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3.2.5.1 Channel Binding

NIST PIV and digital identity SP 800-63B-4 against SP 800-63B
All changes in this version
added 3 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements part of 3.2.5

Title changed

Before · SP 800-63B

After · SP 800-63B-4

Channel Binding

Control changed

Before · SP 800-63B

After · SP 800-63B-4

An authentication protocol with channel binding SHALL establish an authenticated protected channel with the verifier. The protocol SHALL then strongly and irreversibly bind a channel identifier negotiated in establishing the authenticated protected channel to the authenticator output (e.g., by signing the two values together using a private key controlled by the claimant for which the public key is known to the verifier). The verifier SHALL validate the signature or other information used to prove phishing resistance. This prevents an impostor verifier — even one that has obtained a certificate that represents the actual verifier — from successfully relaying that authentication on a different authenticated protected channel.

An example of a phishing-resistant authentication protocol that uses channel binding is client-authenticated TLS [RFC8446] in which the client signs the authenticator output along with earlier messages from the protocol that are unique to the particular TLS connection being negotiated. Personal identity verification (PIV) and common access card (CAC) cards, which use client-authenticated TLS, provide phishing resistance through channel binding.