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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-61447exploit | 10.0 critical | 15.0% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI before 1.6.78 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in CodeAgent._execute_python() that executes LLM-generated Python code without AST validation, import restrictions, or sandbox enforcement. Attackers can influence LLM output through prompt injection to exfiltrate all environment secrets and execute arbitrary code on the host system. | 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-48168 | 10.0 critical | 2.0% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40. | 23 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40288 | 9.8 critical | 1.0% | praison, praisonai, praisonaiagents | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the workflow engine is vulnerable to arbitrary command and code execution through untrusted YAML files. When praisonai workflow run <file.yaml> loads a YAML file with type: job, the JobWorkflowExecutor in job_workflow.py processes steps that support run: (shell commands via subprocess.run()), script: (inline Python via exec()), and python: (arbitrary Python script execution)—all without any validation, sandboxing, or user confirmation. The affected code paths include action_run() in workflow.py and _exec_shell(), _exec_inline_python(), and _exec_python_script() in job_workflow.py. An attacker who can supply or influence a workflow YAML file (particularly in CI pipelines, shared repositories, or multi-tenant deployment environments) can achieve full arbitrary command execution on the host system, compromising the machine and any accessible data or credentials. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-41497 | 9.8 critical | 1.0% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.9, the fix for PraisonAI's MCP command handling does not add a command allowlist or argument validation to parse_mcp_command(), allowing arbitrary executables like bash, python, or /bin/sh with inline code execution flags to pass through to subprocess execution. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.9. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47391 | 9.8 critical | 1.0% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's first-party A2A server example exposes an unauthenticated A2A JSON-RPC endpoint and registers a `calculate(expression)` tool implemented with Python `eval()`. The example also binds to `0.0.0.0`. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send `message/send` to `/a2a`; the request reaches `agent.chat()`, and a real LLM can invoke the registered `calculate` tool. In testing with `gemini/gemini-2.5-flash-lite`, this resulted in arbitrary Python execution in the server process, confirmed by creation of a marker file from an unauthenticated HTTP request. The issue affects deployments following the official A2A example or similar unauthenticated public A2A deployments with unsafe tools. The default unauthenticated A2A surface also exposes task history and task cancellation APIs, increasing confidentiality and integrity impact. Version 4.6.40 patches the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47393 | 9.8 critical | 1.0% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (`praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code`) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (`praisonai deploy --type api`) get a server that binds to `0.0.0.0` per the recommended sample YAML, exposes `/chat` and `/agents` endpoints, runs `praisonai.run()` on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment, and does not require any authentication. Versions prior to 4.6.40 still ship the generator with `auth_enabled` defaulting to `False`. The fix shape is opt-in via `APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...)`. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-61445 | 9.4 critical | 1.0% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains arbitrary file write and command execution vulnerabilities in the AICoder component due to missing path validation and command sanitization in LLM tool calls. Attackers can inject malicious prompts through the chat interface to write files to arbitrary filesystem locations and execute arbitrary shell commands with root privileges. | 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-39305 | 10.0 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40114 | 10.0 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the /api/v1/runs endpoint accepts an arbitrary webhook_url in the request body with no URL validation. When a submitted job completes (success or failure), the server makes an HTTP POST request to this URL using httpx.AsyncClient. An unauthenticated attacker can use this to make the server send POST requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, enabling SSRF against cloud metadata services, internal APIs, and other network-adjacent services. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47396 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured. The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents. This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47410 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-57116 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.2.1 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's AgentOS FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in current main and in releases after the published patched version for GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151. The chat route directly calls agent.chat(request.message). No-auth and wrong-bearer requests both execute the deployed agent. This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those agents. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | 23 Oct |
| CVE-2026-57118 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, AgentTeam.launch and the Agents alias register GET /{path}/list, POST /{path}, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}' without access-control checks before listing agents or calling agent.chat. A remotely exposed server can therefore let unauthenticated clients enumerate agents, consume model resources, access connected private context, and trigger agent tools or workflow side effects. This vulnerability is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40154 | 9.6 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI treats remotely fetched template files as trusted executable code without integrity verification, origin validation, or user confirmation, enabling supply chain attacks through malicious templates. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40088 | 9.6 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.121, the execute_command function and workflow shell execution are exposed to user-controlled input via agent workflows, YAML definitions, and LLM-generated tool calls, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary shell commands through shell metacharacters. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.121. | 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47413 | 9.6 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`) and forwards the request body's `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47416 | 9.6 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member's role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller's own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40157 | 9.4 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, cmd_unpack in the recipe CLI extracts .praison tar archives using raw tar.extract() without validating archive member paths. A .praison bundle containing ../../ entries will write files outside the intended output directory. An attacker who distributes a malicious bundle can overwrite arbitrary files on the victim's filesystem when they run praisonai recipe unpack. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. | 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-61444 | 9.4 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI versions before 4.6.78 contain a code injection vulnerability in deploy/api.py where the agents_file parameter is directly interpolated into an f-string without sanitization. Attackers can inject arbitrary Python code that executes when the generated server code runs via subprocess.Popen(). | 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47407 | 9.4 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40111 | 9.3 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonaiagents | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes. Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-35615 | 9.2 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, _validate_path() calls os.path.normpath() first, which collapses .. sequences, then checks for '..' in normalized. Since .. is already collapsed, the check always passes. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40289 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai, praisonaiagents | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40313 | 9.1 critical | 0.00% | praison, praisonai | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140. | Mon 26 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-11-01. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.