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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98388 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: do_close_on_exec() before taking exec_update_lock do_close_on_exec() currently happens while holding the exec_update_lock, which is used in a lot of places that access process state to synchronize access checks. I recently added another such use of exec_update_lock, causing a regression. do_close_on_exec() can block waiting for a reply from a filesystem. That means a hung filesystem can block codepaths that use exec_update_lock; and it also means that a FUSE filesystem which attempts to inspect the calling process can deadlock. To avoid such problems, move do_close_on_exec() before the exec_update_lock is taken, but after the FD table has been copied if necessary. I have looked through all the calls between the old and new position of the do_close_on_exec() call; there seems to be no file descriptor table access in between. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-98215 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file. For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain transition, or check the wrong target SID after one. Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the regular file SID for the first backing layer. With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing, mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds. Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud Base 44 userspace and gave the same result. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-93113 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: qcom: camcc-sc8280xp: unregister CAMCC_GDSC_CLK With the introduction of sync_state support in the clk and pmdomain subsystems, the following warning happens when the unused clocks are shutdown in camcc-sc8280xp: [ 15.408367] titan_top_gdsc status stuck at 'on' [ 15.408429] WARNING: drivers/clk/qcom/gdsc.c:178 at gdsc_toggle_logic+0x14c/0x160, CPU#2: kworker/u32:1/14 [ 15.408462] Modules linked in: bnep vfat fat ath11k_pci(+) ath11k mac80211 cfg80211 mhi libarc4 snd_soc_wcd938x snd_soc_wcd938x_sdw snd_soc_wcd_classh hci_uart snd_soc_wcd_common snd_soc_sc8280xp soundwire_qcom snd_soc_wcd_mbhc snd_soc_qcom_sdw slimbus snd_soc_qcom_common regmap_sdw btqca btrtl qcom_camss soundwire_bus btbcm btintel snd_soc_sdca snd_soc_lpass_wsa_macro bluetooth snd_soc_lpass_tx_macro snd_soc_lpass_va_macro snd_soc_lpass_rx_macro snd_soc_hdmi_codec snd_soc_lpass_macro_common videobuf2_dma_sg ov5675 v4l2_fwnode videobuf2_memops qcom_spmi_adc5 snd_soc_core qcom_spmi_adc_tm5 videobuf2_v4l2 snd_seq snd_seq_device videobuf2_common v4l2_async qcom_vadc_common qcom_spmi_temp_alarm pm8941_pwrkey industrialio videodev snd_compress rfkill ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine qcom_tsens mc qcom_edac snd_pcm pci_pwrctrl_pwrseq qcom_cpufreq_hw snd_timer snd qcomtee soundcore tee leds_gpio joydev binfmt_misc zram lz4hc_compress governor_simpleondemand panel_edp msm xhci_plat_hcd nvme nvme_core dwc3 qcom_pm8008_regulator [ 15.408688] ucsi_glink nvme_keyring nvme_auth pmic_glink_altmode udc_core typec_ucsi aux_hpd_bridge qcom_battmgr ulpi ubwc_config socinfo ocmem drm_gpuvm qcom_q6v5_pas drm_exec qcom_pil_info leds_qcom_lpg gpu_sched led_class_multicolor rtc_pm8xxx qcom_pbs qcom_common drm_display_helper qcom_pon qcom_glink_smem qcom_glink ghash_ce pwrseq_qcom_wcn gpio_sbu_mux qcom_stats phy_qcom_qmp_combo qcom_q6v5 gf128mul cec dispcc_sc8280xp phy_qcom_edp camcc_sc8280xp i2c_qcom_cci qcom_sysmon drm_dp_aux_bus mdt_loader aux_bridge qcom_pm8008 i2c_hid_of_elan dwc3_qcom_legacy llcc_qcom icc_bwmon gpi typec qcom_refgen_regulator phy_qcom_qmp_usb nvmem_qfprom qcom_ipcc phy_qcom_snps_femto_v2 gpucc_sc8280xp pinctrl_sc8280xp_lpass_lpi qcom_hwspinlock pinctrl_lpass_lpi lpasscc_sc8280xp qrtr qcom_aoss pmic_glink pdr_interface phy_qcom_qmp_pcie qcom_smd qcom_pdr_msg icc_osm_l3 qcom_wdt qmi_helpers qcom_rng smp2p rpmsg_core gpio_keys pwm_bl smem hid_multitouch fuse i2c_dev [ 15.408928] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 14 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 7.1.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 15.408937] Hardware name: LENOVO 21BX0016US/21BX0016US, BIOS N3HET88W (1.60 ) 03/14/2024 [ 15.408942] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 15.408959] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 15.408967] pc : gdsc_toggle_logic+0x14c/0x160 [ 15.408978] lr : gdsc_toggle_logic+0x14c/0x160 [ 15.408987] sp : ffff8000800f3b40 [ 15.408991] x29: ffff8000800f3b40 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 15.409003] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 15.409014] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffffa33f298fca88 [ 15.409024] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffa33f298fc5b0 x18: 00cd15db75dacefd [ 15.409035] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffa33f3b1a3d88 x15: 726f776b80000002 [ 15.409045] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000028 x12: 0101010101010101 [ 15.409056] x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: fefeff3039313274 x9 : ffffa33f3a5edafc [ 15.409067] x8 : ffff8000800f3780 