WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, `objects/getCaptcha.php` accepts the CAPTCHA length (`ql`) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive `strcasecmp` comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on `Captcha::validation()` (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session. Commit bf1c76989e6a9054be4f0eb009d68f0f2464b453 contains a fix.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bf1c76989e6a9054be4f0eb009d68f0f2464b453 Patch
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hg7g-56h5-5pqr Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hg7g-56h5-5pqr Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.3 · wwbnNVD modified 2026-10-26 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
References 3
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bf1c76989e6a9054be4f0eb009d68f0f2464b453 Patch
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hg7g-56h5-5pqr Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hg7g-56h5-5pqr Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory