Learn: where a rule comes from
The ladder gives you the four words — standard, baseline, control, setting. This page answers the next question: who wrote the rulebook, and under whose authority. Every control on this site arrived by the same route. A law obliges somebody to act; a policy says what acting looks like; a framework structures the work; a catalogue holds the controls; a baseline picks the ones your kind of system gets; a setting is how one of them is enforced on a real device; and a check proves it was. Each step below names its publishers, with the address their own words live at and what it takes to read them.
The chain, in one picture
- Law and contract what obliges anyone to do this at all
- Policy what the government or agency directs, under that law
- Framework how the work is structured: categorise, select, assess, authorise
- Control catalogue the controls themselves, written once for everyone
- Baseline the controls chosen for one kind of system
- Configuration setting how a control is enforced on a real device
- Check and evidence how conformance is expressed, measured and proved
Nothing is obliged to use the whole chain. A private business usually joins at the framework or the setting and has no policy rung at all; a DoD system has every rung and a second committee besides. That is what "normalised" means in practice, and the three traces below walk it.
Who publishes what, and for whom
The rows are the steps of the chain; the columns are who the publisher writes for. Reading across one row answers the question this page exists for: the same job, as NIST, DISA, NASA, CIS and the ACSC each answer it. Showing NASA alone.
| Step | NASAan agency's own layer above NIST |
|---|---|
| Law and contractwhat obliges anyone to do this at all | FISMA 2014 |
| Policywhat the government or agency directs, under that law | OMB Circular A-130NPR 2810.1 |
| Frameworkhow the work is structured: categorise, select, assess, authorise | FIPS 199 and FIPS 200NIST SP 800-37 (RMF) |
| Control cataloguethe controls themselves, written once for everyone | NIST SP 800-53NIST SP 800-53A |
| Baselinethe controls chosen for one kind of system | NIST SP 800-53BNASA-SPEC-2600 (ASCS)macOS Security Compliance Project |
| Configuration settinghow a control is enforced on a real device | DISA STIGsMicrosoft security baselinesCIS Benchmarks |
| Check and evidencehow conformance is expressed, measured and proved | Control Correlation IdentifiersOSCALSCAP and the National Checklist Program |
The same control, traced three ways
One control — a device that locks itself after a period of inactivity — carried down three different ladders. The control barely changes. Everything above and below it does.
No trace written for NASA yet; all three are above.
How they are normalised
Four mechanisms do nearly all the work of turning one body's rules into another's, and each one is public.
- Control Correlation Identifiers — DISA breaks each NIST SP 800-53 control statement into single testable assertions and numbers them. A STIG rule cites the CCI, the CCI names the control, and a pile of findings about registry values becomes an answer about controls. This is the one joint that makes a DoD scan report legible to a civilian assessor.
- OSCAL — a catalogue, a profile and a baseline as data rather than prose. A baseline becomes a document that says "this catalogue, these controls, these parameters", which a program resolves. It is how this instance reads 800-53 and 800-171 at all.
- SCAP and the National Checklist Program — XCCDF for the checklist, OVAL for the test, and the National Checklist Program as the public shelf. The same STIG exists twice: as prose for a person and as content for a scanner.
- macOS Security Compliance Project — the worked example. Each macOS rule carries its references to 800-53, 800-171, the STIG, CIS and CMMC at once, and the build emits whichever baseline you asked for. One rule, many citations: that is normalisation done at the source instead of afterwards.
And the two paths into private business
Nothing on this page obliges a company by itself. Federal rules reach private business two ways. By contract: DFARS 252.204-7012 flows NIST SP 800-171 down to every defense supplier, and CMMC audits it; FAR 52.204-21 sets a fifteen-requirement floor in almost every other federal contract. By market: FedRAMP baselines is met once and sold to every agency. Everything else — NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Critical Security Controls, ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 — is adopted because a customer asked or because it is a good idea, and a company can leave at any time. Which of those applies to you is the first thing to settle, because it decides whether the rest of this page is a requirement or a reading list.
What this site does with all of it
One pipeline, the same for every publisher: fetch, keep the exact bytes, normalise into requirements or settings, diff field by field against the previous version, and record the publisher's own stated reason where there is one. So the change register can show a control before and after; Controls searches every tracked catalogue at once; and Baselines builds the strictest published set for a platform and lets you trim it. A machine-generated summary is always labelled as one, and never replaces the publisher's words.
Every body, with its source
16 of 35 publishers, writing for NASA · show all
US Congress (44 U.S.C. ch. 35)
The statute that makes every federal agency run an information security programme, and makes NIST's standards mandatory for the systems it covers.
This is the root of nearly every rule on this site. A federal control exists because FISMA says the agency must have one, not because a vendor recommends it.
