BaselineWatch
61031 CVEs · 136 in KEV
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CVEs known61,031 New, 24 h185 Changed, 24 h188 In KEV136 Public exploit1,650 Match watchlist0

Vulnerabilities

All My stack Known exploited Public exploit Critical (9+) Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%) Changed, 24 h New, 24 h Sort: risk modified published CVSS EPSS
CVECVSSEPSSVendor, productDescriptionModified
CVE-2026-105240 5.3 medium 1.0% apache, log4net Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character vulnerability in the OutputDebugStringAppender of Apache log4net. A NUL character in logged content ended the debug output record at that point, so everything the layout rendered after it, including exception text and trailing fields, was silently lost. A party whose data reaches a log message could hide the rest of that record. Only applications on Windows that use OutputDebugStringAppender are affected. This issue affects Apache log4net: from 1.2.9 before 3.5.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.5.0, which fixes the issue. 9 Oct
CVE-2026-10577 10.0 critical 0.00% no CPE yet A security issue exists within the 1715-AENTR EtherNet/IP Adapter. The affected product exposes a network-accessible debug port that does not enforce proper privilege controls, allowing unauthenticated remote access to intrusive command-line interface (CLI) commands. If exploited, a threat actor could read or delete files, stop tasks, modify memory, and change I/O states, potentially impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the device. 24 Oct
CVE-2026-80589 9.8 critical 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: stop the timeout timer when releasing a never added disk disk_release() undoes blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() for a disk whose probe failed before add_disk(), but it only calls blk_mq_exit_queue(). Nothing there stops q->timeout, and that timer rolls forward: it stays pending until it next expires, not until the last request completes. So if the driver issued any I/O before adding the disk, the request_queue is freed while still linked into a timer wheel bucket. Commit 6f8191fdf41d ("block: simplify disk shutdown") dropped the blk_cleanup_queue() call that used to stop it. __del_gendisk() and blk_mq_destroy_queue() still do; only the probe failure path lost it. nvme gets there because nvme_update_ns_info() submits Report Zones or FDP io-mgmt-recv on ns->queue before the disk is added, so a later failure - a concurrent reset setting NVME_CTRL_FROZEN, or device_add_disk() failing - lands in put_disk() with the timer armed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x30c/0x340 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888004d71310 by task kworker/u8:2/37 __timer_delete_sync+0x156/0x240 kernel/time/timer.c:1621 blk_sync_queue+0x22/0x40 block/blk-core.c:222 nvme_sync_queues+0x100/0x150 drivers/nvme/host/core.c:5362 nvme_reset_work+0x138/0x930 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:3264 Allocated by task 34: __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x33/0x100 block/blk-mq.c:4462 nvme_alloc_ns+0x290/0x3870 drivers/nvme/host/core.c:4146 Freed by task 0: blk_free_queue_rcu+0x3a/0x50 block/blk-core.c:254 rcu_core+0xc10/0x1730 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2857 The queue being synced there is ctrl->admin_q, only a victim sharing a timer wheel bucket with the freed queue's dangling entry; other runs tripped in enqueue_timer(), __run_timers() or blk_mq_timeout_work(). Failing nvme_alloc_ns() with a debug patch makes it deterministic: one leaked timer trips KASAN within seconds, while 1987 patched releases produced no splat. Stop the timer and the queue work items before blk_mq_exit_queue(), like blk_mq_destroy_queue() does. Found by FuzzNvme. 16 Oct
CVE-2026-54458 9.6 critical 0.00% no CPE yet WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16. 24 Oct
CVE-2026-114357 9.3 critical 0.00% no CPE yet Missing authentication for a critical function in the Android Debug Bridge daemon (adbd) in DJI CrystalSky ZS600C firmware v0.3.9.7 through v0.6.6.9 allows an attacker to obtain an unauthenticated shell (uid 2000), a foothold for privilege escalation to root. The device ships with ro.adb.secure=0 (no host key authorization) and USB ADB enabled by default; ADB over TCP is not enabled by default but, once enabled (e.g. via the shipped /system/bin/adbd_tcp.sh or 'setprop persist.adb.tcp.port 5555'), the same unauthenticated shell is reachable over the network (CVSS 4.0 base 9.3). Wed 28 Oct
CVE-2026-102628 9.2 critical 0.00% no CPE yet The Cadmos LTI application hosted at cadmos.eummena.io had Laravel debug mode enabled (APP_DEBUG=true, APP_ENV=local) in a publicly accessible environment. An unauthenticated attacker could send a GET request and trigger an unhandled exception, causing Laravel to expose the entire server environment, including all .env configuration variables, in plaintext. Fixed on or before 2026-09-02. 11 Oct
CVE-2025-4106 8.9 high 0.00% no CPE yet An authenticated admin user with access to both the management WebUI and command line interface on a Firebox can enable a diagnostic debug shell by uploading a platform and version-specific diagnostic package and executing a leftover diagnostic command. 8 Oct
CVE-2026-98981 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: unhash a dentry before detaching the mounts on it unlink(), rmdir() and rename() remove the entry from the filesystem, call detach_mounts() on the entry with the inode locked and then call d_delete() once the inode is unlocked. The thing is that between detach_mounts() and d_delete() the dentry is still hashed and positive. But after detach_mounts() nothing covers the dentry anymore. A lookup that finds this dentry in the dcache can uncover what the mounts hid. That's a problem when unlinking files or directories that are mountpoints in other mount namespaces. Everybody who had the underlying entry covered can race the detach_mount() call until d_delete() has run. The race window isn't all that small. It encompasses namespace_unlock() with a full synchronize_rcu_expedited() grace period and the inode_unlock() of the entry. In my experiments three walkers that kept trying read an overmounted file in 11938 of the 16140 unlinks that removed its mountpoint from a bind mount of the filesystem within a minute. Fun fact, d_invalidate() has the same ordering problem but gets it right. It unhashes the dentry first and detaches the mounts afterwards. Let's do the same in __detach_mounts(): - A lookup that hasn't found the dentry yet misses it in the dcache and waits for the directory lock that the caller holds until the name is gone for good. - A lockless lookup that found it already fails the mount_lock check while the dentry still counts as a mountpoint and the d_seq check once it doesn't, and retries. This fixes the lockless path. We still need to fix the reference count lookup in a follow-up patch. So d_drop() the dentry. The dentry stays positive and held but can't be found anymore. Then proceed with the detach and unlink. Reproducer: The reads were counted with the program below, three walkers for 60 s in a VM with 4 CPUs. The race window is stretched with the debug patch pasted here. fs.detach_race_walk_us sleeps in lookup_fast() once it found a mountpoint dentry and before its mounts are crossed. fs.detach_race_unlink_us sleeps in vfs_unlink() between detach_mounts() and d_delete(). // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of * its mount, against lookups that open it through that copy. * * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1, * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT. * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED). * * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers] */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdatomic.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/openat2.h> #ifndef __NR_open_tree #define __NR_open_tree 428 #endif #ifndef __NR_move_mount #define __NR_move_mount 429 #endif #ifndef __NR_openat2 #define __NR_openat2 437 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 #endif #define WORK "/tmp/uc" #define ADIR WORK "/A" static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3; static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting; static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER; static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 wh ---truncated--- 24 Oct
