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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-71073 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: lkkbd - disable pending work before freeing device lkkbd_interrupt() schedules lk->tq via schedule_work(), and the work handler lkkbd_reinit() dereferences the lkkbd structure and its serio/input_dev fields. lkkbd_disconnect() and error paths in lkkbd_connect() free the lkkbd structure without preventing the reinit work from being queued again until serio_close() returns. This can allow the work handler to run after the structure has been freed, leading to a potential use-after-free. Use disable_work_sync() instead of cancel_work_sync() to ensure the reinit work cannot be re-queued, and call it both in lkkbd_disconnect() and in lkkbd_connect() error paths after serio_open(). | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-89624 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if force-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that only does "return error". The device is left started. The HID core does not unwind on the driver's behalf. __hid_device_probe() releases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev->driver: if (ret) { devres_release_group(&hdev->dev, hdev->devres_group_id); hid_close_report(hdev); hdev->driver = NULL; } The hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through hid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(), so it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev->driver NULL, hid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds while a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the device on both paths. Opening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports a use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -> hid_hw_open() -> the transport's open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object. A descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough: hidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid->inputs stays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure, pidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count, input_ff_create() - all reach the same label. Stop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the device with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do this. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(), since neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the start its own label. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]> | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74529 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_pa_sync() callback There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task is running. Hold refcount to avoid that. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64029 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Serialize UMP output teardown with event_input seq_ump_process_event() borrows client->out_rfile.output without synchronizing with the first-open and last-close transition in seq_ump_client_open() and seq_ump_client_close(). The last output unuse can therefore drop opened[STR_OUT] to zero and release the rawmidi file while an in-flight event_input callback is still inside snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). That leaves the rawmidi substream runtime exposed to teardown before the write path has taken its own buffer reference. Add a per-client rwlock for the event_input-visible output file. Publish a newly opened output file under the write side, and hold the read side from the output lookup through snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). The last output close copies and clears the visible output file under the write side, then drops the lock and releases the saved rawmidi file. Use IRQ-safe rwlock guards because event_input can also be reached from atomic sequencer delivery. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: path A label: event_input path path B label: last unuse path 1. seq_ump_process_event() reads 1. seq_ump_client_close() client->out_rfile.output. drops opened[STR_OUT] to zero. 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1() 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_release() has not yet pinned runtime. closes the output file. 3. The writer continues using 3. close_substream() frees the borrowed substream. substream->runtime. This keeps the output substream and runtime alive for the full event_input write while keeping rawmidi release outside the rwlock. KASAN reproduced this as a slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(), with allocation through seq_ump_use()/snd_seq_port_connect() and free through seq_ump_unuse()/snd_seq_port_disconnect(). Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 RIP: 0033:0x7f5528af837f Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?) print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?) kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?) kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 (?:?) __asan_load8+0x82/0xb0 (?:?) update_stack_state+0x1ef/0x2d0 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write+0x1a/0x20 (?:?) seq_ump_process_event+0xd4/0x120 (sound/core/seq/seq_ump_client.c:82) __snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x8a/0xe0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_from_ump+0x2b2/0xd60 (?:?) lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2e0 (?:?) find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 (?:?) snd_seq_port_use_ptr+0xa6/0xe0 (?:?) __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?) do_raw_read_unlock+0x32/0xa0 (?:?) _raw_read_unlock+0x26/0x50 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x45c/0x4b0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_event+0x10d/0x1b0 (?:?) snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x192/0x240 (?:?) snd_seq_write+0x2cd/0x450 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?) security_file_permission+0x51/0x60 (?:?) vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?) __fget_files+0x12b/0x220 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?) __rcu_read_unlock+0x74/0x2d0 (?:?) __fget_files+0x135/0x220 (?:?) ksys_write+0x15a/0x180 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x24/0x60 (?:?) __x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?) x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-63971 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39955 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect(). syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0] syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before the TFO socket completes 3WHS: 1. accept() 2. connect(AF_UNSPEC) 3. connect() to another destination As of accept(), sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers. Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk, the retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not retransmitted. Let's call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect(). [0]: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017 RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400 RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8 R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540 R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372) timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135) tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035) __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1)) tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096) handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35)) </IRQ> | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40105 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfs: Don't leak disconnected dentries on umount When user calls open_by_handle_at() on some inode that is not cached, we will create disconnected dentry for it. If such dentry is a directory, exportfs_decode_fh_raw() will then try to connect this dentry to the dentry tree through reconnect_path(). It may happen for various reasons (such as corrupted fs or race with rename) that the call to lookup_one_unlocked() in reconnect_one() will fail to find the dentry we are trying to reconnect and instead create a new dentry under the parent. Now this dentry will not be marked as disconnected although the parent still may well be disconnected (at least in case this inconsistency happened because the fs is corrupted and .. doesn't point to the real parent directory). This creates inconsistency in disconnected flags but AFAICS it was mostly harmless. At least until commit f1ee616214cb ("VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon") which removed adding of most disconnected dentries to sb->s_anon list. Thus after this commit cleanup of disconnected dentries implicitely relies on the fact that dput() will immediately reclaim such dentries. However when some leaf dentry isn't marked as disconnected, as in the scenario described above, the reclaim doesn't happen and the dentries are "leaked". Memory reclaim can eventually reclaim them but otherwise they stay in memory and if umount comes first, we hit infamous "Busy inodes after unmount" bug. Make sure all dentries created under a disconnected parent are marked as disconnected as well. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39880 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix invalid accesses to ceph_connection_v1_info There is a place where generic code in messenger.c is reading and another place where it is writing to con->v1 union member without checking that the union member is active (i.e. msgr1 is in use). On 64-bit systems, con->v1.auth_retry overlaps with con->v2.out_iter, so such a read is almost guaranteed to return a bogus value instead of 0 when msgr2 is in use. This ends up being fairly benign because the side effect is just the invalidation of the authorizer and successive fetching of new tickets. con->v1.connect_seq overlaps with con->v2.conn_bufs and the fact that it's being written to can cause more serious consequences, but luckily it's not something that happens often. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40139 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set(). smc_clc_prfx_set() is called during connect() and not under RCU nor RTNL. Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF. Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dev_dst_rcu() under rcu_read_lock() after kernel_getsockname(). Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_set() is not used in the caller. While at it, we change the 1st arg of smc_clc_prfx_set[46]_rcu() not to touch dst there. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-38718 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs. syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998 sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885 sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031 inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] and BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886 sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032 inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39824 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: asus: fix UAF via HID_CLAIMED_INPUT validation After hid_hw_start() is called hidinput_connect() will eventually be called to set up the device with the input layer since the HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT connect mask is used. During hidinput_connect() all input and output reports are processed and corresponding hid_inputs are allocated and configured via hidinput_configure_usages(). This process involves slot tagging report fields and configuring usages by setting relevant bits in the capability bitmaps. However it is possible that the capability bitmaps are not set at all leading to the subsequent hidinput_has_been_populated() check to fail leading to the freeing of the hid_input and the underlying input device. This becomes problematic because a malicious HID device like a ASUS ROG N-Key keyboard can trigger the above scenario via a specially crafted descriptor which then leads to a user-after-free when the name of the freed input device is written to later on after hid_hw_start(). Below, report 93 intentionally utilises the HID_UP_UNDEFINED Usage Page which is skipped during usage configuration, leading to the frees. 0x05, 0x0D, // Usage Page (Digitizer) 0x09, 0x05, // Usage (Touch Pad) 0xA1, 0x01, // Collection (Application) 0x85, 0x0D, // Report ID (13) 0x06, 0x00, 0xFF, // Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00) 0x09, 0xC5, // Usage (0xC5) 0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0) 0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255) 0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8) 0x95, 0x04, // Report Count (4) 0xB1, 0x02, // Feature (Data,Var,Abs) 0x85, 0x5D, // Report ID (93) 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, // Usage Page (Undefined) 0x09, 0x01, // Usage (0x01) 0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0) 0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255) 0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8) 0x95, 0x1B, // Report Count (27) 0x81, 0x02, // Input (Data,Var,Abs) 0xC0, // End Collection Below is the KASAN splat after triggering the UAF: [ 21.672709] ================================================================== [ 21.673700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80 [ 21.673700] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810a0ac000 by task kworker/1:2/54 [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-g9773391cf4dd-dirty #36 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 21.673700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.673700] Call Trace: [ 21.673700] <TASK> [ 21.673700] dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0x80 [ 21.673700] print_report+0xd1/0x660 [ 21.673700] kasan_report+0xe5/0x120 [ 21.673700] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1b/0x30 [ 