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 15.409078] x5 : ffff000bf3ca1288 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff5cccb6a3f000 [ 15.409088] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000080ae0000 [ 15.409098] Call trace: [ 15.409103] gdsc_toggle_logic+0x14c/0x160 (P) [ 15.409115] gdsc_disable+0x4c/0x190 [ 15.409126] _genp ---truncated--- | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90140 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cuse: wait for pending RCU callbacks on module exit Since commit 053fc4f755ad ("fuse: fix UAF in rcu pathwalks"), fuse_conn_put() frees the fuse_conn through call_rcu() rather than synchronously. For cuse, fc->release is cuse_fc_release(), which lives in the cuse module. If the module is removed before the RCU grace period ends, the callback jumps into freed module memory: userspace / module unload | RCU softirq ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ close(/dev/cuse) | cuse_channel_release() | fuse_dev_release() | fuse_conn_put(fch->conn) | call_rcu(delayed_release) ------+---> callback queued | rmmod cuse | cuse_exit() | cuse_channel_destroy() | ... | return | | <module text freed> | | rcu_do_batch() | delayed_release() | fc->release() | -> cuse_fc_release() | ^^^ freed text! The freed module text is unmapped by vfree(), so the jump into the stale callback triggers a page-fault Oops. If the virtual address is subsequently reused, the callback could execute unrelated code (undefined behaviour). Fix this by calling rcu_barrier() in cuse_exit() so that any pending fuse_conn release callback completes before the module is removed. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90139 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: check for NULL root inode in fuse_fill_super_submount fuse_iget() can return NULL when its inode allocation fails, but fuse_fill_super_submount() passed the result straight to get_fuse_inode() and decremented fi->nlookup without checking it: root = fuse_iget(sb, parent_fi->nodeid, ...); fi = get_fuse_inode(root); fi->nlookup--; Inside fuse_iget() the inode allocation can fail and return NULL. The submount root takes the iget5_locked() path, whose alloc_inode() can fail under memory pressure (the auto-submount branch can fail the same way in new_inode() or fuse_alloc_submount_lookup()): inode = iget5_locked(sb, nodeid, fuse_inode_eq, fuse_inode_set, &nodeid); if (!inode) return NULL; A NULL root makes get_fuse_inode() a container_of() on NULL and the nlookup decrement a write to a bogus address, oopsing the mount. With CONFIG_KASAN the following null pointer dereference is reported when the root inode allocation of an auto-submount fails (e.g. under memory pressure): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0 Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000002b0 by task ls/942 CPU: 0 PID: 942 Comm: ls Tainted: G W 6.6 #15 Call Trace: <TASK> fuse_get_tree_submount+0x656/0x8b0 vfs_get_tree+0x48/0x140 fc_mount+0x13/0x50 fuse_dentry_automount+0x7a/0xb0 __traverse_mounts+0xca/0x330 step_into+0x339/0xac0 path_lookupat+0xc5/0x2f0 filename_lookup+0x163/0x2a0 vfs_statx+0xd5/0x200 do_statx+0x83/0xd0 __x64_sys_statx+0xa0/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 </TASK> ================================================================== Return -ENOMEM instead; the caller tears down the partially built superblock on error, matching the other error returns in this function. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90096 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: invalidate the correct range after O_APPEND direct write fuse_direct_write_iter() captures pos before generic_write_checks(), which moves ki_pos to EOF for O_APPEND writes: fuse_direct_write_iter() { pos = iocb->ki_pos; /* 0 (user-supplied) */ generic_write_checks(); /* ki_pos -> EOF */ fuse_direct_io(); /* writes at EOF, correct */ invalidate(pos, pos + res); /* [0, res) -- wrong */ } The post-write invalidation targets a stale range instead of the actual written range at EOF. This can cause data inconsistency when the file size is not page-aligned. The tail page straddling EOF has a valid portion before EOF that concurrent readers can fault back in during the DIO write window: Tail page (file size X not page-aligned): page_start X (EOF) page_end |--- valid data ----|-- stale --| CPU0 (O_APPEND DIO writer) CPU1 (buffered reader) -------------------------- ---------------------- invalidate [X, X+len) tail page evicted FUSE_WRITE in flight ... read [page_start, X) tail page re-faulted [X, page_end) = stale FUSE_WRITE completes i_size = X + len invalidate [0, len) <- WRONG tail page still cached read [X, X+len) hits stale tail page returns old data Fix by reading pos back from iocb->ki_pos after generic_write_checks(), as generic_file_direct_write() does. Also fix a typo in the comment ("may have" -> "may have competed"). | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90095 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and queue->lock). The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change, FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it. Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know. Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN. Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions. If there should be a report from any library or application we probably need to revert this commit. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-89768 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: fix user path of nested backing files backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened. Commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem. As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts: mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \ /ovl/merged # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested mapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user path: # readlink /proc/self/fd/3 /ovl/nested/foo # grep foo /proc/self/maps 7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /foo The bogus path is derived from the f_path of the intermediate backing file, whose mount is a private clone that d_path() cannot resolve. Fix this by using file_user_path(), which returns the outermost user-visible path for backing files and falls back to &user_file->f_path for regular files. This restores the behavior of commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") for overlayfs and also fixes the same problem for the other backing_file_open() callers, fuse passthrough and erofs ishare, when their user file is itself a backing file. backing_tmpfile_open() has the same pattern but is not affected: it is only called by ovl_create_tmpfile() for the upper layer, and another overlayfs is rejected as upperdir by the DCACHE_OP_REAL check in ovl_mount_dir_check(), so its user_file can never be a backing file. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80946 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring The fuse-io-uring transport copies req->in.h out to the ring in fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req->out.h back in fuse_uring_commit(). Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache (fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and panics: usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'fuse_request' (offset 56, size 40)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90) Call Trace: __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268) __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223) copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618) fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785) fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306) tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233) io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84) io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278) __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches stack memory, not the slab object. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80860 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix race between interrupt and resend After commit f8fce75fedf7 ("fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req") the WARN_ON(!list_empty(&req->intr_entry)) in fuse_request_free() still triggers due to the following race: In request_wait_answer() if (test_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags)) -> returns true In fuse_chan_resend() clear_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags) In request_wait_answer() queue_interrupt(req) Fix by: - move clearing FR_SENT inside fpq->lock - move setting FR_PENDING inside fiq->lock - recheck FR_SENT after acquiring fiq->lock in fuse_dev_queue_interrupt() | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80859 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix missing barrier when checking io-uring readiness fuse_block_alloc() reads fch->initialized and then fch->io_uring. fch->io_uring is set before fch->initialized, ordered by the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_intialized(), but fuse_block_alloc() has no matching read barrier between the two loads. This may lead a CPU to observe fch->initialized=1 but fch->io_uring=0, and skip the check that blocks request allocation until the io-uring queues are ready. This can reintroduce the lock-order inversion deadlock that commit 3393ff964e0f prevents. Add an smp_rmb() barrier to pair with the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_initialized() to prevent this. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80858 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: publish io-uring queues with release semantics fuse_uring_create_queue() initializes a fuse_ring_queue and then publishes the pointer into ring->queues[qid] with WRITE_ONCE() under the fch->lock. There are several readers that may concurrently be fetching that pointer locklessly and then deferencing it. WRITE_ONCE() doesn't ensure ordering of the queue's field initialization before the ring->queues[qid] pointer assignment. The queue must be published with smp_store_release() so the field initialization is guaranteed to happen before. Readers in paths where the read may happen concurrently with the store need to use READ_ONCE() because any race involving a plain access is undefined. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80857 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: wait for FR_FINISHED on abort_on_kill to prevent use-after-free The abort_on_kill path in request_wait_answer() calls fuse_abort_conn() and returns without waiting for FR_FINISHED. If fuse_dev_do_write() is concurrently processing the same request (FR_LOCKED set), the caller frees req->args while it is still being accessed, causing a use-after-free. Fix this by jumping to the existing wait_event(FR_FINISHED) instead of returning early. The wait will not hang because fuse_abort_conn() ensures all requests are ended. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80856 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem. For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set: truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-80855 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock. fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain: open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC) └─ fuse_open() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts() └─ dax_break_layout() └─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE └─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2025-68199 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: codetag: debug: handle existing CODETAG_EMPTY in mark_objexts_empty for slabobj_ext When alloc_slab_obj_exts() fails and then later succeeds in allocating a slab extension vector, it calls handle_failed_objexts_alloc() to mark all objects in the vector as empty. As a result all objects in this slab (slabA) will have their extensions set to CODETAG_EMPTY. Later on if this slabA is used to allocate a slabobj_ext vector for another slab (slabB), we end up with the slabB->obj_exts pointing to a slabobj_ext vector that itself has a non-NULL slabobj_ext equal to CODETAG_EMPTY. When slabB gets freed, free_slab_obj_exts() is called to free slabB->obj_exts vector. free_slab_obj_exts() calls mark_objexts_empty(slabB->obj_exts) which will generate a warning because it expects slabobj_ext vectors to have a NULL obj_ext, not CODETAG_EMPTY. Modify mark_objexts_empty() to skip the warning and setting the obj_ext value if it's already set to CODETAG_EMPTY. To quickly detect this WARN, I modified the code from WARN_ON(slab_exts[offs].ref.ct) to BUG_ON(slab_exts[offs].ref.ct == 1); We then obtained this message: [21630.898561] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [21630.898596] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:2050! [21630.898611] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP [21630.900372] Modules linked in: squashfs isofs vfio_iommu_type1 vhost_vsock vfio vhost_net vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vhost tap vhost_iotlb iommufd vsock binfmt_misc nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace netfs tls rds dns_resolver tun brd overlay ntfs3 exfat btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon raid6_pq loop sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables rfkill ip_set sunrpc vfat fat joydev sg sch_fq_codel nfnetlink virtio_gpu sr_mod cdrom drm_client_lib virtio_dma_buf drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper drm ghash_ce backlight virtio_net virtio_blk virtio_scsi net_failover virtio_console failover virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev virtio_pci virtio_pci_legacy_dev virtio_pci_modern_dev virtio virtio_ring autofs4 aes_neon_bs aes_ce_blk [last unloaded: hwpoison_inject] [21630.909177] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3787 Comm: kylin-process-m Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc1+ #74 PREEMPT(voluntary) [21630.910495] Tainted: [W]=WARN [21630.910867] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [21630.911625] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [21630.912392] pc : __free_slab+0x228/0x250 [21630.912868] lr : __free_slab+0x18c/0x250[21630.913334] sp : ffff8000a02f73e0 [21630.913830] x29: ffff8000a02f73e0 x28: fffffdffc43fc800 x27: ffff0000c0011c40 [21630.914677] x26: ffff0000c000cac0 x25: ffff00010fe5e5f0 x24: ffff000102199b40 [21630.915469] x23: 0000000000000003 x22: 0000000000000003 x21: ffff0000c0011c40 [21630.916259] x20: fffffdffc4086600 x19: fffffdffc43fc800 x18: 0000000000000000 [21630.917048] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [21630.917837] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff70001405ee66 [21630.918640] x11: 1ffff0001405ee65 x10: ffff70001405ee65 x9 : ffff800080a295dc [21630.919442] x8 : ffff8000a02f7330 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000003000 [21630.920232] x5 : 0000000024924925 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000007 [21630.921021] x2 : 0000000000001b40 x1 : 000000000000001f x0 : 0000000000000001 [21630.921810] Call trace: [21630.922130] __free_slab+0x228/0x250 (P) [21630.922669] free_slab+0x38/0x118 [21630.923079] free_to_partial_list+0x1d4/0x340 [21630.923591] __slab_free+0x24c/0x348 [21630.924024] ___cache_free+0xf0/0x110 [21630.924468] qlist_free_all+0x78/0x130 [21630.924922] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x11 ---truncated--- | 14 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-27. NVD cursor: 2026-10-28 23:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.