CVE-2026-43249 8.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p/xen: protect xen_9pfs_front_free against concurrent calls The xenwatch thread can race with other back-end change notifications and call xen_9pfs_front_free() twice, hitting the observed general protection fault due to a double-free. Guard the teardown path so only one caller can release the front-end state at a time, preventing the crash. This is a fix for the following double-free: [ 27.052347] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI [ 27.052357] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 32 Comm: xenwatch Not tainted 6.18.0-02087-g51ab33fc0a8b-dirty #60 PREEMPT(none) [ 27.052363] RIP: e030:xen_9pfs_front_free+0x1d/0x150 [ 27.052368] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 48 d0 92 85 53 e8 cb cb 05 00 48 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 <48> 3b 28 0f 85 f9 28 35 fe 48 3b 6a 08 0f 85 ef 28 35 fe 48 89 42 [ 27.052377] RSP: e02b:ffffc9004016fdd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 27.052381] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff88800d66e400 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 27.052385] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 27.052389] RBP: ffff88800a887040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 27.052393] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888009e46b68 [ 27.052397] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800a887040 [ 27.052404] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88808ca57000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 27.052408] CS: e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 27.052412] CR2: 00007f9714004360 CR3: 0000000004834000 CR4: 0000000000050660 [ 27.052418] Call Trace: [ 27.052420] <TASK> [ 27.052422] xen_9pfs_front_changed+0x5d5/0x720 [ 27.052426] ? xenbus_otherend_changed+0x72/0x140 [ 27.052430] ? __pfx_xenwatch_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 27.052434] xenwatch_thread+0x94/0x1c0 [ 27.052438] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 27.052442] kthread+0xf8/0x240 [ 27.052445] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 27.052449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 27.052452] ret_from_fork+0x16b/0x1a0 [ 27.052456] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 27.052459] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 27.052463] </TASK> [ 27.052465] Modules linked in: [ 27.052471] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 21 Oct
CVE-2026-89811 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Add TLB flush after MES queue eviction/suspension MES (Micro Engine Scheduler) does not perform heavy-weight TLB invalidation after unmapping queues, unlike HWS which does this automatically. This causes a race condition where in-flight DMA descriptors can access memory that has been unmapped, leading to page faults and GPU queue hangs during SVM page migration. The issue manifests as KFDSVMRangeTest.MultiThreadMigrationTest failures on gfx1151 (Strix Point) with XNACK mode 1 enabled - the GPU compute queue hangs with packets submitted but never consumed. Add kfd_flush_tlb() calls after MES queue removal in two locations: - evict_process_queues_cpsch(): after all queues removed during eviction - suspend_queues(): after debug/criu queue suspension (with mem_fence barrier) This ensures all in-flight memory accesses from unmapped queues are flushed before memory is freed or migrated. (cherry picked from commit f5c4f88e0f9c45a8fb9dfac0c1df726c95e41b77) 21 Oct
CVE-2026-104795 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise 20 Oct
CVE-2026-68199 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB access from firmware ADDBA window size aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access. Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size. 19 Oct
CVE-2026-23462 8.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: HIDP: Fix possible UAF This fixes the following trace caused by not dropping l2cap_conn reference when user->remove callback is called: [ 97.809249] l2cap_conn_free: freeing conn ffff88810a171c00 [ 97.809907] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1419 Comm: repro_standalon Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 97.809935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 97.809947] Call Trace: [ 97.809954] <TASK> [ 97.809961] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 97.809990] l2cap_conn_free (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1808) [ 97.810017] l2cap_conn_del (./include/linux/kref.h:66 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1821 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1798) [ 97.810055] l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7347 (discriminator 1) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7340 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810086] ? __pfx_l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7341) [ 97.810117] hci_conn_hash_flush (./include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2152 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2644 (discriminator 2)) [ 97.810148] hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5360) [ 97.810180] ? __pfx_hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5285) [ 97.810212] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810242] ? up_write (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:87 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2852 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:268 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:3391 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1385 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643 (discriminator 5)) [ 97.810267] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810290] ? rcu_is_watching (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 ./include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 kernel/rcu/tree.c:752) [ 97.810320] hci_unregister_dev (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:504 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2716) [ 97.810346] vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:691) [ 97.810375] ? __pfx_vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:678) [ 97.810404] __fput (fs/file_table.c:470) [ 97.810430] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:235) [ 97.810451] ? __pfx_task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:201) [ 97.810472] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810495] ? do_raw_spin_unlock (./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:128 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:142 (discriminator 5)) [ 97.810527] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:972) [ 97.810547] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810574] ? __pfx_do_exit (kernel/exit.c:897) [ 97.810594] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:470 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 (discriminator 6)) [ 97.810616] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810639] ? do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:95 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:118 (discriminator 4)) [ 97.810664] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810688] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810721] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1093) [ 97.810745] get_signal (kernel/signal.c:3007 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810772] ? security_file_permission (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:37 security/security.c:2366) [ 97.810803] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810826] ? vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555) [ 97.810854] ? __pfx_get_signal (kernel/signal.c:2800) [ 97.810880] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810905] ? __pfx_vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555) [ 97.810932] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810960] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/ ---truncated--- 19 Oct