21.673700] asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80 [ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700 [ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0 [ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220 [...] [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] Allocated by task 54: [ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3b/0x50 [ 21.673700] __kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xa0 [ 21.673700] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x139/0x340 [ 21.673700] input_allocate_device+0x44/0x370 [ 21.673700] hidinput_connect+0xcb6/0x2630 [ 21.673700] hid_connect+0xf74/0x1d60 [ 21.673700] hid_hw_start+0x8c/0x110 [ 21.673700] asus_probe+0x5a3/0xf80 [ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700 [ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0 [ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220 [...] [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] Freed by task 54: [ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 [ 21.673700] __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x50 [ 21.673700] kfre ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39828 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in: | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-39849 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: sme: cap SSID length in __cfg80211_connect_result() If the ssid->datalen is more than IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN (32) it would lead to memory corruption so add some bounds checking. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40041 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Sign-extend struct ops return values properly The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic: Oops[#1]: CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000741d58, era == 90000000851b5ac0, ra == 90000000851b5aa4 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 449 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 pc 90000000851b5ac0 ra 90000000851b5aa4 tp 90000001076b8000 sp 90000001076bb600 a0 0000000000741ce8 a1 0000000000000001 a2 90000001076bb5c0 a3 0000000000000008 a4 90000001004c4620 a5 9000000100741ce8 a6 0000000000000000 a7 0100000000000000 t0 0000000000000010 t1 0000000000000000 t2 9000000104d24d30 t3 0000000000000001 t4 4f2317da8a7e08c4 t5 fffffefffc002f00 t6 90000001004c4620 t7 ffffffffc61c5b3d t8 0000000000000000 u0 0000000000000001 s9 0000000000000050 s0 90000001075bc800 s1 0000000000000040 s2 900000010597c400 s3 0000000000000008 s4 90000001075bc880 s5 90000001075bc8f0 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000741ce8 s8 0000000000000000 ra: 90000000851b5aa4 __qdisc_run+0xac/0x8d8 ERA: 90000000851b5ac0 __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000741d58 PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] Process test_progs (pid: 449, threadinfo=000000009af02b3a, task=00000000e9ba4956) Stack : 0000000000000000 90000001075bc8ac 90000000869524a8 9000000100741ce8 90000001075bc800 9000000100415300 90000001075bc8ac 0000000000000000 900000010597c400 900000008694a000 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 90000001075bc800 9000000100741ce8 0000000000000050 900000008513000c 9000000086936000 0000000100094d4c fffffff400676208 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 900000008694a000 9000000086bf0dc0 9000000105b59000 9000000086bf0d68 9000000085147010 90000001075be788 0000000000000000 9000000086bf0f98 0000000000000001 0000000000000010 9000000006015840 0000000000000000 9000000086be6c40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 4f2317da8a7e08c4 0000000000000101 4f2317da8a7e08c4 ... Call Trace: [<90000000851b5ac0>] __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 [<9000000085130008>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x578/0x10f0 [<90000000853701c0>] ip6_finish_output2+0x2f0/0x950 [<9000000085374bc8>] ip6_finish_output+0x2b8/0x448 [<9000000085370b24>] ip6_xmit+0x304/0x858 [<90000000853c4438>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x100/0x170 [<90000000852b32f0>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x490/0xdd0 [<90000000852b47fc>] tcp_connect+0xbcc/0x1168 [<90000000853b9088>] tcp_v6_connect+0x580/0x8a0 [<90000000852e7738>] __inet_stream_connect+0x170/0x480 [<90000000852e7a98>] inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x88 [<90000000850f2814>] __sys_connect+0xe4/0x110 [<90000000850f2858>] sys_connect+0x18/0x28 [<9000000085520c94>] do_syscall+0x94/0x1a0 [<9000000083df1fb8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Code: 4001ad80 2400873f 2400832d <240073cc> 001137ff 001133ff 6407b41f 001503cc 0280041d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which requires LoongArch ABI. So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the LoongArch ABI ([1]) and return value spec in function model. [1]: https://loongson.github.io/LoongArch-Documentation/LoongArch-ELF-ABI-EN.html | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40064 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev(). syzbot reported use-after-free of net_device in __pnet_find_base_ndev(), which was called during connect(). [0] smc_pnet_find_ism_resource() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev and passes down to pnet_find_base_ndev(), where RTNL is held. Then, UAF happened at __pnet_find_base_ndev() when the dev is first used. This means dev had already been freed before acquiring RTNL in pnet_find_base_ndev(). While dev is going away, dst->dev could be swapped with blackhole_netdev, and the dev's refcnt by dst will be released. We must hold dev's refcnt before calling smc_pnet_find_ism_resource(). Also, smc_pnet_find_roce_resource() has the same problem. Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in the two functions. [0]: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888036bac33a by task syz.0.3632/18609 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 18609 Comm: syz.0.3632 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926 pnet_find_base_ndev net/smc/smc_pnet.c:946 [inline] smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1103 [inline] smc_pnet_find_ism_resource+0xef/0x390 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1154 smc_find_ism_device net/smc/af_smc.c:1030 [inline] smc_find_proposal_devices net/smc/af_smc.c:1115 [inline] __smc_connect+0x372/0x1890 net/smc/af_smc.c:1545 smc_connect+0x877/0xd90 net/smc/af_smc.c:1715 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2086 [inline] __sys_connect+0x313/0x440 net/socket.c:2105 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2108 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2108 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f47cbf8eba9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f47ccdb1038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 RCX: 00007f47cbf8eba9 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00007f47cc011e19 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f47cc1d6038 R14: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 