- Derives from
- nothing on this page — it is a root
- Feeds into
- OMB Circular A-130, CISA directives, DoDI 8500.01 and 8510.01, NPR 2810.1, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, NIST SP 800-37 (RMF), NIST SP 800-53
- Read it at
- The Act (S.2521, 113th Congress) public
- NIST's FISMA background public
US Office of Management and Budget
The circular that tells agencies how to manage information as a resource, security and privacy included, and binds them to the NIST framework.
FISMA says an agency must have a programme; A-130 is what that programme has to look like.
- Derives from
- FISMA 2014
- Feeds into
- NPR 2810.1, NIST SP 800-37 (RMF), FedRAMP baselines
- Read it at
- Circular A-130 public
NASA Office of the CIO
NASA's own procedural requirements for the security of information and information systems, in the NODIS directives library.
An agency's own layer sits between NIST and the machine. NASA's requirements are NASA's, and they are stricter in places than the NIST publication they rest on.
- Derives from
- FISMA 2014, OMB Circular A-130
- Feeds into
- NASA-SPEC-2600 (ASCS)
- Read it at
- NODIS directives library public
- NASA cybersecurity policy public the quarterly reference that enumerates every NASA document
- On this instance
- as of 2026-09-15 · 1 version held · every version and what changed loaded 20 Oct
NIST
FIPS 199 categorises a system low, moderate or high against confidentiality, integrity and availability; FIPS 200 sets the minimum requirements that follow.
The hinge of the whole federal chain: the category a system is given here is what decides which baseline it gets later.
- Derives from
- FISMA 2014
- Feeds into
- NIST SP 800-37 (RMF), NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-53B
- Read it at
NIST
The Risk Management Framework: seven steps from preparing and categorising through selecting, implementing, assessing, authorising and monitoring controls.
The framework is the verb and the catalogue is the noun. RMF is how a control gets selected, assessed and signed off by somebody with a name.
- Derives from
- FISMA 2014, OMB Circular A-130, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- SP 800-37 Rev. 2 public
NIST
The control catalogue: roughly a thousand controls and enhancements in twenty families, each a statement of what must be true, with discussion and related controls.
The single most derived-from document in this whole registry. STIGs, FedRAMP, 800-171, CNSSI 1253, the mSCP and NASA's own specifications all cut their rules out of this one.
- Derives from
- FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200
- Feeds into
- NIST SP 800-53A, NIST SP 800-53B, CNSSI 1253, DISA Security Requirements Guides, NASA-SPEC-2600 (ASCS), macOS Security Compliance Project, Control Correlation Identifiers, OSCAL, SCAP and the National Checklist Program, CSET (CISA's assessment tool)
- Read it at
- SP 800-53 Rev. 5 public
- Release search (the controls themselves) public
- OSCAL content on GitHub public the machine-readable catalogue this instance reads
- On this instance
- 5.2.0 · 4 versions held · every version and what changed loaded Fri 23 Oct
NIST
The assessment procedures for the catalogue: for each control, what an assessor examines, interviews and tests.
The half of the catalogue people forget. A control says what must be true; 800-53A says what would convince somebody that it is.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53 (and further up: FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- SP 800-53A Rev. 5 public
- On this instance
- tracked as a source, nothing loaded yet
NIST
The low, moderate and high control baselines, plus the privacy baseline, and the tailoring and overlay rules for adjusting them.
Where categorisation turns into a list. FIPS 199 says 'moderate'; 800-53B says which of the thousand controls that means.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200 (and further up: FISMA 2014)
- Feeds into
- NIST SP 800-171, FedRAMP baselines
- Read it at
- SP 800-53B public
- On this instance
- 5.2.0 · 16 versions held · every version and what changed loaded Fri 23 Oct
NASA OCIO — Cybersecurity Standards and Engineering Team (CSET)
The enumeration of NASA's Agency Security Configuration Standards: the agency's own per-platform hardening specifications, taken from NIST checklists, CIS Benchmarks, DISA STIGs and vendor guidance.
The worked example of an agency layer. NASA does not simply adopt a STIG; CSET reconciles the sources and issues a NASA-approved specification, and that is what a NASA machine is built to.
- Derives from
- NPR 2810.1, NIST SP 800-53, DISA STIGs, CIS Benchmarks (and further up: FISMA 2014, OMB Circular A-130, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, DISA Security Requirements Guides, CIS Critical Security Controls, CNSSI 1253, DoDI 8500.01 and 8510.01, CNSS policy)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- CSET (the specifications) agency sign-in NASA sign-in; the specifications themselves are internal
- NTSS (NASA standards) agency sign-in
- Cybersecurity Policy Reference public the public quarterly list of every NASA document, tracked here
- On this instance
- as of 2026-09-15 · 1 version held · every version and what changed loaded 20 Oct
NIST, with DISA, NASA and the Los Alamos National Laboratory
One rule set per macOS release, each rule carrying its references to 800-53, 800-171, the STIG, CIS and CMMC, from which any of those baselines can be generated.