CVE-2025-59144 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet debug is a JavaScript debugging utility. On 8 September 2025, the npm publishing account for debug was taken over after a phishing attack. Version 4.4.2 was published, functionally identical to the previous patch version, but with a malware payload added attempting to redirect cryptocurrency transactions to the attacker's own addresses from within browser environments. Local environments, server environments, command line applications, etc. are not affected. If the package was used in a browser context (e.g. a direct <script> inclusion, or via a bundling tool such as Babel, Rollup, Vite, Next.js, etc.) there is a chance the malware still exists and such bundles will need to be rebuilt. The malware seemingly only targets cryptocurrency transactions and wallets such as MetaMask. npm removed the offending package from the registry over the course of the day on 8 September, preventing further downloads from npm proper. On 13 September, the package owner published new patch versions to help cache-bust those using private registries who might still have the compromised version cached. Users should upgrade to the latest patch version, completely remove their node_modules directory, clean their package manager's global cache, and rebuild any browser bundles from scratch. Those operating private registries or registry mirrors should purge the offending versions from any caches. This issue has been resolved in 4.4.3. 19 Oct
CVE-2025-68736 8.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories Disconnected files or directories can appear when they are visible and opened from a bind mount, but have been renamed or moved from the source of the bind mount in a way that makes them inaccessible from the mount point (i.e. out of scope). Previously, access rights tied to files or directories opened through a disconnected directory were collected by walking the related hierarchy down to the root of the filesystem, without taking into account the mount point because it couldn't be found. This could lead to inconsistent access results, potential access right widening, and hard-to-debug renames, especially since such paths cannot be printed. For a sandboxed task to create a disconnected directory, it needs to have write access (i.e. FS_MAKE_REG, FS_REMOVE_FILE, and FS_REFER) to the underlying source of the bind mount, and read access to the related mount point. Because a sandboxed task cannot acquire more access rights than those defined by its Landlock domain, this could lead to inconsistent access rights due to missing permissions that should be inherited from the mount point hierarchy, while inheriting permissions from the filesystem hierarchy hidden by this mount point instead. Landlock now handles files and directories opened from disconnected directories by taking into account the filesystem hierarchy when the mount point is not found in the hierarchy walk, and also always taking into account the mount point from which these disconnected directories were opened. This ensures that a rename is not allowed if it would widen access rights [1]. The rationale is that, even if disconnected hierarchies might not be visible or accessible to a sandboxed task, relying on the collected access rights from them improves the guarantee that access rights will not be widened during a rename because of the access right comparison between the source and the destination (see LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER). It may look like this would grant more access on disconnected files and directories, but the security policies are always enforced for all the evaluated hierarchies. This new behavior should be less surprising to users and safer from an access control perspective. Remove a wrong WARN_ON_ONCE() canary in collect_domain_accesses() and fix the related comment. Because opened files have their access rights stored in the related file security properties, there is no impact for disconnected or unlinked files. 16 Oct
CVE-2026-5777 8.7 high 0.00% no CPE yet This vulnerability exists in the Atom 3x Projector due to improper exposure of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) service over the local network without authentication or access controls. An unauthenticated attacker on the same network can exploit this vulnerability to obtain root-level access, leading to complete compromise of the targeted device. Mon 26 Oct
CVE-2026-8169 8.7 high 0.00% no CPE yet ExtremeXOS (EXOS) uses a challenge-response mechanism to authorize access to the privileged debug-mode function. The challenge value is generated using an insufficiently random source, which under certain conditions may allow an attacker to predict the expected response and activate debug-mode without authorization. Depending on device configuration and version, this may enable escalation to root-level access and persistent modification of the device software stack. Exploitation requires either a valid low-privilege account on the device (remote scenario) or physical serial console access (local scenario). This vulnerability is distinct from CVE-2017-14329, which addressed a different issue involving Python script privileges. Extreme would like to thank Hadrien Barral (Université Gustave Eiffel) and Georges-Axel Jaloyan (French Ministry of the Interior) for responsible disclosure of their findings. 24 Oct
CVE-2025-64983 8.6 high 0.00% no CPE yet Smart Video Doorbell firmware versions prior to 2.01.078 contain an active debug code vulnerability that allows an attacker to connect via Telnet and gain access to the device. 18 Oct
CVE-2025-10653 8.6 high 0.00% no CPE yet An unauthenticated debug port may allow access to the device file system. 12 Oct
CVE-2025-34251 8.6 high 0.00% no CPE yet Tesla Telematics Control Unit (TCU) firmware prior to v2025.14 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability. The TCU runs the Android Debug Bridge (adbd) as root and, despite a “lockdown” check that disables adb shell, still permits adb push/pull and adb forward. Because adbd is privileged and the device’s USB port is exposed externally, an attacker with physical access can write an arbitrary file to a writable location and then overwrite the kernel’s uevent_helper or /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug entries via ADB, causing the script to be executed with root privileges. 9 Oct
CVE-2024-32008 8.5 high 0.00% no CPE yet A vulnerability has been identified in Spectrum Power 4 (All versions < V4.70 SP12 Update 2). The affected application is vulnerable to a local privilege escalation due to an exposed debug interface on the localhost. This allows any local user to gain code execution as administrative application user. 23 Oct
