MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, find_icon_path_zip in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py uses the Android manifest android:icon value to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting traversal or verifying containment, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted ZIP or APK that reads a server file with an ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffix, copies it to DWD_DIR as the predictable name -icon., and retrieves it through the /download/ endpoint. The same behavior provides a file-existence oracle through the icon_path report field. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 5.5NVD modified 2026-10-22 22:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2627
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.5.1
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-8j49-mmcx-4mp5
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-8j49-mmcx-4mp5