R15: 00007ffc512f8aa8 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888036bacd00 pfn:0x36bac flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001243d08 ffff8880b863fdc0 0000000000000000 raw: ffff888036bacd00 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as freed page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x446dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 16741, tgid 16741 (syz-executor), ts 343313197788, free_ts 380670750466 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x5f/0x1b0 mm/slub.c:4317 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x18/0x90 mm/slub.c:4348 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline] __kvmalloc_node ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40079 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv, bpf: Sign extend struct ops return values properly The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffffa38dbf58 Current test_progs pgtable: 4K pagesize, 57-bit VAs, pgdp=0x00000001109cc000 [ffffffffa38dbf58] pgd=000000011fffd801, p4d=000000011fffd401, pud=000000011fffd001, pmd=0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) xt_conntrack nls_iso8859_1 [...] [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23584 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G W OE 6.17.0-rc1-g2465bb83e0b4 #1 NONE Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2024.01+dfsg-1ubuntu5.1 01/01/2024 epc : __qdisc_run+0x82/0x6f0 ra : __qdisc_run+0x6e/0x6f0 epc : ffffffff80bd5c7a ra : ffffffff80bd5c66 sp : ff2000000eecb550 gp : ffffffff82472098 tp : ff60000096895940 t0 : ffffffff8001f180 t1 : ffffffff801e1664 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ff2000000eecb5d0 s1 : ff60000093a6a600 a0 : ffffffffa38dbee8 a1 : 0000000000000001 a2 : ff2000000eecb510 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000010 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 s2 : ffffffffa38dbee8 s3 : 0000000000000040 s4 : ff6000008bcda000 s5 : 0000000000000008 s6 : ff60000093a6a680 s7 : ff60000093a6a6f0 s8 : ff60000093a6a6ac s9 : ff60000093140000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: ff2000000eecb9d0 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : 0000000000ff0000 t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ff60000093a6a8b6 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffffa38dbf58 cause: 000000000000000d [<ffffffff80bd5c7a>] __qdisc_run+0x82/0x6f0 [<ffffffff80b6fe58>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c0/0x1128 [<ffffffff80b80ae0>] neigh_resolve_output+0xd0/0x170 [<ffffffff80d2daf6>] ip6_finish_output2+0x226/0x6c8 [<ffffffff80d31254>] ip6_finish_output+0x10c/0x2a0 [<ffffffff80d31446>] ip6_output+0x5e/0x178 [<ffffffff80d2e232>] ip6_xmit+0x29a/0x608 [<ffffffff80d6f4c6>] inet6_csk_xmit+0xe6/0x140 [<ffffffff80c985e4>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x45c/0xaa8 [<ffffffff80c995fe>] tcp_connect+0x9ce/0xd10 [<ffffffff80d66524>] tcp_v6_connect+0x4ac/0x5e8 [<ffffffff80cc19b8>] __inet_stream_connect+0xd8/0x318 [<ffffffff80cc1c36>] inet_stream_connect+0x3e/0x68 [<ffffffff80b42b20>] __sys_connect_file+0x50/0x88 [<ffffffff80b42bee>] __sys_connect+0x96/0xc8 [<ffffffff80b42c40>] __riscv_sys_connect+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff80e5bcae>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x256/0x378 [<ffffffff80e69af2>] handle_exception+0x14a/0x156 Code: 892a 0363 1205 489c 8bc1 c7e5 2d03 084a 2703 080a (2783) 0709 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which requires RISC-V ABI. So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the function model and RISC-V ABI([0]). [0]: https://riscv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/riscv-calling.pdf | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-53033 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Take state lock for af_unix iter When a BPF iterator program updates a sockmap, there is a race condition in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() where the `peer` pointer can become stale[1] during a state transition TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSE. CPU0 bpf CPU1 close -------- ---------- // unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) if (unlikely(!sk_pair)) return -EINVAL; // unix_release_sock() skpair = unix_peer(sk); unix_peer(sk) = NULL; sock_put(skpair) sock_hold(sk_pair) // UaF More practically, this fix guarantees that the iterator program is consistently provided with a unix socket that remains stable during iterator execution. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x155/0x490 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881178c9a00 by task test_progs/2231 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_report+0x170/0x4f3 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1c0 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0x155/0x490 sock_map_link+0x71c/0xec0 sock_map_update_common+0xbc/0x600 sock_map_update_elem+0x19a/0x1f0 bpf_prog_bbbf56096cdd4f01_selective_dump_unix+0x20c/0x217 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x21e/0xae0 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1e0/0x2a0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 2236: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x63/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1d5/0x680 sk_prot_alloc+0x59/0x210 sk_alloc+0x34/0x470 unix_create1+0x86/0x8a0 unix_stream_connect+0x318/0x15b0 __sys_connect+0xfd/0x130 __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 2236: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x47/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x11c/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x432/0x6e0 unix_release_sock+0x9b3/0xf60 unix_release+0x8a/0xf0 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x36e/0xac0 fput_close_sync+0xe5/0x1a0 __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x5e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-43023 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46111 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete(). Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del(). hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put (which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way. Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del(). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-31667 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5 controller): ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths: 1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() -> uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex. 2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires input_mutex. 3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires dev->mutex. 4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex. Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock (ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes. To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock. Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated, uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the request becomes visible. Lock ordering after the fix: ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf) udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge) | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-23428 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of share_conf in compound request smb2_get_ksmbd_tcon() reuses work->tcon in compound requests without validating tcon->t_state. ksmbd_tree_conn_lookup() checks t_state == TREE_CONNECTED on the initial lookup path, but the compound reuse path bypasses this check entirely. If a prior command in the compound (SMB2_TREE_DISCONNECT) sets t_state to TREE_DISCONNECTED and frees share_conf via ksmbd_share_config_put(), subsequent commands dereference the freed share_conf through work->tcon->share_conf. KASAN report: [ 4.144653] ================================================================== [ 4.145059] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_write+0xc74/0xe70 [ 4.145415] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810430c194 by task kworker/1:1/44 [ 4.145772] [ 4.145867] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #60 PREEMPTLAZY [ 4.145871] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 4.145875] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 4.145888] Call Trace: [ 4.145892] <TASK> [ 4.145894] dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80 [ 4.145910] print_report+0xce/0x660 [ 4.145919] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 4.145928] ? smb2_write+0xc74/0xe70 [ 4.145931] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 4.145934] ? smb2_write+0xc74/0xe70 [ 4.145937] smb2_write+0xc74/0xe70 [ 4.145939] ? __pfx_smb2_write+0x10/0x10 [ 4.145942] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30 [ 4.145945] ? ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0xeb2/0x24c0 [ 4.145948] ? smb2_tree_disconnect+0x31c/0x480 [ 4.145951] handle_ksmbd_work+0x40f/0x1080 [ 4.145953] process_one_work+0x5fa/0xef0 [ 4.145962] ? assign_work+0x122/0x3e0 [ 4.145964] worker_thread+0x54b/0xf70 [ 4.145967] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 4.145970] kthread+0x346/0x470 [ 4.145976] ? recalc_sigpending+0x19b/0x230 [ 4.145980] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 4.145984] ret_from_fork+0x4fb/0x6c0 [ 4.145992] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 4.145995] ? __switch_to+0x36c/0xbe0 [ 4.145999] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 4.146003] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 4.146013] </TASK> [ 4.146014] [ 4.149858] Allocated by task 44: [ 4.149953] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 4.150061] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 4.150169] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 4.150274] ksmbd_share_config_get+0x1dd/0xdd0 [ 4.150401] ksmbd_tree_conn_connect+0x7e/0x600 [ 4.150529] smb2_tree_connect+0x2e6/0x1000 [ 4.150645] handle_ksmbd_work+0x40f/0x1080 [ 4.150761] process_one_work+0x5fa/0xef0 [ 4.150873] worker_thread+0x54b/0xf70 [ 4.150978] kthread+0x346/0x470 [ 4.151071] ret_from_fork+0x4fb/0x6c0 [ 4.151176] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 4.151286] [ 4.151332] Freed by task 44: [ 4.151418] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 4.151526] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 4.151634] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 4.151751] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 [ 4.151861] kfree+0x1ca/0x430 [ 4.151952] __ksmbd_tree_conn_disconnect+0xc8/0x190 [ 4.152088] smb2_tree_disconnect+0x1cd/0x480 [ 4.152211] handle_ksmbd_work+0x40f/0x1080 [ 4.152326] process_one_work+0x5fa/0xef0 [ 4.152438] worker_thread+0x54b/0xf70 [ 4.152545] kthread+0x346/0x470 [ 4.152638] ret_from_fork+0x4fb/0x6c0 [ 4.152743] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 4.152853] [ 4.152900] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810430c180 [ 4.152900] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 4.153226] The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of [ 4.153226] freed 96-byte region [ffff88810430c180, ffff88810430c1e0) [ 4.153549] [ 4.153596] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 4.153750] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88810430ce80 pfn:0x10430c [ 4.154000] flags: 0x ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-40248 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already established socket leads to several issues: 1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() -> virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated `vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling. 2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs. 3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a use-after-free/null-ptr-deref. Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by sendmsg(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-74714 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto the ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets rsk_refcnt to 3. Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the lock guarantees sk_refcnt > 0. That assumption does not hold for request_sock: CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- tcp_conn_request() reqsk_queue_hash_req() inet_ehash_insert(req) spin_lock(bucket) __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req) // rsk_refcnt == 0 spin_unlock(bucket) bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() spin_lock(bucket) sock_hold(req) <-- addition on 0 spin_unlock(bucket) refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 3) // clobbers saturated value which surfaces as: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1 Call Trace: bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170 bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70 bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410 vfs_read+0xb9/0x380 The iterator's stolen reference is lost when the publishing CPU's refcount_set() overwrites the count, leaving the socket one reference short. When the last legitimate owner drops its reference the reqsk is freed while still reachable, leading to use-after-free. This reproduces in seconds with tcp_syncookies=0, a handful of threads doing connect()/close() to a local listener while others read an iter/tcp link in a tight loop. Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and skip the socket on failure. A skipped socket is still part of the bucket, so keep counting it in expected. The reallocations are sized from expected, and a request sock whose refcount gets published while the lock is held across the last realloc must already have room. A skipped socket is counted in expected but never batched, so end_sk can be short of expected on a batch that is actually complete. Decide completeness by whether the walk left any socket behind instead. The WARN after the locked realloc checks the same, replacing an end_sk == expected check that could not hold on that path since commit cdec67a489d4 ("bpf: tcp: Make sure iter->batch always contains a full bucket snapshot"). If every matching socket in a bucket is mid-init (refcount 0), end_sk stays 0. Advance to the next bucket rather than returning a batch entry that was never filled this round. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2023-54173 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable preemption in bpf_event_output We received report [1] of kernel crash, which is caused by using nesting protection without disabled preemption. The bpf_event_output can be called by programs executed by bpf_prog_run_array_cg function that disabled migration but keeps preemption enabled. This can cause task to be preempted by another one inside the nesting protection and lead eventually to two tasks using same perf_sample_data buffer and cause crashes like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000001 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page ... ? perf_output_sample+0x12a/0x9a0 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x81/0x280 ? perf_event_output+0x66/0xa0 ? bpf_event_output+0x13a/0x190 ? bpf_event_output_data+0x22/0x40 ? bpf_prog_dfc84bbde731b257_cil_sock4_connect+0x40a/0xacb ? xa_load+0x87/0xe0 ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr+0xc1/0x1a0 ? release_sock+0x3e/0x90 ? sk_setsockopt+0x1a1/0x12f0 ? udp_pre_connect+0x36/0x50 ? inet_dgram_connect+0x93/0xa0 ? __sys_connect+0xb4/0xe0 ? udp_setsockopt+0x27/0x40 ? __pfx_udp_push_pending_frames+0x10/0x10 ? __sys_setsockopt+0xdf/0x1a0 ? __x64_sys_connect+0xf/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fixing this by disabling preemption in bpf_event_output. [1] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/26756 | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2023-53866 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: soc-compress: Reposition and add pcm_mutex If panic_on_warn is set and compress stream(DPCM) is started, then kernel panic occurred because card->pcm_mutex isn't held appropriately. In the following functions, warning were issued at this line "snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held". static int dpcm_be_connect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be, int stream) { ... snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe); ... } void dpcm_be_disconnect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) { ... snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe); ... } void snd_soc_runtime_action(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd, int stream, int action) { ... snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(rtd); ... } int dpcm_dapm_stream_event(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int dir, int event) { ... snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe); ... } These functions are called by soc_compr_set_params_fe, soc_compr_open_fe and soc_compr_free_fe without pcm_mutex locking. And this is call stack. [ 414.527841][ T2179] pc : dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750 [ 414.527848][ T2179] lr : dpcm_process_paths+0x37c/0x750 [ 414.527945][ T2179] Call trace: [ 414.527949][ T2179] dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750 [ 414.527955][ T2179] soc_compr_open_fe+0xb0/0x2cc [ 414.527972][ T2179] snd_compr_open+0x180/0x248 [ 414.527981][ T2179] snd_open+0x15c/0x194 [ 414.528003][ T2179] chrdev_open+0x1b0/0x220 [ 414.528023][ T2179] do_dentry_open+0x30c/0x594 [ 414.528045][ T2179] vfs_open+0x34/0x44 [ 414.528053][ T2179] path_openat+0x914/0xb08 [ 414.528062][ T2179] do_filp_open+0xc0/0x170 [ 414.528068][ T2179] do_sys_openat2+0x94/0x18c [ 414.528076][ T2179] __arm64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa4 [ 414.528084][ T2179] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c [ 414.528094][ T2179] el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x104 [ 414.528099][ T2179] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xd8 [ 414.528103][ T2179] el0_svc+0x34/0xc4 [ 414.528125][ T2179] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x8c/0xfc [ 414.528133][ T2179] el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 [ 414.528142][ T2179] Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... So, I reposition and add pcm_mutex to resolve lockdep error. | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2023-53072 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets Christoph reported a UaF at token lookup time after having refactored the passive socket initialization part: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __token_bucket_busy+0x253/0x260 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810698d5b0 by task syz-executor653/3198 CPU: 1 PID: 3198 Comm: syz-executor653 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc59af4eaa31c1f6c00c8f1e448ed99a45c66340dd5 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 print_report+0x16a/0x46f kasan_report+0xad/0x130 __token_bucket_busy+0x253/0x260 mptcp_token_new_connect+0x13d/0x490 mptcp_connect+0x4ed/0x860 __inet_stream_connect+0x80e/0xd90 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3ce/0x710 mptcp_sendmsg+0xff1/0x1a20 inet_sendmsg+0x11d/0x140 __sys_sendto+0x405/0x490 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc We need to properly clean-up all the paired MPTCP-level resources and be sure to release the msk last, even when the unaccepted subflow is destroyed by the TCP internals via inet_child_forget(). We can re-use the existing MPTCP_WORK_CLOSE_SUBFLOW infra, explicitly checking that for the critical scenario: the closed subflow is the MPC one, the msk is not accepted and eventually going through full cleanup. With such change, __mptcp_destroy_sock() is always called on msk sockets, even on accepted ones. We don't need anymore to transiently drop one sk reference at msk clone time. Please note this commit depends on the parent one: mptcp: refactor passive socket initialization | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2026-94444 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Previously, a user operating inside of a malicious Go project that defines a bogus golang.org/fips140 and operates a malicious GOMODPROXY the user chooses to connect to can serve an arbitrary module in its place. We now unpack the trusted ziphash for the bundled golang.org/fips140 module and construct its entry in the GOMODCACHE such that it can be verified by the toolchain. | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2025-21735 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, linux_kernel | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: nci: Add bounds checking in nci_hci_create_pipe() The "pipe" variable is a u8 which comes from the network. If it's more than 127, then it results in memory corruption in the caller, nci_hci_connect_gate(). | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2024-27024 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | linux, debian, linux_kernel, debian_linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down If connection isn't established yet, get_mr() will fail, trigger connection after get_mr(). | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2025-9871 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | razer, synapse | Razer Synapse 3 Chroma Connect Link Following Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Razer Synapse 3. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the Razer Chroma SDK installer. By creating a symbolic link, an attacker can abuse the installer to delete arbitrary files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-26373. | 8 Oct |