CVE-2025-34190 8.5 high 0.00% vasion, virtual_appliance_application, virtual_appliance_host Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host versions prior to 25.1.102 and Application versions prior to 25.1.1413 (macOS/Linux client deployments) are vulnerable to an authentication bypass in PrinterInstallerClientService. The service requires root privileges for certain administrative operations, but these checks rely on calls to geteuid(). By preloading a malicious shared object overriding geteuid(), a local attacker can trick the service into believing it is running with root privileges. This bypass enables execution of administrative commands (e.g., enabling debug mode, managing configurations, or invoking privileged features) without proper authorization. While some actions requiring write access to protected files may still fail, the flaw effectively breaks the intended security model of the inter-process communication (IPC) system, allowing local attackers to escalate privileges and compromise system integrity. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced. 18 Oct
CVE-2025-71425 8.5 high 0.00% no CPE yet Contrast (Edgeless Systems) before 1.8.1 logs the workload secret to stderr, and thus to Kubernetes logs, when the Contrast initializer is configured with CONTRAST_LOG_LEVEL set to info or debug. Because info is the default, all installations that do not customize the initializer log level are affected. This exposes workload secrets — normally accessible only to the Contrast Coordinator, the initializer, the seedshare owner, and the workload owner — to Kubernetes users with get or list permission on pods/logs and to anyone with read access to the Kubernetes log storage, such as the cloud provider. Deployments that do not use workload secrets are unaffected. 14 Oct
CVE-2026-4857 8.4 high 0.00% no CPE yet IdentityIQ 8.5, all IdentityIQ 8.5 patch levels prior to 8.5p2, IdentityIQ 8.4, and all IdentityIQ 8.4 patch levels prior to 8.4p4 allow authenticated users assigned the Debug Pages Read Only capability or any custom capability with the ViewAccessDebugPage SPRight to incorrectly create new IdentityIQ objects. Until a remediating security fix or patches containing this security fix are installed, the Debug Pages Read Only capability and any custom capabilities that contain the ViewAccessDebugPage SPRight should be unassigned from all identities and workgroups. Mon 26 Oct
CVE-2026-9593 8.4 high 0.00% no CPE yet A vulnerability in the iDTM FDI allows an attacker with elevated privileges and access to the host system to enable the debug interface by placing a crafted file in the application directory, potentially resulting in unauthorized access to connected devices and exposure, modification, or disruption of device data or operation. 23 Oct
CVE-2026-80536 8.4 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item: memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT), item->ri_buf[i].iov_base, nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT); The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(), which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat model XFS already guards against elsewhere. Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error. Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it. 16 Oct
CVE-2026-74589 8.4 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix sk_redir use-after-free in send verdict sk_psock_msg_verdict() takes a socket reference for psock->sk_redir. tcp_bpf_send_verdict() copies that pointer while holding the source socket lock, but does not take a reference for the local copy before dropping the lock around tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(). When apply_bytes keeps the cached verdict active, another sendmsg() on the same source socket can consume the remaining bytes and release the cached reference while the first thread still holds only the raw local pointer: CPU 0 CPU 1 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir apply_bytes remains nonzero release_sock(sk) lock_sock(sk) apply_bytes reaches zero psock->sk_redir = NULL release_sock(sk) tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir) sock_put(sk_redir) tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir) The final sock_put() can free sk_redir before CPU 0 dereferences it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0xf39/0x1020 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888108537090 by task poc/87 Call Trace: tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0xf39/0x1020 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x977/0x1a50 __sys_sendto+0x32c/0x3a0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdb/0x1b0 Allocated by task 85: sk_prot_alloc+0x56/0x210 sk_clone+0x6f/0x14b0 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x24/0x740 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x25/0x2710 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x10a/0xe00 Freed by task 0: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xa6/0x1e0 rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850 Last potentially related work creation: __sk_destruct+0x3da/0x540 sk_psock_destroy+0x81e/0xab0 process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070 Take a temporary socket reference while the source socket lock still protects psock->sk_redir, and drop it after tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir() returns. This keeps each unlocked use independent of cached-verdict ownership. 16 Oct
CVE-2025-30185 8.3 high 0.00% no CPE yet Active debug code for some Intel UEFI reference platforms within Ring 0: Kernel may allow a denial of service and escalation of privilege. System software adversary with a privileged user combined with a low complexity attack may enable data alteration. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are not present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (none), integrity (high) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (high) and availability (high) impacts. 19 Oct
CVE-2026-119117 8.2 high 0.00% aws, amazon-kinesis-producer Insertion of sensitive information into a log file in Amazon Kinesis Producer Library for Java before 1.0.8, when the library's logger is configured at DEBUG log level, might allow local users to obtain the AWS credentials that the library resolved for the application. Separately, affected versions of the library pass these credentials to the native child process as command-line arguments, where a local user can read them from the process argument list. To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.0.8 or later, rotate any long-term IAM user keys, revoke active role sessions where needed, and restrict or redact log data written by an affected version. 0.x users should migrate to software.amazon.kinesis:amazon-kinesis-producer 1.0.8 or later. Fri 30 Oct
CVE-2026-45089 8.2 high 0.00% no CPE yet Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, when dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the IsLibrary guard in DalLog, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0. Mon 26 Oct
