BaselineWatch
61067 CVEs · 136 in KEV
Desk
CVEs known61,067 New, 24 h191 Changed, 24 h200 In KEV136 Public exploit1,650 Match watchlist0

Vulnerabilities

All My stack Known exploited Public exploit Critical (9+) Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%) Changed, 24 h New, 24 h Sort: risk modified published CVSS EPSS
CVEs
CVECVSSEPSSVendor, productDescriptionModified
CVE-2026-64824exploit 9.3 critical 1.0% no CPE yet Home Assistant Core before 2026.7.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the backup-restore function that allows attackers to write files to arbitrary absolute filesystem paths by supplying a crafted tar archive with a SYMTYPE entry containing a benign member name paired with an absolute linkname pointing outside the extraction directory. Because the official Docker image runs the Home Assistant process as root and the subsequent regular-file entry is written through the unvalidated symlink, attackers can achieve remote code execution by overwriting auto-imported Python paths such as site-packages/sitecustomize.py or custom component directories. 24 Oct
CVE-2026-17351exploit 9.4 critical 0.00% pgadmin, pgadmin_4 The fix for CVE-2026-12045 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 required the LLM-supplied query passed to the AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool to parse, via sqlparse, as exactly one non-transaction-control statement before running it inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper. sqlparse's string-literal lexing can disagree with PostgreSQL's own parser: under standard_conforming_strings = on (PostgreSQL's default since 9.1), a backslash immediately before a quote is an ordinary character to PostgreSQL, but sqlparse treats it as escaping the quote. A payload such as SELECT '\';COMMIT;CREATE TABLE pwn(x int);SELECT 1 --' therefore parses as a single SELECT to sqlparse's validator, while PostgreSQL executes it as four statements: the smuggled COMMIT ends the wrapping read-only transaction, and the trailing ROLLBACK becomes a no-op. This reintroduces the same write/RCE bypass CVE-2026-12045 was meant to close, reachable via the same indirect prompt-injection delivery (an attacker plants the payload in any object the AI Assistant may read; the LLM emits it as a tool call). An initial candidate fix ran the query with psycopg's execute(..., prepare=True), intending to force PostgreSQL's own Parse step (extended query protocol) to reject multi-statement text regardless of sqlparse's classification. This candidate fix does not work as submitted: psycopg3's PrepareManager silently ignores the prepare argument whenever the connection's prepare_threshold is None, which is pgAdmin's default for every server connection (the per-server "Prepare threshold" field is blank unless an administrator explicitly sets it) -- psycopg3 falls back to the simple query protocol, the same multi-statement-capable path the bypass exploits, so the candidate fix closes nothing on any real-world default configuration. The corrected fix sets conn.prepare_threshold = 0 directly on the dedicated, single-use read-only connection the AI Assistant tool opens, structurally forcing the extended query protocol independent of any server-level configuration. Verified against a live PostgreSQL 18 instance: the payload executes successfully under the prepare_threshold=None (default) behavior, and is rejected with "cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement" once prepare_threshold=0 is set on that connection. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.17. 23 Oct

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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.