Vulnerabilities
All
My stack
Known exploited
Public exploit
Critical (9+)
Likely exploited (EPSS ≥ 50%)
Changed, 24 h
New, 24 h
Sort:
risk
modified
published
CVSS
EPSS
| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | Vendor, product | Description | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-65110 | 9.3 critical | 1.0% | vega_project, vega | Vega is a visualization grammar, a declarative format for creating, saving, and sharing interactive visualization designs. Prior to versions 6.1.2 and 5.6.3, applications meeting two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" expressionInterpreter is used. First, they use `vega` in an application that attaches both `vega` library and a `vega.View` instance similar to the Vega Editor to the global `window`, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope. Second, they allow user-defined Vega `JSON` definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code). This vulnerability allows for DOM XSS, potentially stored, potentially reflected, depending on how the library is being used. The vulnerability requires user interaction with the page to trigger. An attacker can exploit this issue by tricking a user into opening a malicious Vega specification. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application’s domain. This can lead to theft of sensitive information such as authentication tokens, manipulation of data displayed to the user, or execution of unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. This exploit compromises confidentiality and integrity of impacted applications.Patched versions are available in `[email protected]` (requires ESM) for Vega v6 and `[email protected]` (no ESM needed) for Vega v5. As a workaround, do not attach `vega` or `vega.View` instances to global variables or the window as the editor used to do. This is a development-only debugging practice that should not be used in any situation where Vega/Vega-lite definitions can come from untrusted parties. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2025-59840 | 8.1 high | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Vega is a visualization grammar, a declarative format for creating, saving, and sharing interactive visualization designs. In Vega prior to version 6.2.0, applications meeting 2 conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" expressionInterpreter is used. They are vulnerable if they use `vega` in an application that attaches `vega` library and a `vega.View` instance similar to the Vega Editor to the global `window` and if they allow user-defined Vega `JSON` definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code). Patches are available in the following Vega applications. If using the latest Vega line (6.x), upgrade to `vega` `6.2.0` / `vega-expression` `6.1.0` / `vega-interpreter` `2.2.1` (if using AST evaluator mode). If using Vega in a non-ESM environment, upgrade to `vega-expression` `5.2.1` / `1.2.1` (if using AST evaluator mode). Some workarounds are available. Do not attach `vega` View instances to global variables, and do not attach `vega` to the global window. These practices of attaching the vega library and View instances may be convenient for debugging, but should not be used in production or in any situation where vega/vega-lite definitions could be provided by untrusted parties. | 19 Oct |
| CVE-2026-3323 | 7.5 high | 0.00% | vega, vegapuls_6x_firmware | An unsecured configuration interface on affected devices allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access sensitive information, including hashed credentials and access codes. | Mon 26 Oct |
| CVE-2025-66648 | 6.1 medium | 0.00% | vega-functions_project, vega-functions | vega-functions provides function implementations for the Vega expression language. Prior to version 6.1.1, for sites that allow users to supply untrusted user input, malicious use of an internal function (not part of the public API) could be used to run unintentional javascript (XSS). This issue is fixed in vega-functions `6.1.1`. There is no workaround besides upgrading. Using `vega.expressionInterpreter` as described in CSP safe mode does not prevent this issue. | 14 Oct |
| CVE-2026-61952 | 4.9 medium | 0.00% | no CPE yet | Missing Authorization vulnerability in Jose Vega WooCommerce Bulk Edit Products – WP Sheet Editor woo-bulk-edit-products allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WooCommerce Bulk Edit Products – WP Sheet Editor: from n/a through <= 1.8.21. | Sat 24 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90099 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted. Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to: - the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes); - the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw, cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32; - the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion. Also fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the IDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the errout path kfree'd fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer in the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable on demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable and burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu failure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern. Note: [email protected] provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to extend to the other classifiers. Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used), CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn), or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN. - Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo ingress ... <classifier> ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup: system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel memory outside memcg charging. | 21 Oct |
| CVE-2026-90058 | unscored | 0.00% | no CPE yet | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len() to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock, producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by [email protected]. Cap the final qdisc_pkt_len() to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX so the size-table amplification cannot drive deficit schedulers into an unbounded loop. A legitimate size table (e.g. qfq's overhead 999999999, which is handled by dropping) is still accepted. Introduce cap QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 << 20) = 1 MiB which is well above any legitimate single-skb wire length: the largest current skb->len is GSO_MAX_SIZE (524280), and an ATM-style size table (53/48 cell tax) amplifies that to ~578 KB, both comfortably below 1 MiB. At the same time, 1 MiB bounds the deficit refill loop to ~1M iterations per packet with quantum=1, which completes in a few milliseconds well under the demonstrated softlockup threshold (~10^9 iterations). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y (or CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y). - Attach a DRR (or ETS) root qdisc with a crafted TCA_STAB that amplifies qdisc_pkt_len to ~1 GiB (e.g. size_log=15, data=[32768]). - Add a class with a tiny quantum of 1 and send one small packet; the deficit loop spins billions of times under the qdisc lock and trips the softlockup detector (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1). - Reachable as root or from an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn) with namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN. | 19 Oct |
7 of 7
Download these 7 as CSV · subscribe to this list.
EPSS scores: 2026-10-28. NVD cursor: 2026-10-29 00:22. The News page shows only notable CVEs (KEV, your stack, new criticals, EPSS over 50%, or active exploitation per SSVC); this table has all of them.