CVE-2026-43466 8.2 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix DMA FIFO desync on error CQE SQ recovery In case of a TX error CQE, a recovery flow is triggered, mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc() resets dma_fifo_cc to 0 but not dma_fifo_pc, desyncing the DMA FIFO producer and consumer. After recovery, the producer pushes new DMA entries at the old dma_fifo_pc, while the consumer reads from position 0. This causes us to unmap stale DMA addresses from before the recovery. The DMA FIFO is a purely software construct with no HW counterpart. At the point of reset, all WQEs have been flushed so dma_fifo_cc is already equal to dma_fifo_pc. There is no need to reset either counter, similar to how skb_fifo pc/cc are untouched. Remove the 'dma_fifo_cc = 0' reset. This fixes the following WARNING: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1240 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa bonding mlx5_ib mlx5_vfio_pci ipip mlx5_fwctl tunnel4 mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve ip6_gre ip_gre gre nf_tables ip6_tunnel rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core act_mirred act_skbedit act_vlan vhost_net vhost tap ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress vhost_iotlb iptable_raw tunnel6 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio openvswitch nsh rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay zram zsmalloc rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core fuse [last unloaded: nf_tables] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2024_12_30_21_33 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Code: 2b 4d 3b 21 72 26 4d 3b 61 08 73 20 49 89 d8 44 89 f9 5b 4c 89 f2 4c 89 e6 48 89 ef 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 c7 ae 9e ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn+0x7d/0x110 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? report_bug+0x16d/0x180 ? handle_bug+0x4f/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x2e/0x90 dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x10d/0x1b0 mlx5e_tx_wi_dma_unmap+0xbe/0x120 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_poll_tx_cq+0x16d/0x690 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x8b/0xac0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x24/0x190 net_rx_action+0x32a/0x3b0 ? mlx5_eq_comp_int+0x7e/0x270 [mlx5_core] ? notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xa0 handle_softirqs+0xc9/0x270 irq_exit_rcu+0x71/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 19 Oct
CVE-2026-22061 8.2 high 0.00% no CPE yet Trident versions v25.02.1 through v26.06.1 are susceptible to a vulnerability that could allow an authenticated attacker with access to debug logs to view LUKS passphrases or SMB Active Directory credentials. 16 Oct
CVE-2026-58086 8.1 high 0.00% freebsd As an inadvertent side effect of an unrelated code change, PRIV_KTRACE was always denied to a jailed root user. Tracing configured by a jailed root user was therefore not flagged as privileged. An unprivileged user in a jail that has permission to debug the target process can modify the jailed root user's ktrace(2) flags, or disable tracing outright. A jailed root user therefore cannot reliably trace unprivileged processes. Tue 27 Oct
CVE-2026-64368 8.1 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the comment accordingly. 19 Oct
CVE-2023-52761 7.8 high 0.00% linux In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to `shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu `overflow_stack`. If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`. Following are the changes in this patch - Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination register. - In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH (CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel). Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative solution. Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT` Kernel crash log below Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000] Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370] CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80 gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88 t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0 s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000 a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90 s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684 s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10 s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) Call Trace: [<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38 [<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c [<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe [<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0 [<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]--- Fri 30 Oct
CVE-2023-53718 7.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Do not swap cpu_buffer during resize process When ring_buffer_swap_cpu was called during resize process, the cpu buffer was swapped in the middle, resulting in incorrect state. Continuing to run in the wrong state will result in oops. This issue can be easily reproduced using the following two scripts: /tmp # cat test1.sh //#! /bin/sh for i in `seq 0 100000` do echo 2000 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb sleep 0.5 echo 5000 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb sleep 0.5 done /tmp # cat test2.sh //#! /bin/sh for i in `seq 0 100000` do echo irqsoff > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer sleep 1 echo nop > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer sleep 1 done /tmp # ./test1.sh & /tmp # ./test2.sh & A typical oops log is as follows, sometimes with other different oops logs. [ 231.711293] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2026 rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8 [ 231.713375] Modules linked in: [ 231.714735] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc1-00276-g20edcec23f92 #15 [ 231.716750] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 231.718152] Workqueue: events update_pages_handler [ 231.719714] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 231.721171] pc : rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8 [ 231.722212] lr : rb_update_pages+0x25c/0x3f8 [ 231.723248] sp : ffff800082b9bd50 [ 231.724169] x29: ffff800082b9bd50 x28: ffff8000825f7000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 231.726102] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: fffffffffffff010 x24: 0000000000000ff0 [ 231.728122] x23: ffff0000c3a0b600 x22: ffff0000c3a0b5c0 x21: fffffffffffffe0a [ 231.730203] x20: ffff0000c3a0b600 x19: ffff0000c0102400 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 231.732329] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffe7aa8510 [ 231.734212] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 231.736291] x11: ffff8000826998a8 x10: ffff800082b9baf0 x9 : ffff800081137558 [ 231.738195] x8 : fffffc00030e82c8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 231.740192] x5 : ffff0000ffbafe00 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 231.742118] x2 : 00000000000006aa x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff0000c0007208 [ 231.744196] Call trace: [ 231.744892] rb_update_pages+0x378/0x3f8 [ 231.745893] update_pages_handler+0x1c/0x38 [ 231.746893] process_one_work+0x1f0/0x468 [ 231.747852] worker_thread+0x54/0x410 [ 231.748737] kthread+0x124/0x138 [ 231.749549] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 231.750434] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 233.720486] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 233.721696] Mem abort info: [ 233.721935] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 233.722283] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 233.722596] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 233.722805] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 233.723026] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 233.723458] Data abort info: [ 233.723734] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 233.724176] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 233.724589] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 233.725075] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000104943000 [ 233.725592] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 233.726231] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 233.726720] Modules linked in: [ 233.727007] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc1-00276-g20edcec23f92 #15 [ 233.727777] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 233.728225] Workqueue: events update_pages_handler [ 233.728655] pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 233.729054] pc : rb_update_pages+0x1a8/0x3f8 [ 233.729334] lr : rb_update_pages+0x154/0x3f8 [ 233.729592] sp : ffff800082b9bd50 [ 233.729792] x29: ffff800082b9bd50 x28: ffff8000825f7000 x27: 00000000 ---truncated--- Wed 28 Oct
