on usb_ep_queue failure. This patch continues to use goto logic for error handling, as the existing error handling is complex and not easily adaptable to auto-cleanup helpers. kmemleak results: unreferenced object 0xffffff895a512300 (size 240): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1b4/0x358 skb_clone+0x90/0xd8 eem_unwrap+0x1cc/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff8a157f4000 (size 256): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x140 dwc3_gadget_ep_alloc_request+0x58/0x11c usb_ep_alloc_request+0x40/0xe4 eem_unwrap+0x204/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff8aadbaac00 (size 128): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc __kmalloc+0x64/0x1a8 eem_unwrap+0x218/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff89ccef3500 (size 64): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x140 eem_unwrap+0x238/0x36c | 13 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.