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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-5627 | 7.2 high | 1.0% | mintplexlabs, anythingllm | A path traversal vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm versions up to and including 1.9.1, within the `AgentFlows` component. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of user input in the `loadFlow` and `deleteFlow` methods in `server/utils/agentFlows/index.js`. Specifically, the combination of `path.join` and `normalizePath` allows attackers to bypass directory restrictions and access or delete arbitrary `.json` files on the server. This can lead to information disclosure, such as leaking sensitive configuration files containing API keys, or denial of service by deleting critical files like `package.json`. The issue is resolved in version 1.12.1. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2025-63390 | 5.3 medium | 1.0% | mintplexlabs, anythingllm | An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in AnythingLLM v1.8.5 in via the /api/workspaces endpoint. The endpoint fails to implement proper authentication checks, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to enumerate and retrieve detailed information about all configured workspaces. Exposed data includes: workspace identifiers (id, name, slug), AI model configurations (chatProvider, chatModel, agentProvider), system prompts (openAiPrompt), operational parameters (temperature, history length, similarity thresholds), vector search settings, chat modes, and timestamps. | 13 Oct |
| CVE-2026-72917 | 5.9 medium | 0.00% | no CPE yet | AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. From 1.0.0 to 1.15.0, AnythingLLM's unauthenticated account-recovery flow in server/utils/PasswordRecovery/index.js uses recoverAccount() to deduplicate the raw recoveryCodes values before trimming them, so one valid code submitted twice with different surrounding whitespace can satisfy the two-code check. Each normalized value can also match the same stored hash instead of consuming a distinct hash. An attacker who knows the target username and one recovery code can call POST /api/system/recover-account in multi-user mode, receive a password-reset token, and use POST /api/system/reset-password to take over the account, including an administrator account. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-41318 | 5.4 medium | 0.00% | mintplexlabs, anythingllm | AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt="..."` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-48789 | 4.3 medium | 0.00% | no CPE yet | AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to 1.13.0, on Windows, the document folder listing route can accept an encoded absolute Windows path that resolves outside the intended documents directory. The shared path containment helper rejects POSIX-style "../" traversal but does not reject Windows-style parent paths returned by path.relative(), such as "..". This vulnerability is fixed in 1.13.0. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-55611 | 0.0 none | 0.00% | no CPE yet | AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. From 1.11.1 until 1.14.1, userId/workspaceId scoping to the parsed-files read/delete paths was added. However, the POST /api/workspace/:slug/embed-parsed-file/:fileId flow still deletes the target file by primary key only, with no ownership check, inside two finally{} blocks that run even when the ownership-checked read fails. As a result a manager or admin (multi-user mode) can delete any other user's parsed file in any workspace — including workspaces they are not a member of — by enumerating integer fileIds. The server even returns "File not found" while still deleting the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.14.1. | Sun 25 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.