CVE-2026-64239 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: delete tried region in regions_rmdirs() DAMON sysfs maintains the DAMOS tried region directory objects via a linked list. When the user requests refresh of the directories, DAMON sysfs removes all the region directories first, and then generate updated regions directory on the empty space. The removal function (damon_sysfs_scheme_regions_rm_dirs()) only puts the kobj objects. Deletion of the container region object from the linked list is done inside the kobj release callback function. If somehow the callback invocation is delayed, the list will contain regions list that gonna be freed. If the updated region directories creation is started in this situation, the list can be corrupted and use-after-free can happen. Because the kobj objects are managed by only DAMON sysfs, the issue cannot happen in normal situation. But, such delays can be made on kernels that built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE. On the kernel, the issue can indeed be reproduced like below. # damo start --damos_action stat # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0/ # for i in {1..10}; do echo update_schemes_tried_regions > state; done # dmesg | grep underflow [ 89.296152] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. Fix the issue by removing the region object from the list when decrementing the reference count. Also update damos_sysfs_populate_region_dir() to add the region object to the list only after the kobject_init_and_add() is success, so that fail of kobject_init_and_add() is not leaving the deallocated object on the list. The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. Tue 27 Oct
CVE-2026-63927 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time. Tue 27 Oct
CVE-2026-63884 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(), move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right pointer. A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2: [26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI [26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025 [26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915] [26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78 [26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282 [26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000 [26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0 [26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0 [26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554 [26620.095612] Call Trace: [26620.095615] <TASK> [26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915] [26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm] [26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915] [26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm] [26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm] [26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0 [26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30 [26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30 [26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915] [26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm] [26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm] [26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm] [26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0 [26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm] [26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915] [26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915] [26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100 [26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915] [26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915] [26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915] [26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915] [26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915] [26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100 [26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915] [26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50 [26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915] [26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0 [26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915] Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no longer needed. Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called, indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement and caching policy, ---truncated--- Mon 26 Oct
CVE-2026-31530 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/port: Fix use after free of parent_port in cxl_detach_ep() cxl_detach_ep() is called during bottom-up removal when all CXL memory devices beneath a switch port have been removed. For each port in the hierarchy it locks both the port and its parent, removes the endpoint, and if the port is now empty, marks it dead and unregisters the port by calling delete_switch_port(). There are two places during this work where the parent_port may be used after freeing: First, a concurrent detach may have already processed a port by the time a second worker finds it via bus_find_device(). Without pinning parent_port, it may already be freed when we discover port->dead and attempt to unlock the parent_port. In a production kernel that's a silent memory corruption, with lock debug, it looks like this: []DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(__owner_task(owner) != get_current()) []WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:949 at __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1ee/0x310 []Call Trace: []mutex_unlock+0xd/0x20 []cxl_detach_ep+0x180/0x400 [cxl_core] []devm_action_release+0x10/0x20 []devres_release_all+0xa8/0xe0 []device_unbind_cleanup+0xd/0xa0 []really_probe+0x1a6/0x3e0 Second, delete_switch_port() releases three devm actions registered against parent_port. The last of those is unregister_port() and it calls device_unregister() on the child port, which can cascade. If parent_port is now also empty the device core may unregister and free it too. So by the time delete_switch_port() returns, parent_port may be free, and the subsequent device_unlock(&parent_port->dev) operates on freed memory. The kernel log looks same as above, with a different offset in cxl_detach_ep(). Both of these issues stem from the absence of a lifetime guarantee between a child port and its parent port. Establish a lifetime rule for ports: child ports hold a reference to their parent device until release. Take the reference when the port is allocated and drop it when released. This ensures the parent is valid for the full lifetime of the child and eliminates the use after free window in cxl_detach_ep(). This is easily reproduced with a reload of cxl_acpi in QEMU with CXL devices present. 21 Oct