The cleanest answer on this page to 'how are these normalised?'. One rule, many citations, and a build step that emits whichever baseline you asked for.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-171, CIS Benchmarks, DISA STIGs, CNSSI 1253 (and further up: FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, NIST SP 800-53B, DFARS 252.204-7012, CIS Critical Security Controls, DISA Security Requirements Guides, CNSS policy, DoDI 8500.01 and 8510.01)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- macos_security on GitHub public
- On this instance
- iOS 26 Guidance, Revision 3.0 (6262df0) · 3 versions held · every version and what changed loaded 20 Oct
DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency)
Security Technical Implementation Guides: per-product rules, each with a severity (CAT I, II, III), the exact check text and the exact fix text.
The most concrete rung there is, and the reason this site exists. A STIG rule tells you the command to run, which no catalogue ever does — and because it is free and public, it is read far outside the DoD.
- Derives from
- DISA Security Requirements Guides (and further up: NIST SP 800-53, CNSSI 1253, DoDI 8500.01 and 8510.01, FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, CNSS policy)
- Feeds into
- NASA-SPEC-2600 (ASCS), macOS Security Compliance Project, DISA STIG GPO package, DISA STIG Intune package
- Read it at
- STIG downloads public
- STIG Viewer and tools public
- On this instance
- V1R1 · 19 versions held · every version and what changed loaded 20 Oct
Microsoft
The vendor's own recommended settings for each Windows and Office release, shipped as GPO backups and policy rules in the Security Compliance Toolkit.
The vendor is a publisher too, and often the first one: Microsoft's baseline for a new Windows release lands months before the STIG for it does.
- Derives from
- nothing on this page — it is a root
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- Windows security baselines public
- Security Compliance Toolkit public what this instance reads
- On this instance
- v2 · 10 versions held · every version and what changed loaded 15 Oct
Center for Internet Security
Consensus hardening benchmarks per platform at two levels, each recommendation with its audit and remediation steps and its rationale.
The private sector's STIG. Free to read under CIS's own terms, licensed for use, and the thing most non-government hardening actually derives from.
- Derives from
- CIS Critical Security Controls
- Feeds into
- NASA-SPEC-2600 (ASCS), macOS Security Compliance Project
- Read it at
- CIS Benchmarks free account
- CIS WorkBench free account where the owner's own PDF copy comes from
- On this instance
- tracked as a source, nothing loaded yet
DISA
A list that breaks each 800-53 control statement into single testable assertions, each with a CCI number that a STIG rule then cites.
The joint in the whole machine. A CCI is how 'this registry value' gets back to 'AC-11', and so how a pile of STIG findings becomes an answer about controls.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53 (and further up: FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- CCI list public
- On this instance
- 2026-07-14 · 1 version held · every version and what changed loaded 17 Oct
NIST
The Open Security Controls Assessment Language: catalogues, profiles, baselines, implementation statements and assessment results as JSON, XML or YAML.
The format that makes any of this computable. A baseline as an OSCAL profile is a document that says 'this catalogue, these controls, these parameters' — which a program can resolve, and a person cannot be trusted to.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53 (and further up: FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- OSCAL public
- NIST's OSCAL content public
SCAP and the National Checklist Program
Check and evidenceUS federal civilianUS defensePrivate businessNASANIST
XCCDF for the checklist, OVAL for the test, CPE for the product, and the NCP repository that holds the published checklists for each platform.
This is what a scanner reads. The same STIG exists as prose for a person and as SCAP content for a tool, and the NCP is the public shelf both come off.
- Derives from
- NIST SP 800-53 (and further up: FISMA 2014, FIPS 199 and FIPS 200)
- Feeds into
- nothing here derives from it yet
- Read it at
- National Checklist Program repository public
- SCAP public
Names that collide
Most of the difficulty in learning this field is that several different things share a name. Each reading below is real; none of them is the wrong answer, so the thing to do is say which one you mean.
- CSET
- NASA OCIO — the Cybersecurity Standards and Engineering Team, which writes NASA's own configuration specifications (the ASCS set). source agency sign-in
- CISA — the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool, free software for assessing yourself against a chosen standard. source public
- Georgetown University — the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, a policy research centre — no controls, no baselines. source public
- FISMA, not FISA
- FISMA — the Federal Information Security Modernization Act: the statute behind every federal control on this site. source public
- FISA — the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: surveillance authority law. It publishes no controls, baselines or standards, and nothing on this site derives from it. source public
- CSI
- NIST, CSRC and NVD
- 800-53, 800-53A, 800-53B
What this page is not
It is not legal advice, and it is not a compliance determination: whether a given system is obliged to meet a given baseline is a question for the people who authorise it. Every link here goes to a publisher's own address, and the access chip says what that publisher requires of a reader — this site adds no access to anything. Nothing restricted is reproduced here. For the vocabulary, see how to read this site; for what this instance is actually holding, All standards and the change register.