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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-58412 | 8.2 high | — | filecoin-project, filecoin-pin | Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. Prior to 1.1.0, the upload GitHub Action's fork detection in `upload-action/src/build.js` checks only `event.pull_request`. In the documented two-workflow pattern, an untrusted fork pull-request workflow produces an artifact and a privileged `workflow_run` workflow downloads and uploads it. Because `workflow_run` has no `event.pull_request`, `isForkPR` becomes false and `uploadStatus` becomes `pending-upload`. The action later resolves `workflow_run.pull_requests` without repeating the fork check before initializing the wallet with `walletPrivateKey` and uploading the artifact. An external contributor can therefore cause attacker-controlled artifacts to be stored using the repository owner's Filecoin wallet, incurring unauthorized storage expenditure, dataset pollution and consumption of configured wallet funds. Disclosure of the wallet private key is not required. The 0.x action line is not receiving a backport and must be migrated to a fixed 1.x release. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.0. | 17 h ago |
| CVE-2026-62300 | 6.5 medium | — | filecoin-project, filecoin-pin | Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. In daemon deployments up to and including version 1.1.0, `POST /pins` in `src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts` checks a caller-supplied CID with `CID.parse` and passes it to `pinStore.pin`, but does not enforce request rate limits or per-user quotas. In `src/filecoin-pin-store.ts`, each pin independently schedules `_processPinInBackground` with `setTimeout` without a queue, semaphore or concurrency cap, then recursively traverses the full DAG using `helia.pins.add(cid)`. The per-pin Helia/Bitswap node in `src/create-pinning-helia.ts` has no application-level byte, block or traversal-time limits. Blocks are written under `carStoragePath` by `src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts` and `src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts`, with `stats.totalSize` updated only after writing. An authenticated caller, or an anonymous caller when `ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true`, can submit large DAGs and exhaust disk, network, CPU, memory and libp2p resources, causing service degradation or host/process failure and leaving partial CAR files requiring recovery. The default localhost binding and token requirement reduce exposure. Because nodes have no bootstrap or mDNS configuration, a CID alone may not be fetchable, but caller-supplied `origins` can point to a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p source; concurrent requests accelerate resource pressure. Version 1.1.1 documents operational mitigations but does not implement the missing resource controls. | 17 h ago |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-30. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.