CVE-2025-38582 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/hns: Fix double destruction of rsv_qp rsv_qp may be double destroyed in error flow, first in free_mr_init(), and then in hns_roce_exit(). Fix it by moving the free_mr_init() call into hns_roce_v2_init(). list_del corruption, ffff589732eb9b50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100) WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1047115 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240 ... Call trace: __list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240 hns_roce_qp_remove+0x4c/0x3f0 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp_common+0x1dc/0x5f4 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp+0x22c/0x46c [hns_roce_hw_v2] free_mr_exit+0x6c/0x120 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_v2_exit+0x170/0x200 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_exit+0x118/0x350 [hns_roce_hw_v2] __hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0x1c8/0x304 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify_init+0x170/0x21c [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0x6c/0x190 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hclge_notify_roce_client+0x6c/0x160 [hclge] hclge_reset_rebuild+0x150/0x5c0 [hclge] hclge_reset+0x10c/0x140 [hclge] hclge_reset_subtask+0x80/0x104 [hclge] hclge_reset_service_task+0x168/0x3ac [hclge] hclge_service_task+0x50/0x100 [hclge] process_one_work+0x250/0x9a0 worker_thread+0x324/0x990 kthread+0x190/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 21 Oct
CVE-2026-74264 7.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track() (which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()). By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the reference tracking information without adding synchronization between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported: list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026 Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52 Call Trace: <TASK> __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline] list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline] ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329 netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline] netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline] netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline] netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline] dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363 dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397 linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline] linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166 __linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240 linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314 process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline] worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478 kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 This patch has three coordinated parts: 1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations. 2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on(): This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context (via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use spin_lock_bh() for synchronization. 3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer: Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock. Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is not already present. In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently by netdev_watchdog_up(). 21 Oct
CVE-2026-72375 7.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix reinitialisation of the inode, in particular ->lock_work It seems that initalising afs_vnode::lock_work a single time in the slab's init function isn't sufficient for work_structs. This results in the DEBUG_OBJECTS debugging stuff producing a warning occasionally when running the generic/131 xfstest: ODEBUG: activate not available (active state 0) object: 0000000016d8760f object type: work_struct hint: afs_lock_work+0x0/0x220 WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x4b/0x90, CPU#3: locktest/7695 ... CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 7695 Comm: locktest Tainted: G S 7.1.0-build3+ #2771 PREEMPT ... RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x65/0x90 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_afs_lock_work+0x10/0x10 debug_object_activate+0x122/0x170 insert_work+0x25/0x60 __queue_work+0x2e0/0x340 queue_delayed_work_on+0x48/0x70 afs_fl_release_private+0x57/0x70 locks_release_private+0x5c/0xa0 locks_free_lock+0xe/0x20 posix_lock_inode+0x55f/0x5b0 locks_lock_inode_wait+0x81/0x140 ? file_write_and_wait_range+0x50/0x70 afs_lock+0xcd/0x110 fcntl_setlk+0x10d/0x260 do_fcntl+0x24e/0x5b0 __do_sys_fcntl+0x6a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x310 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 Fix this by reinitialising ->lock_work after allocating an inode. Also, flush ->lock_work when the inode is being evicted to make sure it's not still running. 21 Oct
CVE-2026-68323 7.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: serialize udp bearer replicast list updates tipc_udp_rcast_add() and cleanup_bearer() both update ub->rcast.list with list_add_rcu() / list_del_rcu(), but nothing serializes them. The add runs from the encap receive softirq (via tipc_udp_rcast_disc()) without rtnl_lock(), so it can race the cleanup delete and corrupt the list: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8880298d7ab8, but was ffff88802449ad38. (prev=ffff888027e3ec98) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62! RIP: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x17a/0x200 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Call Trace: cleanup_bearer (net/tipc/udp_media.c:811) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3302) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3466) The bearer can be enabled from an unprivileged user namespace, as the TIPCv2 generic-netlink ops carry no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Add a spinlock to struct udp_bearer and take it around the list_add_rcu() in tipc_udp_rcast_add() and the list_del_rcu() loop in cleanup_bearer() so the two writers can no longer corrupt the list. Reject a duplicate peer under the same lock before allocating, and remove tipc_udp_is_known_peer(). The old lockless pre-check in tipc_udp_rcast_disc() was racy: two softirqs discovering the same peer could both find it absent and add it twice. cleanup_bearer() runs from a workqueue after tipc_udp_disable() clears the bearer's up bit, so an encap softirq can still reach tipc_udp_rcast_add() and add a peer after cleanup_bearer() has already emptied the list, leaking that entry when the bearer is freed. Mark the bearer disabled under rcast_lock once the list is emptied and refuse further additions. 21 Oct
CVE-2026-64032 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each port and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The reverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. When global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each port. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled. The above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts (per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port: # ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1 This is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below. Prior to this commit, when removing a bridge port, br_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context and the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when flushing VLANs. After this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the per-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. If both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed, the per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the bridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port multicast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled. [1] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927) WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116) kfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565) kobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689) rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47)) </IRQ> 19 Oct
CVE-2026-63996 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel. The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling: - cmis_cdb_validate_password() - cmis_cdb_module_features_get() - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get() so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong... Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len. Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming. 19 Oct
