NIST platform security: roots of trust, firmware and secure enclaves FIPS 140-2
All1 OVERVIEW2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS3 FUNCTIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
| Ref | Title | Text | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | OVERVIEW | This standard specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 o | |
| 1.1 in 1 |
Security Level 1 | Security Level 1 provides the lowest level of security. Basic security requirements are specified for a cryptographic module (e.g., at least one Approved algorithm or Approved security function shall be used). No specific physical security | |
| 1.2 in 1 |
Security Level 2 | Security Level 2 enhances the physical security mechanisms of a Security Level 1 cryptographic module by adding the requirement for tamper-evidence, which includes the use of tamper-evident coatings or seals or for pick-resistant locks on r | |
| 1.3 in 1 |
Security Level 3 | In addition to the tamper-evident physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 2, Security Level 3 attempts to prevent the intruder from gaining access to CSPs held within the cryptographic module. Physical security mechanisms re | |
| 1.4 in 1 |
Security Level 4 | Security Level 4 provides the highest level of security defined in this standard. At this security level, the physical security mechanisms provide a complete envelope of protection around the cryptographic module with the intent of detectin | |
| 2 | GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS | ||
| 2.1 in 2 |
Glossary of Terms | The following definitions are tailored for use in this standard: Approved : FIPS-Approved and/or NIST-recommended. Approved mode of operation : a mode of the cryptographic module that employs only Approved security functions (not to be co | |
| 2.2 in 2 |
Acronyms | The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this standard: ANSI American National Standards Institute API Application Program Interface CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile CBC Cipher Block Chaining CC Common Crite | |
| 3 | FUNCTIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES | The security requirements specified in this standard relate to the secure design and implementation of a cryptographic module. The requirements are derived from the following high-level functional security objectives for a cryptographic mod | |
| 4 | SECURITY REQUIREMENTS | This section specifies the security requirements that shall be satisfied by cryptographic modules conforming to this standard. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These a | |
| 4.1 in 4 |
Cryptographic Module Specification | A cryptographic module shall be a set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that implements cryptographic functions or processes, including cryptographic algorithms and, optionally, key generation, and is contained wi | |
| 4.2 in 4 |
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces | A cryptographic module shall restrict all information flow and physical access points to physical ports and logical interfaces that define all entry and exit points to and from the module. The cryptographic module interfaces shall be logica | |
| 4.3 in 4 |
Roles, Services, and Authentication | A cryptographic module shall support authorized roles for operators and corresponding services within each role. Multiple roles may be assumed by a single operator. If a cryptographic module supports concurrent operators, then the module sh | |
| 4.3.1 in 4.3 |
Roles | A cryptographic module shall support the following authorized roles for operators: User Role. The role assumed to perform general security services, including cryptographic operations and other Approved security functions. Crypto Officer | |
| 4.3.2 in 4.3 |
Services | Services shall refer to all of the services, operations, or functions that can be performed by a cryptographic module. Service inputs shall consist of all data or control inputs to the cryptographic module that initiate or obtain specific s | |
| 4.3.3 in 4.3 |
Operator Authentication | Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role. Depen | |
| 4.4 in 4 |
Finite State Model | The operation of a cryptographic module shall be specified using a finite state model (or equivalent) represented by a state transition diagram and/or a state transition table. The state transition diagram and/or state transition table inc | |
| 4.5 in 4 |
Physical Security | A cryptographic module shall employ physical security mechanisms in order to restrict unauthorized physical access to the contents of the module and to deter unauthorized use or modification of the module (including substitution of the enti | |
| 4.5.1 in 4.5 |
General Physical Security Requirements | The following requirements shall apply to all physical embodiments. • Documentation shall specify the physical embodiment and the security level for which the physical security mechanisms of a cryptographic module are implemented. • Docum | |
| 4.5.2 in 4.5 |
Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules | In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to single-chip cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 There are no additional Security Level 1 requirements for single-c | |
| 4.5.3 in 4.5 |
Multiple-Chip Embedded Cryptographic Modules | In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirement shall apply to multiple-chip | |
| 4.5.4 in 4.5 |
Multiple-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Modules | In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirement shall apply to multiple-chi | |
| 4.5.5 in 4.5 |
Environmental Failure Protection/Testing | The electronic devices and circuitry are designed to operate within a particular range of environmental conditions. Deliberate or accidental excursions outside the specified normal operating ranges of voltage and temperature can cause errat | |
