NIST platform security: roots of trust, firmware and secure enclaves SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5
All1 The unauthorized disclosure of a key means that another entity (an unauthorized entity)2 A compromise of the integrity of a key means that the key is incorrect − either that the key3 A compromise of a key’s usage or application association means that the key could be used4 A compromise of a key’s association with the owner or other entity means that the identity5 A compromise of a key’s association with other information means that there is no6 Establishing an accountability system that keeps track of each access to secret symmetric7 Providing a cryptographic integrity check on the key (e.g., using a MAC or a digital8 Transition: A transition plan should be developed and followed so that the changeover9 Additional Considerations
| Ref | Title | Text | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Additional Considerations | Many aspects of key management can be handled by a key-management system that is designed to manage cryptographic keys and their metadata. An automated key management system may be used to oversee, automate, and secure the key management pr | changed here |
| 9.1 in 9 |
Access Control and Identity Authentication | An access control system is needed to ensure that every key and metadata management function can only be initiated in response to a request by an authorized entity. When key-management functions are initiated by an entity, an access control | changed here |
| 9.2 in 9 |
Inventory Management | When using cryptographic mechanisms employing keys, all long-term keys shall be inventoried. In the case of symmetric keys, this includes the keys used for the protection of information in transit and in storage. For asymmetric key pairs, t | changed here |
| 9.2.1 in 9.2 |
Key Inventories | A key inventory shall include information about each key (e.g., all or part of the metadata associated with the key); unless the inventory is also used for key backup or archiving, the inventory shall not include secret or private keys but | changed here |
| 9.2.2 in 9.2 |
Certificate Inventories | Over the years, the use of public-key certificates has grown; certificates are used by communication servers (e.g., TLS and SSH), for providing web applications and services (e.g., government services, online banking, flight operations, mis | changed here |
| 9.3 in 9 |
Accountability | Accountability has two different aspects with respect to key management: responsibility and traceability. Each human involved with key management must be clearly informed about their key- management responsibilities and held accountable for | changed here |
| 9.4 in 9 |
Audit | The auditing of activities associated with key management is required. Three types of audit should be performed on key-management systems: | changed here |
| 9.5 in 9 |
Key-Management System Survivability | A failure in a key-management system or its environment could hamper or prevent access to an organization’s stored information. Disaster recovery requires having procedures and a sufficient backup capability to recover from facility damage, | changed here |
| 9.5.1 in 9.5 |
Backed Up and Archived Key | OMB11/01 focused on the need to recover decryption keys to decrypt encrypted information (see Section 9.5.1). However, as the tables in Section 8.2.2.1 show, there are other operational keys in addition to those associated with decryption t | changed here |
| 9.5.2 in 9.5 |
Key Recovery | Key recovery is the process of retrieving or reconstructing a key from key backups or archives in order to process cryptographically protected information (e.g., to decrypt encrypted information or verify a signature on signed information). | changed here |
| 9.5.3 in 9.5 |
System Redundancy/Contingency Planning | Cryptography is a useful tool for preventing unauthorized access to data and/or resources, but when the mechanism fails, it can prevent access by valid entities to critical information and 107 If the corresponding public key has been inclu | changed here |
| 9.5.3.1 in 9.5.3 |
General Principles | Planning for recovery from system failures is an essential management function. Interruptions of critical infrastructure services should be anticipated, and planning for maintaining the continuity of operations in support of an organization | changed here |
| 9.5.3.2 in 9.5.3 |
Cryptography and Key-Management-Specific Recovery Issues | A key recovery capability generally involves some redundancy or multiple copies of key information. If one copy of critical key information is lost or corrupted, another copy usually needs to be available in order to recover data and/or res | changed here |
| 9.5.4 in 9.5 |
Compromise Recovery | When a secret or private key that is used to protect sensitive information or critical processes is disclosed to unauthorized entities, all of the information and/or processes protected by that key become immediately subject to disclosure, | changed here |
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