Sparkle is a software update framework for macOS. Prior to version 2.9.2, `Autoupdate/SUBinaryDeltaApply.m` enforces `relativePath.pathComponents containsObject:@".."` and rejects writes whose immediate parent directory IS itself a symbolic link, but does not detect symlinks deeper in the relative path. `Autoupdate/SPUSparkleDeltaArchive.m`'s `extractItem:` will create symlinks in the destination tree from archive content (no `..` check on the symlink target), and a subsequent `Extract` item targeting `<symlink>/foo/bar` then escapes the destination tree via `fopen(path, "wb")` because the kernel resolves the intermediate symlink during the open call. This is a defense-in-depth issue: exploitation requires a maliciously-crafted `.delta` that passes EdDSA signature verification, i.e. EdDSA private-key compromise. With the AppInstaller running as root for system-domain installs, it gives the holder of a stolen signing key arbitrary file write at root level via the delta-apply path, which is a strictly broader primitive than the "drop-in replacement bundle" install they would otherwise have. Version 2.9.2 contains a patch for the issue.
Fix
Patch, vendor advisory and mitigation references on NVD 3
- https://github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle/commit/fe7b718d0736f3e139e374e26fbca96f29e13bf0 Patch
- https://github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle/security/advisories/GHSA-hg88-v3cw-3qrh Vendor Advisory
- https://github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle/security/advisories/GHSA-hg88-v3cw-3qrh Vendor Advisory
Every line above is quoted from NVD, CISA, Microsoft, the vendor's own advisory or DISA; nothing is generated.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.1 · sparkle-projectNVD modified 2026-10-24 20:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 1
cpe:2.3:a:sparkle-project:sparkle:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*