WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly. Commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 fixes the issue.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 Patch
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh Exploit, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh Exploit, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.3 · wwbnNVD modified 2026-10-26 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 3
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 Patch
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh Exploit, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh Exploit, Vendor Advisory