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| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33555exploit | 5.8 medium | 0.00% | haproxy | An issue was discovered in HAProxy before 3.3.6. The HTTP/3 parser does not check that the received body length matches a previously announced content-length when the stream is closed via a frame with an empty payload. This can cause desynchronization issues with the backend server and could be used for request smuggling. The earliest affected version is 2.6. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-39806 | 8.7 high | 1.0% | mtrudel, bandit | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via worker process exhaustion. 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':do_read_chunked_data!/5 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex terminates only when the last-chunk line 0\r\n is followed immediately by the empty trailer line \r\n. RFC 9112 §7.1.2 permits zero or more trailer fields between them. When trailers are present, none of the match clauses fit: the catch-all arm computes a negative to_read, calls read_available!/2, receives <<>> on timeout, and tail-recurses with unchanged state. The worker process is pinned for the lifetime of the TCP connection. A handful of concurrent connections sending RFC-conformant chunked requests with trailer fields is sufficient to exhaust the Bandit worker pool and render the server unresponsive to all further traffic. No authentication, special headers, or large payload is required. Proxies such as NGINX and HAProxy legitimately forward trailer-bearing requests, so servers behind such proxies may be affected without any malicious client involvement. This issue affects bandit: from 1.6.1 before 1.11.1. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-110353 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | no CPE yet | HAProxy 3.2 before 3.4.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service (worker-thread CPU exhaustion) via a truncated HTTP/2 PING frame. h2c_handle_ping in src/mux_h2.c does not check for a short read, unlike the other H2 frame handlers. Because the incomplete frame cannot be processed, its data is never consumed, and the H2 multiplexer tasklet is repeatedly woken by that pending data without making progress. The CPU spins until timeout http-request closes the connection, and an attacker opening many such connections can sustain high CPU usage. | 22 Oct |
| CVE-2026-110354 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | no CPE yet | HAProxy 3 before 3.4.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service (persistent worker-thread CPU exhaustion) via an HTTP/1.1 chunked request. Although the H1 multiplexer drains the request before closing the stream, the parser repeatedly re-processes the same bytes without making progress. The affected thread stays busy at 100% CPU after timeouts expire and after the client disconnects, and repeated requests can consume all worker threads until the process is restarted. | 22 Oct |
| CVE-2025-11230 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | haproxy, aloha_appliance, haproxy_enterprise | Inefficient algorithm complexity in mjson in HAProxy allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via specially crafted JSON requests. | 18 Oct |
| CVE-2026-93564 | 7.5 high | 1.0% | no CPE yet | A flaw was found in Netty. A reference-count leak in the HAProxy PROXY-v2 message decoder allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to send specially crafted PROXY-protocol v2 headers. This can lead to memory exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected system. | 15 Oct |
| CVE-2026-48772 | 10.0 critical | 0.00% | proxysql | ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 2.0.0 through 3.0.8, the ProxySQL MySQL frontend accepts the `PROXY UNKNOWN <addr> <addr> <port> <port>\r\n` PP1 frame as a well-formed PROXY protocol header. The HAProxy PROXY protocol v1 specification says that when the protocol token is `UNKNOWN`, the receiver MUST ignore any address fields that follow it, because the proxy has declared it cannot determine the client identity. ProxySQL parses those address fields anyway via `sscanf` and writes the spoofed source address into the session's `addr.addr` field. From there it flows directly into the query-rule matcher, where the `client_addr` predicate decides routing and ACL. When `mysql-proxy_protocol_networks = '*'` (the default), any TCP peer can send a PP1 frame and choose any source IP claim. With that, any `mysql_query_rules` row pinned to a `client_addr` value is forgeable: the attacker writes the address they want to match into the PP1 line, and ProxySQL routes their query as if it came from that address. In practice this is a routing and ACL bypass. Real deployments use `client_addr` for read-write splitting (internal apps go to the primary, public traffic to read replicas), per-app schema pinning, and query-filter rules (DDL allowed only from admin CIDR, public queries blocked from dangerous patterns). An attacker that can reach the frontend port can forge their way into any of those routes. Version 3.0.9 patches this issue. | Sun 25 Oct |
| CVE-2026-109575 | 9.8 critical | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In HAProxy Data Plane API 2.2.0 through 3.4.3 (and corresponding Enterprise Edition releases), Server.ConfigureAPI() has process-global authentication logic that improperly drops security controls across multiple transport types. When a TLS Certificate Authority (tls_ca) is configured and a numeric TLS port (tls_port) is specified, the application globally disables Basic authentication on its shared internal request handler. Because this handler is shared concurrently among HTTP, HTTPS, and UNIX domain socket listeners, and mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificate verification (tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert) is enforced exclusively on the HTTPS server path, all other simultaneously active non-mTLS listeners fail open. Consequently, an unauthenticated attacker capable of reaching an affected HTTP or UNIX management endpoint can completely bypass credentials to gain full API administrative access. This allows unauthorized remote or local actors to read sensitive, cleartext HAProxy configuration data or replace the managed configuration entirely via the raw configuration endpoint. This has been fixed in versions 3.4.4, 3.3.9, 3.2.17, 3.0.25, 2.9.29, and their respective EE backports by migrating to a per-request TLS connection-state validation model. | 16 Oct |
| CVE-2026-55203 | 9.0 critical | 0.00% | haproxy | HAProxy through 3.4.0, fixed in commit 5985276, contains an integer overflow vulnerability in the fcgi_conn structure's drl field that allows buffer misparse as new FCGI record headers. When contentLength is 65535 and paddingLength is 1 or more, the drl field wraps to 0, causing incorrect record consumption and allowing malicious FastCGI backends to desynchronize the FCGI framing parser, potentially causing request routing errors, response smuggling, or memory safety issues. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2026-55204 | 8.7 high | 0.00% | haproxy | HAProxy through 3.4.0, fixed in commit 9a6d1fe, contains a null pointer dereference vulnerability in hpack_dht_insert() within src/hpack-tbl.c that fails to validate the return value of hpack_dht_defrag() when the memory pool is exhausted. An attacker can trigger HPACK dynamic table insertions under memory pressure to dereference a NULL pointer and crash HAProxy worker processes, causing denial of service. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2025-59303 | 6.4 medium | 0.00% | no CPE yet | HAProxy Kubernetes Ingress Controller before 3.1.13, when the config-snippets feature flag is used, accepts config snippets from users with create/update permissions. This can result in obtaining an ingress token secret as a response. The fixed versions of HAProxy Enterprise Kubernetes Ingress Controller are 3.0.16-ee1, 1.11.13-ee1, and 1.9.15-ee1. | 8 Oct |
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EPSS scores: 2026-10-29. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.