MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, confluence_upload_attachment passes its client-supplied file_path directly to open(file_path, "rb") in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py through _upload_attachment_direct() without calling validate_safe_path. An authenticated MCP client can read any file accessible to the server process and exfiltrate it to Confluence as an attachment. If an AI agent can be induced to call the tool through untrusted content, the same flaw can disclose server environment variables such as CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN and other credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.
Fix
Nothing published yet: no patch, vendor advisory or mitigation reference on NVD, no vendor advisory in the News for this CVE, not in CISA's KEV, no fixed package version. BaselineWatch does not guess at one.
Change history 1
- First seenCVSS 7.7NVD modified 2026-10-23 19:10
Affected (CPE criteria) 0
NVD has not attached CPE configurations yet.
References 5
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-g5r6-gv6m-f5jv
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-g5r6-gv6m-f5jv