| CVE-2026-40348 | 7.7 high | 0.00% | leepeuker, movary | Movary is a self hosted web app to track and rate a user's watched movies. Prior to version 0.71.1, an ordinary authenticated user can trigger server-side requests to arbitrary internal targets through `POST /settings/jellyfin/server-url-verify`. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled URL, appends `/system/info/public`, and sends a server-side HTTP request with Guzzle. Because there is no restriction on internal hosts, loopback addresses, or private network ranges, this can be abused for SSRF and internal network probing. Any ordinary authenticated user can use this endpoint to make the server connect to arbitrary internal targets and distinguish between different network states. This enables SSRF-based internal reconnaissance, including host discovery, port-state probing, and service fingerprinting. In certain deployments, it may also be usable to reach internal administrative services or cloud metadata endpoints that are not directly accessible from the outside. Version 0.71.1 fixes the issue. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-12990 | 7.7 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | An access control vulnerability in the mobile app (APK v5.5.0) for Ghost Robotics' Vision 60 robot allows multiple simultaneous sessions to run without proper client validation or session integrity checks. An attacker with a modified version of the app can connect to the robot during an active, legitimate session. This allows the attacker to bypass control restrictions, intercept sensitive information (such as real-time video), and partially interact with the system unnoticed and without disconnecting the legitimate user, compromising confidentiality and operational security. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-64524 | 7.7 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded into the existing zero-check. When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated, which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8 defaults. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-18166 | 7.7 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | IBM Db2 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.5 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes DB2 Connect Server) could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to improper authorization when using the CREATE WRAPPER command. | 13 Oct |
| CVE-2024-36968 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix div-by-zero in l2cap_le_flowctl_init() l2cap_le_flowctl_init() can cause both div-by-zero and an integer overflow since hdev->le_mtu may not fall in the valid range. Move MTU from hci_dev to hci_conn to validate MTU and stop the connection process earlier if MTU is invalid. Also, add a missing validation in read_buffer_size() and make it return an error value if the validation fails. Now hci_conn_add() returns ERR_PTR() as it can fail due to the both a kzalloc failure and invalid MTU value. divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G W 6.9.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work RIP: 0010:l2cap_le_flowctl_init+0x19e/0x3f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:547 Code: e8 17 17 0c 00 66 41 89 9f 84 00 00 00 bf 01 00 00 00 41 b8 02 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 4c 89 e2 89 d9 e8 27 17 0c 00 44 89 f0 31 d2 <66> f7 f3 89 c3 ff c3 4d 8d b7 88 00 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 RSP: 0018:ffff88810bc0f858 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000002a0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88810bc0f7c0 RDI: ffffc90002dcb66f RBP: ffff88810bc0f880 R08: aa69db2dda70ff01 R09: 0000ffaaaaaaaaaa R10: 0084000000ffaaaa R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810d65a084 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000000002a0 R15: ffff88810d65a000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000103268003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> l2cap_le_connect_req net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4902 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5420 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5486 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe59d/0x11710 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6809 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x544/0x10a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3939 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x5e5/0xb20 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4176 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x90f/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x926/0xe70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2e3/0x380 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x5c/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | 20 h ago |
| CVE-2026-111459 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | An improper certificate validation vulnerability exists in Moxa Remote Connect Suite (MRC Client). Under certain conditions, an unauthenticated attacker with on-path access to the communication between the MRC Client and its server could impersonate a trusted server and conduct a man-in-the-middle attack, potentially compromising the confidentiality and integrity of communications. | Tue 27 Oct |
| CVE-2026-42790 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | erlang, erlang\/otp | Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1, OTP 27.3.4.12 and OTP 26.2.5.21, corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1, 1.17.1.3 and 1.15.1.7. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-59804 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Midscene Bridge Server through 1.10.3, fixed in commit 86f4118, contains a missing authentication and CORS misconfiguration vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack active bridge sessions by opening a cross-origin WebSocket connection to the local Socket.IO server, which performs no Origin header validation and requires no authentication token. Attackers can connect from any web page visited by the victim to seize the single-client slot, intercept and inject automation commands, exfiltrate command-payload data, or unconditionally terminate the server by supplying the MIDSCENE_BRIDGE_SIGNAL_KILL query parameter. