Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 6.0NVD modified 2026-10-18 20:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/masci/banks/commit/a215f6d779966945c56e0af5abed1ae5916fd9d3
- https://github.com/masci/banks/pull/77
- https://github.com/masci/banks/releases/tag/v2.4.5
- https://github.com/masci/banks/security/advisories/GHSA-x8wg-4xgc-vr54
- https://github.com/masci/banks/security/advisories/GHSA-x8wg-4xgc-vr54