CVE-2025-39871 7.8 high 0.00% linux, linux_kernel In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Remove improper idxd_free The call to idxd_free() introduces a duplicate put_device() leading to a reference count underflow: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 4428 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110 ... Call Trace: <TASK> idxd_remove+0xe4/0x120 [idxd] pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x197/0x200 driver_detach+0x48/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xf0 pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0 idxd_exit_module+0x34/0x7a0 [idxd] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x183/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The idxd_unregister_devices() which is invoked at the very beginning of idxd_remove(), already takes care of the necessary put_device() through the following call path: idxd_unregister_devices() -> device_unregister() -> put_device() In addition, when CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE is enabled, put_device() may trigger asynchronous cleanup via schedule_delayed_work(). If idxd_free() is called immediately after, it can result in a use-after-free. Remove the improper idxd_free() to avoid both the refcount underflow and potential memory corruption during module unload. 19 Oct
CVE-2025-39776 7.8 high 0.00% linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/debug_vm_pgtable: clear page table entries at destroy_args() The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct. That in itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those entries with the *_clear functions. The problem is that leaves stale entries. If another process allocates an mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the stale entry. This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function): [ 2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000 [ 2.539366] kmem_cache info [ 2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508 [ 2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e (...) [ 2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.552816] Modules linked in: [ 2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY [ 2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries [ 2.552872] NIP: c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90 [ 2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug) [ 2.552899] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002822 XER: 0000000a [ 2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0 [ 2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff [ 2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000 [ 2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb [ 2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0 [ 2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000 [ 2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001 [ 2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760 [ 2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0 [ 2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 [ 2.553199] Call Trace: [ 2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable) [ 2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0 [ 2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570 [ 2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650 [ 2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290 [ 2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0 [ 2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870 [ 2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150 [ 2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50 [ 2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0 [ 2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec (...) [ 2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1 [ 2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144 Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test. That is not a problem, since the mm_stru ---truncated--- 19 Oct
CVE-2025-39860 7.8 high 0.00% linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() syzbot reported the splat below without a repro. In the splat, a single thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() freed sk and touched it after that. The root cause would be the racy l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() call added by the cited commit. bt_accept_dequeue() is called under lock_sock() except for l2cap_sock_release(). Two threads could see the same socket during the list iteration in bt_accept_dequeue(): CPU1 CPU2 (close()) ---- ---- sock_hold(sk) sock_hold(sk); lock_sock(sk) <-- block close() sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <-- refcnt by bt_accept_enqueue() release_sock(sk) lock_sock(sk) sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <-- last refcnt bt_accept_unlink(sk) <-- UAF Depending on the timing, the other thread could show up in the "Freed by task" part. Let's call l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803b7eb1c4 by task syz.5.3276/16995 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 16995 Comm: syz.5.3276 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] release_sock+0x21/0x220 net/core/sock.c:3746 bt_accept_dequeue+0x505/0x600 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:312 l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen+0x5c/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1451 l2cap_sock_release+0x5c/0x210 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1425 __sock_release+0xb3/0x270 net/socket.c:649 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xeb/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:43 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f6/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2accf8ebe9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb6cb1378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000426fb RCX: 00007f2accf8ebe9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f2acd1b7da0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000012b6cb166f R10: 0000001b30e20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2acd1b609c R13: 00007f2acd1b6090 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffdb6cb1490 </TASK> Allocated by task 5326: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline] __kmalloc_nopro ---truncated--- 19 Oct
CVE-2025-40167 7.8 high 0.00% no CPE yet In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: detect invalid INLINE_DATA + EXTENTS flag combination syzbot reported a BUG_ON in ext4_es_cache_extent() when opening a verity file on a corrupted ext4 filesystem mounted without a journal. The issue is that the filesystem has an inode with both the INLINE_DATA and EXTENTS flags set: EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_cache_extents:545: inode #15: comm syz.0.17: corrupted extent tree: lblk 0 < prev 66 Investigation revealed that the inode has both flags set: DEBUG: inode 15 - flag=1, i_inline_off=164, has_inline=1, extents_flag=1 This is an invalid combination since an inode should have either: - INLINE_DATA: data stored directly in the inode - EXTENTS: data stored in extent-mapped blocks Having both flags causes ext4_has_inline_data() to return true, skipping extent tree validation in __ext4_iget(). The unvalidated out-of-order extents then trigger a BUG_ON in ext4_es_cache_extent() due to integer underflow when calculating hole sizes. Fix this by detecting this invalid flag combination early in ext4_iget() and rejecting the corrupted inode. 19 Oct

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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.