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-59950 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | lfprojects, mcp_python_sdk | The MCP Python SDK, called mcp on PyPI, is a Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Prior to 1.28.1, the deprecated mcp.server.websocket.websocket_server transport accepted WebSocket handshakes without applying Host or Origin header validation, leaving no SDK-level way to restrict which origins could connect to applications that exposed that transport. This issue is fixed in version 1.28.1. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-97687 | 7.6 high | 0.00% | python, urllib3 | urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 1.26.0 until 2.8.0, the proxy_ssl_context, proxy_assert_hostname, proxy_assert_fingerprint, ssl_context, cert_reqs, verify_mode, use_forwarding_for_https=True, and CERT_NONE configuration paths fail to remain separated because target-server TLS settings are incorrectly applied to the HTTPS proxy connection. The trigger is that an application uses an HTTPS proxy and configures target-server TLS settings that must remain separate from the proxy TLS handshake, including HTTPS forwarding with target-specific identity or credentials. Applying cert_reqs=CERT_NONE can overwrite proxy_ssl_context.verify_mode in place, and the mutation persists so later connections reusing the same context may connect to the HTTPS proxy without certificate verification. The attack mechanism is that an attacker intercepts and impersonates the HTTPS proxy after the effective proxy policy accepts the attacker's certificate. The impact is that the attacker can observe or modify forwarded traffic or receive a target TLS client certificate, while CONNECT tunneling still preserves the separate end-to-end target TLS connection. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.0. | 13 Oct |
| CVE-2026-46265 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | linux | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/hns: Fix WQ_MEM_RECLAIM warning When sunrpc is used, if a reset triggered, our wq may lead the following trace: workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM xprtiod:xprt_rdma_connect_worker [rpcrdma] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM hns_roce_irq_workq:flush_work_handle [hns_roce_hw_v2] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8250 at kernel/workqueue.c:2644 check_flush_dependency+0xe0/0x144 Call trace: check_flush_dependency+0xe0/0x144 start_flush_work.constprop.0+0x1d0/0x2f0 __flush_work.isra.0+0x40/0xb0 flush_work+0x14/0x30 hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp+0xac/0x1e0 [hns_roce_hw_v2] ib_destroy_qp_user+0x9c/0x2b4 rdma_destroy_qp+0x34/0xb0 rpcrdma_ep_destroy+0x28/0xcc [rpcrdma] rpcrdma_ep_put+0x74/0xb4 [rpcrdma] rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x1d8/0x260 [rpcrdma] xprt_rdma_connect_worker+0xc0/0x120 [rpcrdma] process_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x154/0x414 kthread+0x104/0x144 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Since QP destruction frees memory, this wq should have the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM. | 20 h ago |
| CVE-2025-61479 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via the SPC Connect Pro software accepts replayed application-layer payloads injected into an active TCP session. | Wed 28 Oct |
| CVE-2026-31923 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | apache, apisix | Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information vulnerability in Apache APISIX. This can occur due to `ssl_verify` in openid-connect plugin configuration being set to false by default. This issue affects Apache APISIX: from 0.7 through 3.15.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.16.0, which fixes the issue. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-44028 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | An issue was discovered in Nix before 2.34.7 and Lix before 2.95.2. Unbounded recursion in the NAR (Nix Archive) parser could lead to a stack-to-heap overflow when the parser is run on a coroutine stack. The stack is allocated without a guard page, which means that a stack overflow could overwrite memory on the heap and could allow arbitrary code execution as the Nix daemon (run as root in multi-user installations) if ASLR hardening is bypassed. This can be exploited by all users able to connect to the daemon (e.g., in Nix, this is configurable via the allowed-users setting, defaulting to all users). The fixed versions are 2.34.7, 2.33.6, 2.32.8, 2.31.5, 2.30.5, 2.29.4, and 2.28.7 for Nix (introduced in 2.24.4); and 2.95.2, 2.94.2, and 2.93.4 for Lix (introduced in 2.93.0). | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-9793 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | redhat, build_of_keycloak | A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted request object is submitted, Keycloak may incorrectly process unsigned claims if the decrypted content is raw JSON, bypassing the configured signature policy. This allows a remote attacker to submit unauthorized claims, leading to a compromise of data integrity within the OpenID Connect (OIDC) authorization flow. While a redirect URI allowlist acts as a compensating control, this vulnerability violates OIDC Core and Financial-grade API (FAPI) signing requirements. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-47204 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | envoyproxy, envoy | Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.26.0 until 1.35.13, 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, the envoy.filters.http.grpc_stats filter crashes (null pointer dereference / segfault) when a Connect protocol request (Content-Type: application/connect+proto or application/connect+json) hits a direct_response route. A single unauthenticated HTTP request crashes the Envoy process. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.13, 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-55524 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-13089 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-12947 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | ibm, app_connect_enterprise | IBM App Connect Enterprise 13.0.1.0 through 13.0.7.2, and 12.0.1.0 through 12.0.12.27 stores potentially sensitive information in log files that could be read by a local user. | 23 Oct |
| CVE-2025-59420 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | authlib | Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.4, Authlib’s JWS verification accepts tokens that declare unknown critical header parameters (crit), violating RFC 7515 “must‑understand” semantics. An attacker can craft a signed token with a critical header (for example, bork or cnf) that strict verifiers reject but Authlib accepts. In mixed‑language fleets, this enables split‑brain verification and can lead to policy bypass, replay, or privilege escalation. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.4. | 19 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-30. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.