| 4.5.5.1 in 4.5.5 |
Environmental Failure Protection Features (Alternative 1) | Environmental failure protection (EFP) features shall protect a cryptographic module against unusual environmental conditions or fluctuations (accidental or induced) outside of the module's normal operating range that can compromise the sec | |
| 4.5.5.2 in 4.5.5 |
Environmental Failure Testing Procedures (Alternative 2) | Environmental failure testing (EFT) shall involve a combination of analysis, simulation, and testing of a cryptographic module to provide reasonable assurance that environmental conditions or fluctuations (accidental or induced) outside the | |
| 4.6 in 4 |
Operational Environment | The operational environment of a cryptographic module refers to the management of the software, firmware, and/or hardware components required for the module to operate. The operational environment can be non-modifiable (e.g., firmware conta | |
| 4.6.1 in 4.6 |
Operating System Requirements | SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirements shall apply to operating systems for Security Level 1. • For Security Level 1 only, the operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent operators ar | |
| 4.7 in 4 |
Cryptographic Key Management | The security requirements for cryptographic key management encompass the entire lifecycle of cryptographic keys, cryptographic key components, and CSPs employed by the cryptographic module. Key management includes random number and key gene | |
| 4.7.1 in 4.7 |
Random Number Generators (RNGs) | A cryptographic module may employ random number generators (RNGs). If a cryptographic module employs Approved or non-Approved RNGs in an Approved mode of operation, the data output from the RNG shall pass the continuous random number genera | |
| 4.7.2 in 4.7 |
Key Generation | A cryptographic module may generate cryptographic keys internally. Cryptographic keys generated by the cryptographic module for use by an Approved algorithm or security function shall be generated using an Approved key generation method. Ap | |
| 4.7.3 in 4.7 |
Key Establishment | Key establishment may be performed by automated methods (e.g., use of a public key algorithm), manual methods (use of a manually-transported key loading device), or a combination of automated and manual methods. If key establishment methods | |
| 4.7.4 in 4.7 |
Key Entry and Output | Cryptographic keys may be entered into or output from a cryptographic module. If cryptographic keys are entered into or output from a cryptographic module, the entry or output of keys shall be performed using either manual (e.g., via a keyb | |
| 4.7.5 in 4.7 |
Key Storage | Cryptographic keys stored within a cryptographic module shall be stored either in plaintext form or encrypted form. Plaintext secret and private keys shall not be accessible from outside the cryptographic module to unauthorized operators. | |
| 4.7.6 in 4.7 |
Key Zeroization | A cryptographic module shall provide methods to zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs within the module. Zeroization of encrypted cryptographic keys and CSPs or keys otherwise physically or logically protected | |
| 4.8 in 4 |
Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) | Cryptographic modules shall meet the following requirements for EMI/EMC. Radios are explicitly excluded from these requirements but shall meet all applicable FCC requirements. Documentation shall include proof of conformance to EMI/EMC req | |
| 4.9 in 4 |
Self-Tests | A cryptographic module shall perform power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests to ensure that the module is functioning properly. Power-up self-tests shall be performed when the cryptographic module is powered up. Conditional self-test | |
| 4.9.1 in 4.9 |
Power-Up Tests | Power-up tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module when the module is powered up (after being powered off, reset, rebooted, etc.). The power-up tests shall be initiated automatically and shall not require operator intervention. Whe | |
| 4.9.2 in 4.9 |
Conditional Tests | Conditional tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the following tests occur: pair-wise consistency test, software/firmware load test, manual key entry test, continuous random number generator t | |
| 4.10 in 4 |
Design Assurance | Design assurance refers to the use of best practices by the vendor of a cryptographic module during the design, deployment, and operation of a cryptographic module, providing assurance that the module is properly tested, configured, deliver | |
| 4.10.1 in 4.10 |
Configuration Management | Configuration management specifies the security requirements for a configuration management system implemented by a cryptographic module vendor, providing assurance that the functional requirements and specifications are realized in the imp | |
| 4.10.2 in 4.10 |
Delivery and Operation | Delivery and operation specifies the security requirements for the secure delivery, installation, and startup of a cryptographic module, providing assurance that the module is securely delivered to authorized operators, and is installed and | |
| 4.10.3 in 4.10 |
Development | Development specifies the security requirements for the representation of a cryptographic module security functionality at various levels of abstraction from the functional interface to the implementation representation. Development provide | |
| 4.10.4 in 4.10 |
Guidance Documents | Crypto officer guidance is concerned with the correct configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module. User guidance describes the security functions of the cryptographic module along with instructions, guidelines |
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