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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80991 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ravb: serialize PTP clock teardown ravb_ptp_interrupt() can race with ravb_ptp_stop() and pass the clock to ptp_clock_event() while ptp_clock_unregister() is freeing it. This can lead to a use-after-free. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() for lockless access to the clock pointer. Atomically detach it with xchg() before disabling PTP interrupts, then synchronize all IRQs which can invoke ravb_ptp_interrupt() before unregistering the detached clock. A handler which read the old pointer completes before the clock is unregistered, while later handlers read NULL and skip the event. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74715 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value. __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference. The reference imbalance can occur as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 read opts->netns_id (-1) skip get_net_ns_by_id() write opts->netns_id (id) read opts->netns_id (id) put_net(net) /* no matching get */ The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users. The kernel reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or using it. The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from changing partway through an invocation. The individual reads can still observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each selected field value remains stable for that invocation. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74544 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: validate offshift to prevent shift-out-of-bounds u32_change() copies the user-provided tc_u32_sel.offshift (unsigned char, 0-255) into the kernel knode object without bounds validation. When a packet later hits u32_classify() with TC_U32_VAROFFSET set, it evaluates `ntohs(offmask & *data) >> offshift` where the left operand is a 16-bit value promoted to a 32-bit int. Any offshift >= 32 is undefined behavior per C11 6.5.7p3, triggerable by an unprivileged user via user/network namespaces. UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_u32.c:236:43 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type int Fix this by rejecting offshift >= 16 during filter creation in u32_change(). | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74513 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dibs: fix use-after-free of dmb_node in loopback attach/detach/unregister dibs_lo_attach_dmb(), dibs_lo_detach_dmb() and dibs_lo_unregister_dmb() look up the dmb_node under dmb_ht_lock, drop the lock and only then operate on the node's refcount. Nothing keeps the node alive across that window: __dibs_lo_unregister_dmb() removes the node from the hash table under the write lock and immediately frees it. A concurrent final put can therefore free the node between the lookup and the refcount operation: CPU0 (attach) CPU1 (owner unregisters) read_lock_bh(&dmb_ht_lock) find dmb_node (refcnt == 1) read_unlock_bh(&dmb_ht_lock) refcount_dec_and_test() 1 -> 0 write_lock_bh(&dmb_ht_lock) hash_del(&dmb_node->list) write_unlock_bh(&dmb_ht_lock) kfree(dmb_node) refcount_inc_not_zero(&dmb_node->refcnt) <-- use-after-free The same window exists for the refcount_dec_and_test() calls in the detach and unregister paths. Close the race structurally by making hash table membership and the refcount transitions atomic with respect to each other: - Perform the final refcount_dec_and_test() and hash_del() in a single dmb_ht_lock write-side critical section, in both the unregister and the detach path. Freeing the node still happens after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a node whose refcount reached zero has left the hash table and can no longer be found. - This establishes the invariant that any node found in the hash table holds at least one reference, and that the final reference can only be dropped under the write lock. dibs_lo_attach_dmb() can thus take its reference with a plain refcount_inc() while still holding the read lock; refcount_inc_not_zero() is no longer needed. __dibs_lo_unregister_dmb() no longer touches the hash table and is renamed to dibs_lo_free_dmb() accordingly. Note: commit cc21191b584c ("dibs: Move data path to dibs layer") moved the code to its current location; the race was introduced earlier by commit c3a910f2380f ("net/smc: implement DMB-merged operations of loopback-ism"). Tested SMC-D via ISM and dibs loopback. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74317 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ixgbe: do not configure xps for XDP queues netif_set_xps_queue() should not be called for an XDP Tx queue, since such queues are not netdev-exposed. On systems with number of CPUs >=64, on E610 adapter, netdev is configured with maximum number queue pairs being 63 (due to MSI-X assignment), but configuring XDP results in 64 XDP queues. So, during XDP program load, when netif_set_xps_queue() is called for the last XDP queue, we get a WARNING with a call trace and KASAN report afterwards (if enabled). [ 2012.699800] WARNING: net/core/dev.c:2854 at __netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40, CPU#36: xdpsock/103668 [...] [ 2012.700029] RIP: 0010:__netif_set_xps_queue+0x116a/0x1e40 [ 2012.700035] Code: b6 34 06 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 40 38 f0 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f 85 03 0a 00 00 0f b7 44 24 40 66 43 89 44 6a 18 e9 01 fb ff ff <0f> 0b e9 f2 ee ff ff 44 8b 44 24 44 45 85 c0 74 50 4d 85 e4 0f 84 [ 2012.700040] RSP: 0018:ffff8882369aeb28 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2012.700046] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000003f RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2012.700050] RDX: 1ffff1111da3d891 RSI: ffff888120e34250 RDI: ffff8888ed1ec488 [ 2012.700054] RBP: ffff888913281560 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8888ed1ec000 [ 2012.700058] R10: ffff8888a2e83180 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000007fa8 [ 2012.700061] R13: 000000000000003f R14: ffff888120e34854 R15: ffff8889132817c8 [ 2012.700065] FS: 00007fc8ea9ff740(0000) GS:ffff88884cefe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2012.700069] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2012.700073] CR2: 00007f81c8000020 CR3: 00000002299f8006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 2012.700077] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2012.700080] Call Trace: [ 2012.700084] <TASK> [ 2012.700087] ? ktime_get+0x61/0x150 [ 2012.700097] ? usleep_range_state+0x133/0x1b0 [ 2012.700108] ? __pfx_usleep_range_state+0x10/0x10 [ 2012.700114] netif_set_xps_queue+0x31/0x50 [ 2012.700119] ixgbe_configure_tx_ring+0x472/0x920 [ixgbe] [...] [ 2012.700486] ixgbe_xdp+0x38f/0x750 [ixgbe] [...] [ 2012.701094] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue+0x1ac5/0x1e40 [ 2012.701100] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88888d43cff8 by task xdpsock/103668 Skip XPS configuration for XDP Tx queues. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74264 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track() (which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()). By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the reference tracking information without adding synchronization between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported: list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026 Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52 Call Trace: <TASK> __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline] list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline] ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329 netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline] netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline] netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline] netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline] dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363 dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397 linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline] linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166 __linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240 linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314 process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline] worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478 kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 This patch has three coordinated parts: 1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations. 2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on(): This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context (via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use spin_lock_bh() for synchronization. 3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer: Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock. Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is not already present. In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently by netdev_watchdog_up(). | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74257 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg() syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0] sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock->ingress_msg under a lock, but its processing is lockless. Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg. For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)->iolock. Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited commit removed it. Let's serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg(). Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock) is not an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428 udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84 inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x1a8/0x270 net/socket.c:1100 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1e6/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2812 ___sys_recvmsg+0x215/0x590 net/socket.c:2854 do_recvmmsg+0x334/0x800 net/socket.c:2949 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3023 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3046 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3039 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x198/0x250 net/socket.c:3039 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe2/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb319f9aeb9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb31ad97028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb31a216090 RCX: 00007fb319f9aeb9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fb31a008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000040000021 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fb31a216128 R14: 00007fb31a216090 R15: 00007ffe21dd0a98 </TASK> Allocated by task 6019: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x3d1/0x6e0 mm/slub.c:5780 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] alloc_sk_msg net/core/skmsg.c:510 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x60/0x350 net/core/skmsg.c:612 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1038 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x7d9/0x8d0 net/core/skmsg.c:1236 udp_read_skb+0x73e/0x7e0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2045 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x12d/0x550 net/core/skmsg.c:1257 __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0xc54/0x10b0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1789 __udp_queue_rcv_skb net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 [inline] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xac5/0x19c0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2475 __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver+0xc06/0xcf0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2585 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x10f6/0x2620 net/ipv4/udp.c:2724 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x282/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3bb/0x6f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:241 NF_HOOK+0x336/0x3c0 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x221/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:584 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_inp ---truncated--- | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-72405 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync Yue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations. The workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the worker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again. When the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag to 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance. udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees the structure while the second work item is still active in the queue, leading to UAF. Fix this by returning early in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync() if work_pending is already set, preventing redundant work queueing. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-72404 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy() TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish: static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work) { ... list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) { dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache); list_del_rcu(&rcast->list); kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu); } ... dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache); udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk); synchronize_net(); ... } This is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the per-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst entries without any synchronization. If a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another CPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently, leading to: 1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash). 2. "rcuref - imbalanced put()" warning if it attempts to release a dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy(). Furthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without closing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window where a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after synchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs. To fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after we have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all existing readers have finished: 1. Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree()) to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry(). Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly. 2. Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops new receive readers). 3. Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers (both transmit and receive) to finish. 4. Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer cache, and free ub. Note: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use call_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68404 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: use wiphy work for socket owner autodisconnect nl80211_netlink_notify() walks the cfg80211 wireless device list when a NETLINK_GENERIC socket is released. If the socket owns a connection, the notifier queues the embedded wdev->disconnect_wk work item. That work is a plain work_struct today. NETDEV_GOING_DOWN cancels it, but a NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that already observed conn_owner_nlportid can queue it after that cancel returns. _cfg80211_unregister_wdev() then removes the wdev from the list and waits for RCU readers, but synchronize_net() does not drain work queued by such a reader. Make the autodisconnect work a wiphy_work instead. The callback already needs the wiphy mutex, and wiphy_work runs under that mutex. This lets teardown cancel pending autodisconnect work while holding the mutex, without a cancel_work_sync() vs. worker locking concern. Also cancel the wiphy work after list_del_rcu() and synchronize_net(). Any NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that had already reached the wdev list has then either queued the work and it is removed, or can no longer find the wdev. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68323 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: serialize udp bearer replicast list updates tipc_udp_rcast_add() and cleanup_bearer() both update ub->rcast.list with list_add_rcu() / list_del_rcu(), but nothing serializes them. The add runs from the encap receive softirq (via tipc_udp_rcast_disc()) without rtnl_lock(), so it can race the cleanup delete and corrupt the list: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff8880298d7ab8, but was ffff88802449ad38. (prev=ffff888027e3ec98) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62! RIP: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x17a/0x200 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Call Trace: cleanup_bearer (net/tipc/udp_media.c:811) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3302) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3466) The bearer can be enabled from an unprivileged user namespace, as the TIPCv2 generic-netlink ops carry no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Add a spinlock to struct udp_bearer and take it around the list_add_rcu() in tipc_udp_rcast_add() and the list_del_rcu() loop in cleanup_bearer() so the two writers can no longer corrupt the list. Reject a duplicate peer under the same lock before allocating, and remove tipc_udp_is_known_peer(). The old lockless pre-check in tipc_udp_rcast_disc() was racy: two softirqs discovering the same peer could both find it absent and add it twice. cleanup_bearer() runs from a workqueue after tipc_udp_disable() clears the bearer's up bit, so an encap softirq can still reach tipc_udp_rcast_add() and add a peer after cleanup_bearer() has already emptied the list, leaking that entry when the bearer is freed. Mark the bearer disabled under rcast_lock once the list is emptied and refuse further additions. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68290 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket rds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via rds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since rds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock->sk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with netns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk. KASAN reports the race as: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0 rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721 proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c vfs_write fs/read_write.c __x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c Fix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling rds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl handlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so the listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested against the linked reproducer. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64539 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: eir: Fix stack OOB write when prepending the Flags AD eir_create_adv_data() builds the advertising data into a fixed-size buffer ("size", 31 for the legacy path). It may prepend a 3-byte "Flags" AD structure (LE_AD_NO_BREDR on an LE-only controller) and then copies the per-instance data without checking that it still fits: memcpy(ptr, adv->adv_data, adv->adv_data_len); tlv_data_max_len() only reserves those 3 bytes when the user-supplied flags carry a managed-flags bit, so an instance added with flags == 0 is accepted with adv_data_len up to the full buffer. At advertise time the flags are still prepended, and the memcpy() writes 3 + adv_data_len bytes into the size-byte buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) Write of size 31 at addr ffff88800a547bdc by task kworker/u9:0/65 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) hci_update_adv_data_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1310) hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1817) hci_cmd_sync_work (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332) This frame has 1 object: [32, 64) 'cp' The "Flags" structure is added by the kernel, not requested by userspace, so only prepend it when it fits together with the instance advertising data; when there is no room for both, drop the flags rather than the user-provided data. Reachable by a local user with CAP_NET_ADMIN owning an LE-only controller on the legacy advertising path. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-72072 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: macsec: fix use-after-free of metadata_dst on RX SC delete When an offloaded MACsec RX SC is deleted, macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() freed the per-SC metadata_dst with metadata_dst_free(), which kfree()s the object unconditionally and ignores the dst reference count. The RX datapath in mlx5e_macsec_offload_handle_rx_skb() looks up the SC under rcu_read_lock() via xa_load(), takes a reference with dst_hold() and attaches the dst to the skb with skb_dst_set(). A reader that already obtained the rx_sc pointer can race with the delete path and operate on freed memory. Fix the owner side by dropping the reference with dst_release() instead of freeing unconditionally, and convert the RX datapath to dst_hold_safe() so a reader racing the SC delete cannot attach a dst whose last reference was just dropped; only attach it when a reference was actually taken. mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsc() also published sc_xarray_element via xa_alloc() before rx_sc->md_dst was allocated and initialised, so a datapath reader that looked the SC up by fs_id could observe rx_sc with md_dst still NULL or, on weakly-ordered architectures, a non-NULL md_dst pointer whose contents were not yet visible. NULL-check the xa_load() result and md_dst on the datapath, and reorder add_rxsc() so the xa_alloc() publish happens only after md_dst is fully initialised; the xarray RCU publish then pairs with the rcu_read_lock()/xa_load() in the datapath. Note: macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() also kfree()s rx_sc->sc_xarray_element without an RCU grace period while the same datapath reads it under rcu_read_lock(); that is a separate pre-existing issue left to a follow-up patch. