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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-57740 | 8.8 high | 1.0% | fortinet, fortiproxy, fortipam, fortios | An Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability [CWE-122] in FortiOS version 7.6.2 and below, version 7.4.7 and below, version 7.2.10 and below, 7.0 all versions, 6.4 all versions; FortiPAM version 1.5.0, version 1.4.2 and below, 1.3 all versions, 1.2 all versions, 1.1 all versions, 1.0 all versions and FortiProxy version 7.6.2 and below, version 7.4.3 and below, 7.2 all versions, 7.0 all versions RDP bookmark connection may allow an authenticated user to execute unauthorized code via crafted requests. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-32316 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | jqlang, jq | jq is a command-line JSON processor. An integer overflow vulnerability exists through version 1.8.1 within the jvp_string_append() and jvp_string_copy_replace_bad functions, where concatenating strings with a combined length exceeding 2^31 bytes causes a 32-bit unsigned integer overflow in the buffer allocation size calculation, resulting in a drastically undersized heap buffer. Subsequent memory copy operations then write the full string data into this undersized buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow classified as CWE-190 (Integer Overflow) leading to CWE-122 (Heap-based Buffer Overflow). Any system evaluating untrusted jq queries is affected, as an attacker can crash the process or potentially achieve further exploitation through heap corruption by crafting queries that produce extremely large strings. The root cause is the absence of string size bounds checking, unlike arrays and objects which already have size limits. The issue has been addressed in commit e47e56d226519635768e6aab2f38f0ab037c09e5. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-10849 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | zephyrproject, zephyr | The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in response_json_cb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes response_data[downloaded_size] = '\0' — and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787). The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->body_frag_start / rsp->body_frag_len) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloaded_size + body_len, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloaded_size + body_len) > response_buffer_size) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation — 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer — skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at response_data[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write. The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation. | Fri 23 Oct |
| CVE-2025-46373 | 7.8 high | 0.00% | fortinet, forticlient | A Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability [CWE-122] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientWindows 7.4.0 through 7.4.3, FortiClientWindows 7.2.0 through 7.2.8 may allow an authenticated local IPSec user to execute arbitrary code or commands via "fortips_74.sys". The attacker would need to bypass the Windows heap integrity protections | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-103658 | 5.9 medium | 0.00% | no CPE yet | GNU Aspell 0.60.8.2 (first vulnerable version is not known) contains a heap-based buffer overflow write (CWE-122) in its read-only dictionary loader. String::reserve() in common/string.hpp computes its capacity check with a signed int ((int)s + 1), so a requested size of 0x7FFFFFFF wraps negative and the backing buffer is never grown. ReadOnlyDict::load() in modules/speller/default/readonly_ws.cpp passes the unvalidated 32-bit size fields from a .rws dictionary header into this path, so a crafted .rws file with a valid endian marker (12345678) and an oversized length field (e.g. lang_name_size = 0x7FFFFFFF) causes attacker-controlled data to be written out of bounds past an undersized heap allocation. An attacker who induces a victim to load a malicious dictionary — for example via aspell dump master <file> — can corrupt heap memory, resulting in denial of service and potentially code execution. Fixed in b830b6e and will be fixed in release 0.60.8.3. | 16 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-27. NVD cursor: 2026-10-28 20:19. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.