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-72036 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_multiq: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked multiq_dequeue() takes a packet from a band's child with a direct ->dequeue() call after multiq_peek() peeked it. When the child is non-work-conserving the peek stashes the skb in the child's gso_skb, so the direct dequeue returns a different skb and orphans the stash, desyncing the child's qlen/backlog. With a qfq child reached through a peeking parent (e.g. tbf) this re-enters the child on an emptied list and dereferences NULL, panicking the kernel from softirq on ordinary egress. Take the packet through qdisc_dequeue_peeked(), as sch_prio already does and as sch_red and sch_sfb were just fixed to do. The helper is a no-op when the child has no stash, so a work-conserving child is unaffected. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64423 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64401 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons for the same net/share name share one registration id. A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock order. Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex, then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done. Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the idr entry and frees the stable identity strings. This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64189 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw() of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section. A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index into it, causing a use-after-free. The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7] RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64123 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: defer node table free until after RCU readers HSR node-list and node-status generic-netlink operations run under rcu_read_lock(). They walk hsr->node_db through hsr_get_next_node() and hsr_get_node_data(), but RTM_DELLINK teardown removes the same node table with plain list_del() and frees each node immediately. That lets a generic-netlink reader hold a struct hsr_node pointer across hsr_dellink(). In a KASAN build, widening the reader window after hsr_get_next_node() obtains the node reproduces a slab-use-after-free when the reader copies node->macaddress_A; the freeing stack is hsr_del_nodes() from hsr_dellink(). Use list_del_rcu() and defer the free through the existing hsr_free_node_rcu() callback. This matches the lifetime rule used by the HSR prune paths, which already delete nodes with list_del_rcu() and call_rcu(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64114 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64032 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each port and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The reverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. When global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each port. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled. The above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts (per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port: # ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1 This is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below. Prior to this commit, when removing a bridge port, br_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context and the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when flushing VLANs. After this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the per-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. If both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed, the per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the bridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port multicast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled. [1] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927) WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116) kfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565) kobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689) rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47)) </IRQ> | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64027 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: shaper: rework the VALID marking (again) Recent commit changed the semantics from NOT_VALID to VALID. I didn't realize that the flags are not stored atomically with the entry in XArray. There's still a race of reader observing a VALID mark for a slot, getting interrupted, writer replacing the entry with a different one, reader continuing, fetching the entry which is now a different pointer than the pointer for which VALID was meant. The biggest consequence of this is that we may see a UAF since net_shaper_rollback() assumed that entries without VALID can be freed without observing RCU. Looks like the XArray marks are buying us nothing at this point. Let's convert the code to an explicit valid field. The smp_load_acquire() / smp_store_release() barriers are marginally cleaner. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64009 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Check for underflow in xfrm_state_mtu Leo Lin reported OOB write issue in esp component: xfrm_state_mtu() returns u32 but performs its arithmetic in unsigned modulo-2^32 space using an attacker-influenced "header_len + authsize + net_adj" subtracted from a small "mtu" argument. A nobody user can install an IPv4 ESP tunnel SA with a large authentication key (XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, e.g. hmac(sha512), 64-byte key, 64-byte trunc), configure a small interface MTU (68 bytes), and set XFRMA_TFCPAD to a large value. When a single UDP datagram is then sent through the tunnel, xfrm_state_mtu() underflows to a near-2^32 value, and esp_output() consumes it as a signed int via: padto = min(x->tfcpad, xfrm_state_mtu(x, mtu_cached)) esp.tfclen = padto - skb->len (assigned to int) esp.tfclen ends up negative (e.g. -207). It is sign-extended to size_t when passed to memset() inside esp_output_fill_trailer(), producing a ~16 EB write of zeroes at skb_tail_pointer(skb). KASAN logs it as "Write of size 18446744073709551537 at addr ffff888...". Check for underflow and return 1. This causes the sendmsg attempt to fail with ENETUNREACH. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64005 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: Do not re-initialize smc hashtables INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&smc_v*_hashinfo.ht) are called after smc_nl_init(), proto_register() and sock_register(). This can lead to smc_v*_hashinfo.ht being reset even though hash entries already exist and are being used, possibly resulting in a corrupted list. Remove unnecessary and dangerous re-initialisation of smc_v*_hashinfo.ht in smc_init(); it is implicitly initialised to zero anyhow. Add HLIST_HEAD_INIT to the definitions for clarity. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64004 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix locking in .getsockopt Mirror iucv_sock_setsockopt() and wrap the whole switch in lock_sock()/release_sock(). The pre-existing SO_MSGLIMIT-only lock becomes redundant and is removed. Any AF_IUCV HIPER user can potentially crash the kernel by racing recvmsg() with getsockopt(SO_MSGSIZE): the SO_MSGSIZE arm dereferences iucv->hs_dev->mtu after iucv_sock_close() (called from the racing recvmsg()) has set hs_dev to NULL, producing a NULL pointer dereference oops. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64002 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table() ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports too soon. Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-63987 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: coalesce: cap profile updates at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES ethnl_update_profile() walks the ETHTOOL_A_PROFILE_IRQ_MODERATION nest list with an index 'i' and writes new_profile[i++] without bounding i. The destination is kmemdup()'d at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES entries (5), but the Netlink nest count is entirely user-controlled. Netlink policies do not have support for constraining the number of nested entries (or number of multi-attr entries). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39955 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect(). syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0] syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before the TFO socket completes 3WHS: 1. accept() 2. connect(AF_UNSPEC) 3. connect() to another destination As of accept(), sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers. Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk, the retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not retransmitted. Let's call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect(). [0]: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017 RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400 RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8 R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540 R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372) timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135) tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035) __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1)) tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096) handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35)) </IRQ> | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-38730 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry Ring provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single execution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this and invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if MSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too little was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than recycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons: 1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry, then the req->buf_list will no longer be valid. 2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption in the application, as either receive could land in the same userspace buffer. Fix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer across multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39860 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() syzbot reported the splat below without a repro. In the splat, a single thread calling bt_accept_dequeue() freed sk and touched it after that. The root cause would be the racy l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() call added by the cited commit. bt_accept_dequeue() is called under lock_sock() except for l2cap_sock_release(). Two threads could see the same socket during the list iteration in bt_accept_dequeue(): CPU1 CPU2 (close()) ---- ---- sock_hold(sk) sock_hold(sk); lock_sock(sk) <-- block close() sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <-- refcnt by bt_accept_enqueue() release_sock(sk) lock_sock(sk) sock_put(sk) bt_accept_unlink(sk) sock_put(sk) <-- last refcnt bt_accept_unlink(sk) <-- UAF Depending on the timing, the other thread could show up in the "Freed by task" part. Let's call l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803b7eb1c4 by task syz.5.3276/16995 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 16995 Comm: syz.5.3276 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:86 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock+0x26f/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] release_sock+0x21/0x220 net/core/sock.c:3746 bt_accept_dequeue+0x505/0x600 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:312 l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen+0x5c/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1451 l2cap_sock_release+0x5c/0x210 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1425 __sock_release+0xb3/0x270 net/socket.c:649 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1439 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:468 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xeb/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:43 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:225 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:175 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:210 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f6/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2accf8ebe9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb6cb1378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000426fb RCX: 00007f2accf8ebe9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f2acd1b7da0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000012b6cb166f R10: 0000001b30e20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2acd1b609c R13: 00007f2acd1b6090 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffdb6cb1490 </TASK> Allocated by task 5326: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline] __kmalloc_nopro ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39979 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: fs, fix UAF in flow counter release Fix a kernel trace [1] caused by releasing an HWS action of a local flow counter in mlx5_cmd_hws_delete_fte(), where the HWS action refcount and mutex were not initialized and the counter struct could already be freed when deleting the rule. Fix it by adding the missing initializations and adding refcount for the local flow counter struct. [1] Kernel log: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 mlx5_fs_put_hws_action.part.0.cold+0x21/0x94 [mlx5_core] mlx5_fc_put_hws_action+0x96/0xad [mlx5_core] mlx5_fs_destroy_fs_actions+0x8b/0x152 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_hws_delete_fte+0x5a/0xa0 [mlx5_core] del_hw_fte+0x1ce/0x260 [mlx5_core] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x12d/0x240 [mlx5_core] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xf4/0x110 mlx5_ib_destroy_flow+0x103/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib] uverbs_free_flow+0x20/0x50 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x1b/0x50 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x34/0x1a0 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x3c/0x80 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_run_method+0x23e/0x360 [ib_uverbs] ? uverbs_finalize_object+0x60/0x60 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x14f/0x2c0 [ib_uverbs] ? do_tty_write+0x1a9/0x270 ? file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x98/0xc0 ? new_sync_write+0xfc/0x190 ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xd7/0x160 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39981 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40173 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/ip6_tunnel: Prevent perpetual tunnel growth Similarly to ipv4 tunnel, ipv6 version updates dev->needed_headroom, too. While ipv4 tunnel headroom adjustment growth was limited in commit 5ae1e9922bbd ("net: ip_tunnel: prevent perpetual headroom growth"), ipv6 tunnel yet increases the headroom without any ceiling. Reflect ipv4 tunnel headroom adjustment limit on ipv6 version. Credits to Francesco Ruggeri, who was originally debugging this issue and wrote local Arista-specific patch and a reproducer. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40250 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Clean up only new IRQ glue on request_irq() failure The mlx5_irq_alloc() function can inadvertently free the entire rmap and end up in a crash[1] when the other threads tries to access this, when request_irq() fails due to exhausted IRQ vectors. This commit modifies the cleanup to remove only the specific IRQ mapping that was just added. This prevents removal of other valid mappings and ensures precise cleanup of the failed IRQ allocation's associated glue object. Note: This error is observed when both fwctl and rds configs are enabled. [1] mlx5_core 0000:05:00.0: Successfully registered panic handler for port 1 mlx5_core 0000:05:00.0: mlx5_irq_alloc:293:(pid 66740): Failed to request irq. err = -28 infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_ib_test_wc:290:(pid 66740): Error -28 while trying to test write-combining support mlx5_core 0000:05:00.0: Successfully unregistered panic handler for port 1 mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: Successfully registered panic handler for port 1 mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: mlx5_irq_alloc:293:(pid 66740): Failed to request irq. err = -28 infiniband mlx5_0: mlx5_ib_test_wc:290:(pid 66740): Error -28 while trying to test write-combining support mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: Successfully unregistered panic handler for port 1 mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0: mlx5_irq_alloc:293:(pid 28895): Failed to request irq. err = -28 mlx5_core 0000:05:00.0: mlx5_irq_alloc:293:(pid 28895): Failed to request irq. err = -28 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe277a58fde16f291: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x23/0x7d Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9 ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2f9 ? mlx5_irq_alloc.cold+0x5d/0xf3 [mlx5_core] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xa ? die_addr+0x39/0x53 ? exc_general_protection+0x1c4/0x3e9 ? dev_vprintk_emit+0x5f/0x90 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x27 ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x23/0x7d mlx5_irq_alloc.cold+0x5d/0xf3 [mlx5_core] irq_pool_request_vector+0x7d/0x90 [mlx5_core] mlx5_irq_request+0x2e/0xe0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_irq_request_vector+0xad/0xf7 [mlx5_core] comp_irq_request_pci+0x64/0xf0 [mlx5_core] create_comp_eq+0x71/0x385 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_open_xdpsq+0x11c/0x230 [mlx5_core] mlx5_comp_eqn_get+0x72/0x90 [mlx5_core] ? xas_load+0x8/0x91 mlx5_comp_irqn_get+0x40/0x90 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_open_channel+0x7d/0x3c7 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_open_channels+0xad/0x250 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_open_locked+0x3e/0x110 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_open+0x23/0x70 [mlx5_core] __dev_open+0xf1/0x1a5 __dev_change_flags+0x1e1/0x249 dev_change_flags+0x21/0x5c do_setlink+0x28b/0xcc4 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x3d ? inet6_validate_link_af+0x6b/0x108 ? cpumask_next+0x1f/0x35 ? __snmp6_fill_stats64.constprop.0+0x66/0x107 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x48/0x1e6 __rtnl_newlink+0x5ff/0xa57 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x164/0x2ce rtnl_newlink+0x44/0x6e rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2bb/0x362 ? __netlink_sendskb+0x4c/0x6c ? netlink_unicast+0x28f/0x2ce ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x150/0x146 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5f/0x112 netlink_unicast+0x213/0x2ce netlink_sendmsg+0x24f/0x4d9 __sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x6a ____sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2c9 ? import_iovec+0x17/0x2b ___sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xe0 __sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xd8 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x87 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 RIP: 0033:0x7fc328603727 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 0b ed ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 44 ed ff ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8eb3f1a0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007fc328603727 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe8eb3f1f0 RDI: 000000000000000d RBP: 00007ffe8eb3f1f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00000000000 ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-38718 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs. syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998 sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885 sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031 inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] and BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886 sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032 inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-38734 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out() BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39766 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Make cake_enqueue return NET_XMIT_CN when past buffer_limit The following setup can trigger a WARNING in htb_activate due to the condition: !cl->leaf.q->q.qlen tc qdisc del dev lo root tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: htb default 1 tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 \ htb rate 64bit tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle f: \ cake memlimit 1b ping -I lo -f -c1 -s64 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 This is because the low memlimit leads to a low buffer_limit, which causes packet dropping. However, cake_enqueue still returns NET_XMIT_SUCCESS, causing htb_enqueue to call htb_activate with an empty child qdisc. We should return NET_XMIT_CN when packets are dropped from the same tin and flow. I do not believe return value of NET_XMIT_CN is necessary for packet drops in the case of ack filtering, as that is meant to optimize performance, not to signal congestion. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39796 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lapbether: ignore ops-locked netdevs Syzkaller managed to trigger lock dependency in xsk_notify via register_netdevice. As discussed in [0], using register_netdevice in the notifiers is problematic so skip adding lapbeth for ops-locked devices. xsk_notifier+0xa4/0x280 net/xdp/xsk.c:1645 notifier_call_chain+0xbc/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:2230 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xf9d/0x2700 net/core/dev.c:12077 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:12140 [inline] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x305/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:11984 register_netdevice+0x18f1/0x2270 net/core/dev.c:11149 lapbeth_new_device drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:420 [inline] lapbeth_device_event+0x5b1/0xbe0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:462 notifier_call_chain+0xbc/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:2230 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x12c/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:9497 netif_change_flags+0x108/0x160 net/core/dev.c:9526 dev_change_flags+0xba/0x250 net/core/dev_api.c:68 devinet_ioctl+0x11d5/0x1f50 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1200 inet_ioctl+0x3a7/0x3f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1001 0: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39828 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in: | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39952 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: avoid buffer overflow in WID string configuration Fix the following copy overflow warning identified by Smatch checker. drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/wlan_cfg.c:184 wilc_wlan_parse_response_frame() error: '__memcpy()' 'cfg->s[i]->str' copy overflow (512 vs 65537) This patch introduces size check before accessing the memory buffer. The checks are base on the WID type of received data from the firmware. For WID string configuration, the size limit is determined by individual element size in 'struct wilc_cfg_str_vals' that is maintained in 'len' field of 'struct wilc_cfg_str'. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39962 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix untrusted unsigned subtract Fix the following Smatch static checker warning: net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c:65 rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket() warn: untrusted unsigned subtract. 'ticket_len - 10 * 4' by prechecking the length of what we're trying to extract in two places in the token and decoding for a response packet. Also use sizeof() on the struct we're extracting rather specifying the size numerically to be consistent with the other related statements. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39985 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: mcba_usb: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the mcba_usb driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, mcba_usb_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on these lines: usb_msg.dlc = cf->len; memcpy(usb_msg.data, cf->data, usb_msg.dlc); Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39986 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: sun4i_can: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on this line: dlc = cf->len; Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a couple line below when doing: for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++) writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4)); Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39987 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: hi311x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further checks. This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on this line: memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF, frame->data, frame->len); Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39988 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: etas_es58x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the etas_es58x driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)); to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, es58x_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN(FD) frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. For example, using the es581.4 variant, the frame will be dispatched to es581_4_tx_can_msg(), go through the last check at the beginning of this function: if (can_is_canfd_skb(skb)) return -EMSGSIZE; and reach this line: memcpy(tx_can_msg->data, cf->data, cf->len); Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU or CANFD_MTU (depending on the device capabilities). By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40012 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix warning in smc_rx_splice() when calling get_page() smc_lo_register_dmb() allocates DMB buffers with kzalloc(), which are later passed to get_page() in smc_rx_splice(). Since kmalloc memory is not page-backed, this triggers WARN_ON_ONCE() in get_page() and prevents holding a refcount on the buffer. This can lead to use-after-free if the memory is released before splice_to_pipe() completes. Use folio_alloc() instead, ensuring DMBs are page-backed and safe for get_page(). WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 12152 at ./include/linux/mm.h:1330 smc_rx_splice+0xaf8/0xe20 [smc] CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 12152 Comm: smcapp Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc3-11705-g9cf4672ecfee #10 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (z/VM 7.4.0) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000793161032696c (smc_rx_splice+0xafc/0xe20 [smc]) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 001cee80007d3001 00077400000000f8 0000000000000005 0000000000000001 001cee80007d3006 0007740000001000 001c000000000000 000000009b0c99e0 0000000000001000 001c0000000000f8 001c000000000000 000003ffcc6f7c88 0007740003e98000 0007931600000005 000792969b2ff7b8 Krnl Code: 0007931610326960: af000000 mc 0,0 0007931610326964: a7f4ff43 brc 15,00079316103267ea #0007931610326968: af000000 mc 0,0 >000793161032696c: a7f4ff3f brc 15,00079316103267ea 0007931610326970: e320f1000004 lg %r2,256(%r15) 0007931610326976: c0e53fd1b5f5 brasl %r14,000793168fd5d560 000793161032697c: a7f4fbb5 brc 15,00079316103260e6 0007931610326980: b904002b lgr %r2,%r11 Call Trace: smc_rx_splice+0xafc/0xe20 [smc] smc_rx_splice+0x756/0xe20 [smc]) smc_rx_recvmsg+0xa74/0xe00 [smc] smc_splice_read+0x1ce/0x3b0 [smc] sock_splice_read+0xa2/0xf0 do_splice_read+0x198/0x240 splice_file_to_pipe+0x7e/0x110 do_splice+0x59e/0xde0 __do_splice+0x11a/0x2d0 __s390x_sys_splice+0x140/0x1f0 __do_syscall+0x122/0x280 system_call+0x6e/0x90 Last Breaking-Event-Address: smc_rx_splice+0x960/0xe20 [smc] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40027 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p: fix double req put in p9_fd_cancelled Syzkaller reports a KASAN issue as below: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000021: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000108-0xdead00000000010f] CPU: 0 PID: 5083 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00037-g855bd1d7d838 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del include/linux/list.h:114 [inline] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:137 [inline] RIP: 0010:list_del include/linux/list.h:148 [inline] RIP: 0010:p9_fd_cancelled+0xe9/0x200 net/9p/trans_fd.c:734 Call Trace: <TASK> p9_client_flush+0x351/0x440 net/9p/client.c:614 p9_client_rpc+0xb6b/0xc70 net/9p/client.c:734 p9_client_version net/9p/client.c:920 [inline] p9_client_create+0xb51/0x1240 net/9p/client.c:1027 v9fs_session_init+0x1f0/0x18f0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xba/0xcb0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0x108/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x300 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3056 [inline] path_mount+0x6a6/0x1e90 fs/namespace.c:3386 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3399 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3607 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3584 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x283/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3584 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 This happens because of a race condition between: - The 9p client sending an invalid flush request and later cleaning it up; - The 9p client in p9_read_work() canceled all pending requests. Thread 1 Thread 2 ... p9_client_create() ... p9_fd_create() ... p9_conn_create() ... // start Thread 2 INIT_WORK(&m->rq, p9_read_work); p9_read_work() ... p9_client_rpc() ... ... p9_conn_cancel() ... spin_lock(&m->req_lock); ... p9_fd_cancelled() ... ... spin_unlock(&m->req_lock); // status rewrite p9_client_cb(m->client, req, REQ_STATUS_ERROR) // first remove list_del(&req->req_list); ... spin_lock(&m->req_lock) ... // second remove list_del(&req->req_list); spin_unlock(&m->req_lock) ... Commit 74d6a5d56629 ("9p/trans_fd: Fix concurrency del of req_list in p9_fd_cancelled/p9_read_work") fixes a concurrency issue in the 9p filesystem client where the req_list could be deleted simultaneously by both p9_read_work and p9_fd_cancelled functions, but for the case where req->status equals REQ_STATUS_RCVD. Update the check for req->status in p9_fd_cancelled to skip processing not just received requests, but anything that is not SENT, as whatever changed the state from SENT also removed the request from its list. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. [updated the check from status == RECV || status == ERROR to status != SENT] | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40064 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev(). syzbot reported use-after-free of net_device in __pnet_find_base_ndev(), which was called during connect(). [0] smc_pnet_find_ism_resource() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev and passes down to pnet_find_base_ndev(), where RTNL is held. Then, UAF happened at __pnet_find_base_ndev() when the dev is first used. This means dev had already been freed before acquiring RTNL in pnet_find_base_ndev(). While dev is going away, dst->dev could be swapped with blackhole_netdev, and the dev's refcnt by dst will be released. We must hold dev's refcnt before calling smc_pnet_find_ism_resource(). Also, smc_pnet_find_roce_resource() has the same problem. Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in the two functions. [0]: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888036bac33a by task syz.0.3632/18609 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 18609 Comm: syz.0.3632 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926 pnet_find_base_ndev net/smc/smc_pnet.c:946 [inline] smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1103 [inline] smc_pnet_find_ism_resource+0xef/0x390 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1154 smc_find_ism_device net/smc/af_smc.c:1030 [inline] smc_find_proposal_devices net/smc/af_smc.c:1115 [inline] __smc_connect+0x372/0x1890 net/smc/af_smc.c:1545 smc_connect+0x877/0xd90 net/smc/af_smc.c:1715 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2086 [inline] __sys_connect+0x313/0x440 net/socket.c:2105 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2108 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2108 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f47cbf8eba9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f47ccdb1038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 RCX: 00007f47cbf8eba9 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00007f47cc011e19 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f47cc1d6038 R14: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 R15: 00007ffc512f8aa8 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888036bacd00 pfn:0x36bac flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001243d08 ffff8880b863fdc0 0000000000000000 raw: ffff888036bacd00 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as freed page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x446dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 16741, tgid 16741 (syz-executor), ts 343313197788, free_ts 380670750466 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x5f/0x1b0 mm/slub.c:4317 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x18/0x90 mm/slub.c:4348 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline] __kvmalloc_node ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40215 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x The ipcomp fallback tunnels currently get deleted (from the various lists and hashtables) as the last user state that needed that fallback is destroyed (not deleted). If a reference to that user state still exists, the fallback state will remain on the hashtables/lists, triggering the WARN in xfrm_state_fini. Because of those remaining references, the fix in commit f75a2804da39 ("xfrm: destroy xfrm_state synchronously on net exit path") is not complete. We recently fixed one such situation in TCP due to defered freeing of skbs (commit 9b6412e6979f ("tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we currently drop dst")). This can also happen due to IP reassembly: skbs with a secpath remain on the reassembly queue until netns destruction. If we can't guarantee that the queues are flushed by the time xfrm_state_fini runs, there may still be references to a (user) xfrm_state, preventing the timely deletion of the corresponding fallback state. Instead of chasing each instance of skbs holding a secpath one by one, this patch fixes the issue directly within xfrm, by deleting the fallback state as soon as the last user state depending on it has been deleted. Destruction will still happen when the final reference is dropped. A separate lockdep class for the fallback state is required since we're going to lock x->tunnel while x is locked. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-68377 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_tunnel_key: Defer dst_release to RCU callback Fix a race-condition use-after-free in tunnel_key_release_params(). The function releases the metadata_dst of the old params synchronously via dst_release() while deferring the params struct free with kfree_rcu(). A concurrent tunnel_key_act() reader on the datapath may still hold the old params pointer (under rcu_read_lock_bh) and proceed to call dst_clone(¶ms->tcft_enc_metadata->dst) after the writer's dst_release has already pushed the dst's rcuref to RCUREF_DEAD. [email protected] produced a poc which i (and Victor) verified that KASAN reports: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88806158de40 by task poc/9388 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9388 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.1.0-rc7 #7 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:272 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:284 skb_release_head_state+0x293/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1163 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1187 [..] Allocated by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2f1/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 offload_action_alloc+0x2f/0x130 net/core/flow_offload.c:35 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x1ba/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:258 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 [..] Freed by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 __kasan_slab_free+0x6b/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2689 slab_free mm/slub.c:6251 kfree+0x21f/0x6b0 mm/slub.c:6566 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x4ad/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:284 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806158de00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of freed 256-byte region [ffff88806158de00, ffff88806158df00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88806158d600 pfn:0x6158c head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_map ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.